Risk based asset integrity indicators by Hassan, MD. Jakiul




RISK BASED ASSET INTEGRITY INDICATORS
by
© MD. JAKIUL HASSAN
A Thcsis submittcd to thc
School ofGraduatc Studies
in partial fulfillmcntofthe rcquircmcnts forthcdcgrccof
MASTER OF ENGINEERING
Faculty ofEnginccring and Applied Scicncc
Memorial University of Newfoundland
September 2011
St. John's Newfoundland
ABSTRACT
Currently, asset integrity is a major concern and presents challenges to the process
industry that cannot bc ignored. Asscssing asset performancc is also a difficult task, due
to the involvement of versatile tangible, as well as intangible, assets' performance
measuring parameters. Monitoring and assessing asset performance through indicators is
gaining popularity in several sectors. However, the lack of a comprehensive set of
appropriate indicators' development strategy, quantification technique, and measurement
cohesion limit the usc of an indicator system. To overcome these problems, a hierarchical
fi'amework is developed for identifying indicators and monitoring the performance of the
asset. The hierarchical structure attempts to characterize the asset and relate it 10 a
company's strategic goal. The hierarchical structure is based on the three major areas of
asset integrity, and provides an opportunity to follow bottom-up perspective for
identifying multilevel level indicators. This approach uses a risk metric to classify asset
integrity, and risk provides a common ground to integrate leading and lagging indicators.
The hierarchical structure is followed because the specific indicator results will have no
values unless they are linked to the ultimate goal for ensuring asset integrity by measuring
asset performance. Similarly, this framework and indicator will have no values unless a
mathematical model is used to quantifY the risk information. The analytical hierarchy
process is used to determine the weight or prioritization of each level indicator and the
aggregation of the indicators' outcomes arc done depending on the associated risk. This
will eventually aid in assessing asset risk based performance. To validate the developed
model and to quantify the condition of assets ofa process plant a benchmark study is
conductcd. Thc estimated index value will determine the condition of the asset based on
the performance risk index scale. As a result, the indicator system can provide a
comprehensive view on a process plant equipment status and also can Icad to the
particular consideration of trends requiringattcntion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In the process industry, asset integrity is presently a major concern. A large number of
accidents/incidents took place in process industries in the past where the failures of
equipment were found to be fundamental contributory issues. Failure of the equipment
occurred due to lack of identification and subsequent rectification of deteriorating asset
conditions. As components in a process plant operate, degradation is obvious and
continues until finally resulting in a complete breakdown. Failure to detect the asset
conditions that indicate a high likelihood for loss of containment can also result in
disaster. With these regards, it is inferable that every incident starts in conjunction with
the faulty assets operating in a process facility. The assets either lack adequate
maintenance or improper operation originates the failure scenarios. The inadequate
attention to the assets' health resulted in the following cases:
Case one: On April 8, 2004, at the Giant Industries' Ciniza oil refinery, Jamestown,
Mexico, United States, mechanics were mistaken regarding the position of the valve
wrench indicator while reinstalling a pump after repair. The consequence was a sudden
release of flammable liquid. Subsequently after about 30 to 45 seconds of the initial
release of hazardous Alkylate, fire and the first of the several explosions occurred. The
incident injured six employees and caused the evacuation of non-essential employees.
Refinery equipment and support stnlctures were damaged and the production was not
resumed until the end of 2004. The review of the repair work prior to this incident
revealed a history of repeated pump failures and showed the Giant's approach of
following break-down maintenance instead of identifying the root causes of rrequent
failure. At the same time, the LOTO procedure and the valve position indicator were also
neglected during maintenance, which resulted in this undesired event (CSB, 2005).
Case two: On the morning of November 19, 1984, a pipe used to transport light
hydrocarbons from a refinery to a storage terminal in Mexico City, Mcxico, ruptured and
an accident occurred. Corrosion had gradually weakened a certain portion of the pipeline.
The light hydrocarbons quickly found an ignition source, triggering a series of fires and
explosions, resulting in approximately 500 fatalities and destroying the LPG terminal.
The gradual degradation of the pipeline, which was either undetected or unaddressed,
resulted in the failure of the equipment. This accident represents the largest series of
major BLEVEs, and high fatality occurred because the housing was too close to the plant
area. In this case also, due to the lack of attention towards maintaining asset integrity
through routine inspection, and subsequent protection measure resulted in a catastrophic
incident (Mannan, 2005).
Case three: On May 10,2008, the largest LPG producer of Indonesia, Balongan LPG
Plant, had a major accident and had to shut down the plant for eighteen days for repair
purposes. The accident occurred because of critical failure in a fluid catalytic cracking
unit, which is a high pressure system. Consequences of this failure were significant, as the
plant supplies around 30% of LPG to national market. The company was in the excess of
twelve million US dollar production loss. The Health and Safety Executive, UK,
indicated the inability to predict or inability to anticipate in-service damage as one of the
dominant root causes of failure in pressure systems. Thus, this un-anticipated in service
damage of LPG process plant critical equipment can be considered as a failure of the
asset integrity (Clough, 2009).
Case four: On March 23, 2005, a tire and explosion occurred at BP's Texas City
Refinery in Texas City, Texas, killing 15 workers and injuring more than 180 personnel.
The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) identified several aspects of importance in this event
related to poor asset integrity. The incident occurred in an isomerisation unit in start-up
mode, with a number of important level instruments defective and some operations'
experience gaps. This eventually led to overfilling of a distillation column, and liquid
overflowed into a relief system that was directed to an atmospheric vent in the unit. The
vent system also filledwithliquid,andeventuallygasolineoverflowedfromtheventinto
the atmosphere of the process area. The failure to take effective emergency action
resulted in a loss of containment incident. The vented gasoline certainly found an ignition
source and a vapor cloud explosion occurred. The investigation reports of both Mogford
(2005) and Baker (2007) panel pointed out asset integrity related several other underlying
issues as the cause of the accident.
Ca.l'ejive: Beyond the process industries, on May 25, 1979, a DC-IO crashed on takeofTat
the Chicago's O'Hare Airport when the pylon holding the left engine to the wing failed.
The resulting crash killed 273 people including 2 on the ground. The damage to the pylon
was a result of incorrect maintenance procedures during the replacement of some internal
bearings eight weeks before the crash. Ignoring the standard procedure of removing the
engine prior to the removal of the engine pylon, both the engine and pylon were removed
atonetimeanda forklift was used to hold it in place. A failure of the forklift's hydraulic
system left the engine unsupported and damaged the pylon. The damage went unnoticed
for several flights, getting worse with each flight. Finally, during the incident, the pylon
failed and tore the left engine away fi'om the wing (CCPS-RPPS, 2007).
These are only a few brief examples of occurred incidents in different areas directly
related to lack or failure of asset integrity issues/concerns. Beyond these, there arc also
several accident scenarios in the hydrocarbon industries that arc listed in "The 100
Largest Losses 1972 - 2009" and compiled by Clough (2009). The undesired incidents in
the process facility arc some portentous signs for ncar future serious mishaps. The
investigation of accidents/incidents in process industries revealed that in most oflhe cases
the root causes of the incident were related to the negligence of asset integrity assurance
or poor asset integrity systems. These incidents are occurring routinely one after another,
and the desired integrity of asset has yet to be achieved. Much more attention is required
to maintain the integrity level of the process plant.
Besides the accident scenario, the annual unwanted downtime in North American industry
causes production loss of more or less 5% of total production, which is equivalent to
staggering US$ 20+ billion annually. The numbers show the impact of downtime on
overall performance and become a threatening issue for the survival of an industry. Much
of this can be attributed to the failure of the industry to maintain the integrity of the assets
or lack of recognition for necessary asset integrity. On the other hand, poor pertonnanee
of asset integrity runs counter to the basic objective of industry being able to operate
reliably while avoiding unwanted scenarios.
Over the last several decades, substantial improvements in the industry have been
observed in the area of lost time injury frequency (L1TF) and total recordable incident
rates (TRIR), as shown in the Figure I-I (OGP, 2010). But, satisfaction with good
occupational health and safety performance docs not ensure the occurrences of serioLIS
mishaps in the future. The recent undesired incidents in the oil and gas sectors arc some
portentous signs for ncar n.lture severe accidents. The anatomy of Texas City (2005)
incident reveals that overlooking to asset health condition, i.e. the lack of mechanical,
operational, and personnel integrity, were primarily responsible for the occurrence of the
incident. This enforces the requirement of asset integrity, which had been neglected over
the years. Again, requirement of asset integrity, in a process facility bccome more
dominant with the increasing life of assets. With the ageing condition of equipment in a
proccss plant, degradation progresses at a faster rate than expected. This causcs frequent
failurescenarios,andplantdowntimealsoincreasesasaconsequenceofotherincidents.
Engineering structures, equipment, safety systems and components playa vital role in the
process industry in fulfilling business requirements. Any threat to these components will
also threaten the performance of overall assct integrity. At the same time, most of the
process industry deals with hazardous materials, and loss of containment of these could
be catastrophic. So, the requirement of asset integrity is two-fold: one is for keeping the
equipment in operating condition and another is keeping the hazardous material inside the
containment. This could be achieved by ensuring asset integrity. Engineering integrity is
an integrated system in which every component anccts other component in overall
system. So process industries should be aware that failure to maintain the integrity of any
asset could have potential effects on humans, environment, and even on the financial
aspect of the industry.
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Figure I-I: (a) Total recordable incident rate (b) Lost time injury frequency (OGP, 2010)
Asset integrity refers to the strategies and activities intended for maintaining plant assets
or equipment to ensure that they remain available, safe, and reliable in order to operate
continuously. It includes characteristics such as design, operations, maintenance, and
inspeetionpropertytomaximizereturIl from operating assets. The importance ofertcctive
asset integrity increases as the industry assets continue to age. This issue has been
realized by the Offshore Division, HSE (2007), for the offshore installations of UK
continental shelf. Realizing the requirement of improving the integrity of installations to
overcome the risk of major accidents, they have initiated the KP3-Asset integrity
program. In addition, when there is effeetive asset integrity, industries will have safer
process plants with less accident, fewer leaks, and less damage to thc environment.
Eventually, this will cnhance the reputation of the organization. By implementing an
effective asset integrity maintaining stratcgy, industries will significantly reduce serious
damage to human livcs and to the environment. As well, industries will even have
improved business performance.
To assure integrity of assets, most of the organizations involved consultancy companies
and addressed some particular safety critical components to determine the overall plant
characteristics. Sometimes organizations carried out only the inspection and assess the
overall asset performance, ignoring the maintenance activity, human factor, and
organizational issucs. On the othcr hand, to determine the pcrformancc of the plant
organizations usually rely on the occupational health and safety performance. So,
eventually these attempts turned out to be inadequate for maintaining and monitoring
asset integrity and required a comprehcnsive approach. For ensuring asset integrity, a
holistic approach is to be developed and followed that will consider cvery aspect of asset
related issues. All threatening aspects of asset integrity should be neutralized proactively
for the target of an incident frec facility.
Monitoring the performance of asset integrity is one of the most important and
challenging issues in the assct integrity management program. Integrity monitoring
should be fact-based, rather than opinion based, and may includc the following strategies
pointedoutbyOGP(2008):
Key performance indicators (KPI), or simply performance indicators
ii. Barrier performance standard verification
iii. Audit findings
iv. Incident and accident investigations
Benchmarking and lessons learned from external events
In this research, for the purpose of monitoring, reviewing and evaluating, the asset
integrity indicator system is adopted. Catastrophic or major incidents due to loss of assel
integrity in process plant arc relatively rare but not completely avoidable. That is why it is
important to monitor asset performance and record even minor incidents which will
eventually ensure the integrity in process facilities. But, for a process facility the
indicators for monitoring asset integrity could be of quite large numbers as to cover every
aspect. Furthermore, the information through the indicators could also be in varying
characteristics and importance levels. As a result, it would not be possible, neither
practical, to use all these parameters as indicators for asset performance monitoring or
assessing. Therefore, in this research asset integrity indicator system will adopt a risk-
based approach. The selection ofOoor level indicators will be based on the characteristics
of risk associated with the events related to assets. The risk-based indicator system can
simplify the complex array of information related to asset integrity. The consideration of
risk characteristics will also allow the appropriate quantification of the indicators
outcomes and numerical figures can be obtained for further aggregation.
1.2 Asset
An asset in respect to process industry is considered as an engineered piece ofequipment
that is essential for the overall function of a process industry and critical to every
industry's performance. According to Sutton (2010), assets arc all equipment, piping,
instrumentation, electrical systems, and other physical items in a process unit. In a single
word an asset is a physical facility that is required for process opcration and has distinct
value to the organization. BSI PAS 55-1 (2008) defined asset as "Plant, machincry,
propcrty, buildings, vehicles and other items that have a distinct value to thc
organization". So, for the process industries, which run three hundred sixty five days a
year, seven days a week, and twenty tour hours a day, the need to upkeep the asscts
condition is of prime importance. Thus, management of assets' is the highcst priority for
the performance and growth of the industry. A physical asset can be considered as a
critical factor in achieving business goals. To maintain the comprchensiveness of the
asset integrity approach, this thesis will consider the aspect of tangible as wcll as
intangible assets.
1.3 Asset Integrity
CCPS-RBPS (2007) express that the primary objective of the asset integrity clement is to
help ensure reliable performance of equipment designed to contain, prevent, or mitigate
the consequences of a release of hazardous materials or energy. Searching through the
literature and different regulatory organizations' guidelines resulted in identifying five
major types of asset integrity, defined as follows:
HSE (2007) defined "asset integrity as the ability of an asset to perform its required
function eftcctivelyand efficiently whilst protecting health, safety and the environment."
On the other hand CCPS- RBPS (2007) also defined asset integrity in the same manner:
"The asset integrity clement is the systematic implementation of activities, such as
inspcctionsandtcstsncccssarytocnsurcthatimportantequipmcntwillbcsuitablc for its
intcndcd application throughout its lifc."
Again, OGP (2008) dcscribcd that "asset integrity is rclated to thc prcvcntion of major
incidents. It is an outeomc of good dcsign, construction and opcrating praetiecs. It is
achicvcd whcn facilitics are structurally and mcehanically sound and pcrfonn the process
and produce thc products for which thcy were dcsigncd."
Thc CCPS (2010) guidclinc for proecss safcty mctrics dcfincd asset integrity as "work
aetivitics that hclp ensurc that cquipmcnt is propcrly designcd is installcd in aecordancc
with specifications, and rcmains fit for purposc ovcr its lifccyclc."
Finally, Piric (2007) of DNV dcfincd asset integrity as a "continuous proccss of
knowlcdgc and cxpcricncc applicd throughout thc lifccyclc to managc thc risk of failurcs
and cvcnts in dcsign, construction, and during operation of facilitics to cnsurc optimal
production without compromising safcty, hcalth and cnvironmcntal requiremcnts."
From thc abovc dcfinitions, it can bc summarizcd that an asset in a proccssing facility
achicvcs intcgrity when it opcratcs as dcsigncd, which mcans it is bcing opcratcd salcly
following standard proccdurc with compctent pcrsonncl and complying with all ncccssary
maintcnancc, inspcctions and tcsts; to be ablc to opcratc for its dcsigncd lifc mcans
replaccmcnts, rcnovation, up-gradation, and rcpairs i.c. maintcnance, must be donc in a
timcly, planncd manncr, conforming dcsign eodcs and cnginccring standards. For all
asscts' associatcd risks to remain as low as reasonably practicablc, mcans all
safeguarding and cmcrgcncy systcms associatcd with thcassct must bc in excellcnt shapc
and able to handlc any risk cscalation situation or subscqucnt damage trom incidcnts.
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This charactcrization of asset intcgrity will ultimatcly assist in dctcrmining thc cxtcnt of
assct performance mcasurcmcnt through risk bascd indicators.
1.4 Factors Affecting the Integrity of Asset
Tcchnical issucs havc thc grcatcst impact on thc intcgrity ofasscts. Othcr than tcchnical
issucs, which arc highlightcd hcrc as a mcchanical intcgrity, opcrational, organizational,
and pcrsonnel rclatcd issucs also havc substantial impact on thc assct intcgrity conccrn.
The following arc thc major mcchanical issues that havc thc utmost impact on thc
intcgrityofassct opcrating in a proccss facility:
Extcrnal and intcrnal corrosion and crosion ofsystcms, structurcs and componcnts
which is also rcsponsiblc for rcduction of componcnts' uscfullifc.
Fatiguc condition ofwcldcdjoints in systcms, structurcs and componcnts.
iii. Corrosion undcr insulation is a threatcning issuc that causcs juvcnile t~lilurc of
componcnts.
iv. Inappropriate spccification, application, use, and maintcnancc of insulation and
coating matcrials, as wcll as cathodic protection, contributc to corrosion.
Vibration levcl, ovcrprcssurc, over tcmpcraturc, ovcrloading situation bcyond
design limit, and instrumcntation that monitor critical opcrational paramctcrs.
vi. Backlog of maintcnance resulting trom cxccssivc dcfcrrals, lack of tcchnical
rcsourccs to conduct the maintcnancc, maintcnancc staffing, and lack of
prioritizing tcchniquc for detcrmining safcty and cnvironmcntally critical
cquipmcnt.
II
vii. Equipment design and selection, personnel competencies, and inspection strategy
and maintenance planning and schedules.
viii. Ageing of operating assets. As ageing facilities approach their designed life,
management also reduces maintcnanee costs as production levels decline, which
in turn contributes to an increased risk of major accidents.
Sclcction of spare parts and consumables formaintenanceandopcration.
Meteorological phcnomcnon can also affect thcavailabilityofassets.
Besides thcsc, the issues related to operational and personnel activities that have most
impactontheperformanceofassctintegrityare:
i. Incomprehensivencss of operating instructions and often continued operation
beyond the safe design operating limits.
Management of change issues arc not executed following guidelines and not
communicated properly.
iii. Immature safety culture and lack of management commitmcnt and support lor
ensuring safety performance.
Poor integration between maintenance and operations' management systems.
Risk management strategy and lack of root cause analysis to determine the issues
that led to an incident or failure.
Human factors including deliberate damage and competency of plant personnel.
vii. Poor communication system.
viii. Lack ofadequate technical and interpersonal trainings.
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1.5 Why Need Performance Measurement?
The famous industrial revolutionary Peter Drucker said, "It is not possible to manage
what you cannot control and you cannot control what you cannot measure." Rouhiainen
(1990) also realizes the importance of measurement irrespective of objectives and
suggests that "Measuremcnt is an absolute prerequisite for control, whethcr this is the
control of production quality, accidents, or any other component of an industrial system."
Again Amaratunga et el. (2002) defined mcasurcmcnt as something that providcs "thc
basis for an organization to assess how well it is progressing towards its predetermined
objectives, helps to identify areas of strengths and weaknesscs, and dccides on fulure
initiatives, with the goals of improving organizational performance." Performance
measures refers to an indicator scheme used by management to measure, report. and
improve performance and arc classed as either a key result indicator, a performance
indicator, or a key performance indicator (Parmenter, 2007). The measurement of
performance is important because of the following issues:
Identification of the current performance gap with the desired performance.
For managing strategies, executing initiatives, and evaluating performance.
iii. Indication ofprogress towards closing the gap between desired and outcome.
iv. For effective and efficient control of the equipment reliability for its purpose.
To ensure current performance is broadly communicated and thoroughly
understood by different levels of management.
vi. Performance improvement through the involvement of multi level management.
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vii. To enable a proactive management environment along with reactive management.
Fortunately, catastrophic accidents occur on a relatively infrequent basis. However, when
they do occur, they usually involve a lot of investigation and root cause analysis activity.
The investigation rcvcals a number of for the accident secnario, which helps other
stakeholders to learn from those situations. Other than wait for an accident to occur and
investigate to identify the causes of failure, the assets' real time performance should be
monitored. Otherwise, every process facility will be in need a of very robust and
unnecessary accident protection system. The performance monitoring should be based on
the risk based indicator system. Risk is inherent in all aspects of the asset maintenance
and operation. Hence, the control of risk is central to asset integrity. This risk based
monitoring of asset performance will cover both the active and reactive monitoring
aspect. The rule thumb from Pareto charts states that 20% of equipment represents 80%
of the risk, so the idea is to focus on that 20% of equipment (API, 2000). To ensure the
asset integrity, this 20% of equipment should be given more importance and can be
categorized as most critical or highly risk significant components. Thus, risk-based
performance monitoring will allow problems to be identified and corrective action to be
taken before a serious incident occurs.
1.6 Performance Measure
Performancc measures constitute the 'Check clement' of the famous Deming's Plan-Do-
Check-Act (PDCA) cycle. The Check clement involves monitoring different activities
and strategies, as well as determining thepcrformance gap between current and expected
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outcomes. Over the years, different types of performance measuring tools have been used
depending on the area of measurement and the objectives ofmcasurcmcnl. Thcrc are four
major types of performance measures for an organization, including: input to the system
measure, process activity measure, and output or outcome measures. Among these.
OECD (2008) guidelines deal with thc activity and outeome measures using indicators,
for performance measurement. Parmenter (1997) mentioncd that thcre are three types of
pcrformancc measures, and thcseare: key result indicators, pcrformance indicators, and
key performancc indicators. KRls rcveals how you have done in a perspective, Pis direct
towards what to do, and the KPls indicatc what to do to increase performance
dramatically.Parmenterusesanonionanalogytodescribetherelationshipofthesethree
measures, as shown in Figure 1-2. The outside skin describes the overall condition of the
onion, the amount of sun, water, and nutrients it has received, as well as how it has been
handled from harvest to supemlarket shelf. However, as layers are peeled off the onion,
more information is found. The layers represent the various performance indicators, and
the core represents the key performance. KPls represent a set of measures focusing on the
aspects of organizational performance that are the most critical for the current and future
success of the organization.
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Figurcl-2: Thrcc typcs ofpcrformancc mcasurc (D. Parmcntcr, 1997)
Ovcrall cquipmcnt cffcctivcncss (OEE)
Thc OEE conccpt is usually utilizcd to mcasure thc efTcetivcncss of a manufacturing
process, but it can also bc utilized in non-manufacturing operations. akajima (1988)
dcfincd OEE as "a bottom-up hicrarehy approach whcrc an intcgratcd workforcc strivcs
to achicvc ovcrall cquipmcnt cffcctivcncss by climinating thc six big losscs." Godfrcy
(2002) cxplores thc bcnefit of using OEE to inform decision making throughout thc
litceyelc of an assct along with thc power of OEE mcasurc to improvc thc opcrational
pcrformance." Thc overall pcrtormance for a singlc componcnt or for an cntirc filcility
can bc measurcd dcpcnding on thc cumulativc impact of the thrcc OEE factors. OEE is a
mcasurc of tota) cquipmcnt pcrformancc i.e. thc dcgrcc to which thc assct is doing what it
is supposed to do basc on OEE dimcnsions: actual availability, pcrformance cfficicncy,
and quality of product or output. Thus, OEE is considcrcd a kcy factor in mcasuring both
productivity and cffcctivcncss, and thc hierarchy ofmctrics focuscs on how cffectively a
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manufacturing opcration is utilizcd. OEE mcasurcmcnt is also commonly uscd as a KPI in
conjunction with lean manufacturing cfforts to providc an indicatorofsucccss (Stamatis,
2010). Yct it is not a statistically valid tool and not intcndcd for usc as a corporatc or
plant lcvcl mcasurc. OEE pcrformancc pcrccntagc assumcs that all cquipmcnt-rclatcd
losscs arc cqually important and is a rough cstimation of sclectcd cquipmcnt
cffcctivcncss.
1.7 Asset Integrity Indicator
Thc tcrm 'indicator' traccs back (0 thc Latin vcrb 'indicarc', mcaning to disclosc or point
out, to announcc or makc publicly known, or to cstimatc or put a pricc on (Hammond,
2005). In accordancc with thc dcfinition of Building Tcrms fi'om Standards Australia
(BTSA) (SAA HB50, 1994), asset integrity indicator can bc dcfincd as "a qualitativc or
quantitative mcasurcofthcqualityofthcassct's pcrformancc, cfficicncy, productivity of
an activity which cnablcs a comparison to bc madc for managcmcnt proccss of
pcrformancc against a standard targct." Again, in glossary ofkcy tcrms in cvaluation and
rcsults-bascdmanagcmcnt, OECD (2010) dcfincd an indicator solcly as a "quantitativc or
qualitativc factor or variablc that providcs a simplc and rcliablc means to mcasurc
achicvcmcnt, to rcflcct thc changcs connected to an intcrvcntion, or to hclp asscss thc
pcrformancc ofa dcvclopmcnt actor." This spccific mcaning is uscd to clarify conccpts
and diminish tcrminological confusion (OECDIDAC, 2010). EEA (2005) also dcfincd an
indicator as a quantitativc mcasurc that can bc uscd "to illustratc and communicatc
complex phcnomcna simply, including trcnds and progrcss ovcr time." HSE, KP3 rcport
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(2007) stated that indicators measure performance and provide feedback on what is
happening so that the user can shape the appropriate actions to respond to changing
circumstances. Indicators have a variety of options in measurement, and an organization
has to choose activities that arc related to their goal. Therefore the identified indicators
should be established and formulated to fi.dfill the overall goal. According to British
Standard (2005), indicators allow an organization to performLhe following activities:
i. Measure Lhestatus
Evaluate the performance
iiI. Compare performance
Identify strengths and weaknesses
Set objectives
vi. Plan strategies and actions
vii. Share the results in order to inform and motivate people and
viii. Control progress and changes over time.
1.7.1 Purpose of asset integrity indicators
Indicators became essential, as well as effective, tools for tracking asset integrity
performance in process industries. Indicators that correspond to asset integrity have
several advantages that encourage their usc for asset performance measurement. Target
oriented appropriate indicators also act as a source of asset management information.
CCPS-RBPS (2007) guidelines also enforce the requirement ofmetrics that could be used
Lo monitor asset integrity. The following benefits of indicators arc a few rcasons they
should be used for performance measurement:
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Playa crucial role in making asset management information system operational.
Reduce time for locating the fault in assets and locating the latent weakness of
operatmgassets.
iii. Identify the early signals of deteriorating asset performance that could underpin
the asset integrity.
iv. Provide warning of approaching troublc bcforca scrious incident occurs.
Allow an ease in investigation and root-cause analysis through warning system so
thatcorreetive action can be taken betoreany unwanted incident occurs.
vi. Provide guideline to management for rational decision making in maintenance
prioritizationandtoachievetop-Ievelpolicymakers'atlention.
vii. Compare and tune of target performance with theaclual performance.
viii. Identify strong and weak areas of performance and knowledge transfer Ii·om
similar strong and weak areas.
ix. Act as powerful motivational tools that provide an ease in decision making.
Asset integrity indicators should provide the earliest possible warning of declining
performance that could be increasing the operational risk. It is theretoreessential to use a
broad set of indicators to cover process plant general performance in the region of
maintenance, operation, and manpower related activities.
1.7.2 Types of Asset Integrity Indicators
Surprisingly, over the years, proeess industries around the world were sat is tied with
measurement provided through lagging indicators. More specifically, they werc rclying
on occupational safcty indicators, such as thc fatal accidcnt rate (FAR), lost time injury
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fi'cqucncy (LTIF), and total rccordable incident ratc (TRJR). Managcmcnts arc imposing
morc cmphasis only on improving thc forcsaid lagging catcgory in ordcr to provc thcir
systcm are opcrating cfficicntly, whilc neglccting the plant's physical assct condition.
Mogford's (2005) invcstigation rcport on Tcxas City cxplosion pointcd out that thc sitc
has numcrous mcasurcs for tracking opcrational, commercial, cnvironmcntal, and safety
pcrformancc. But, thcsc indicators, mostly of lagging typc, not prioritizcd and did not
clcarly focus on thc Icading indicators as wcll. Mogford concludcd that "by definition,
catastrophic and major proccss incidcnts arc rarc cvcnts, and performancc mcasurcs nccd
to bc preferably focuscd on Icading indicators, or at Icast lagging indicators ofrclcvant,
morc '"j'cqucnt smallcr incidcnts." Thc samc issuc was also idcntilicd in thc Noradic
Nuclcar Safcty Rcscarch projcct rcport (Laakso et aI., 1994), which statcd lhat throughout
thc opcration of nuclcar powcr plant only a fcw major safcty significant dircct cvcnts can
occur. So, with thc Iimitcd quantity ofdircct evcnt information, managcmcnts havc littlc
todctcrmine futurecsscntials. Thiscnforcesthcrcquircmentofcasilymcasurablcindircct
plant pcrformancc paramctcrs that will also provide an advanccd warning of dccaying
pcrformancc. In this way, thc dircct impact can also be avoidcd as wcll. Bakcr (2007)
statcd thc importancc of use of lagging and leading indicators as rcactivc and activc
monitoring of performance, rcspcctivcly, where "reactive monitoring allows an
organization to idcntify and corrcct dcficiencies in response to spccific incidcnts or trcnds
and active monitoring cvaluatcs thc prcscnt state of a facility through the routinc and
systcmatic inspection and tcstingofwork systems, premiscs, plant, and cquipmenl."
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In the updated guideline, HSE, UK (2006) introduced the concept of 'dual assurance'
with both leading and lagging indicator utilization for ultimate risk control. Ifboth types
of indicator sets arc employed in a structured and systematic way then it will ensure the
cflcctiveness of critical risk control system. BSI PAS 55 (2008) described the
requirement of proactive, reactive, leading, lagging, quantitative and qualitative measure
for physical asset. IAEA (2000) also pointed out that monitoring pcrformance with
combination of Icading and lagging indicator sets provides the bcst performance
measurcment system. Considering all of the above issucs, asset integrity indicators arc
also categorized into the following two major groups:
Leading or proactive indicator
Lagging or reactive indicator
The combined application of indicators for monitoring asset performance will provide a
comprehensive view of asset condition. Based on the performance of leading indicators,
the outcome can be predicted and, with the lagging indicators result areas for
improvement in the leading inputs can be determined. In the long run, lagging
performance will be improved on the basis of good performances of leading indicators.
1.7.3 Characteristics of Asset Integrity Indicators
The selection of effective indicators can be done after a complete and thoughtful revision
and collaboration of key processes, equipment, organization culture, and activities
involved in process facilities that possess grcater risks. The successfulness of assct
integrity indicator system depends on the proper selection of indicators and their precise
uses. If the indicators arc not selected correctly and used improperly then this could be
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misleading rather than assisting in performance measurement. The selection of indicators
should be based on certain characteristic that will assist in identifYing the proper
indicators. To determine the appropriateness of potential indicators, Mc eeney (2005)
provides a detailed set of criteria known as the 'SMART' test. The acronym stands for the
live characteristics: specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely. Identified
indicators have to comply with these five characteristics for maintaining quality and
elTeetiveness in performance measurement. IAEA (2000) also identified an ideal set of
characteristics for selecting operational safety indicators for maintaining the quality of
indicator information. Indicator characteristics varied with their context of application. In
case of asset integrity where too Illany issues arc involved, effective characteristic
selection is a major concern. To identifY generic sets of indicators for monitoring asset
integrity, suggested characteristics of IAEA (2000) and DOE (2002) criteria were
analyzed thoroughly to figure out required potential characteristics of asset integrity
indicators. Analyzing these potential traits, the following characteristics arc preferred lor
selecting asset integrity indicators that will go with the risk based concept too:
Relevance and direct relationship with the assessment category.
Unambiguollsand lInderstandableat each level.
iii. Reliable, Illeaningful, and easily integrated to asset related activities.
iv. Capable of expressing in quantitative terms and able to provide information
timely.
Capable of representing the risk significant issues involved in the operation.
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The selection of indicators for assessing the asset integrity is a vital issue that determines
the etTectiveness of the risk based asset integrity indicator strategy.
1.8 Objectives of Research
Maintaining equipment fitness for purpose and ensuring safety systcms functionality
when necessary is of paramount importance to process industries (CCPS, 2007). In a
typical day, maintenance will spend 40% of its time investigating the root causes of a
problem (Gonzalez, 2005). This significant amount of time can be reduced by introducing
indicators for monitoring assets continuously. Considering the above issue along with the
strategy and purposes of ensuring asset integrity, the objectives of this research work arc
Develop a generic hierarchical fTamework to relate the top level strategy of
ensuring asset integrity with the events occurring on the site floor.
Identify comprehensive sets of risk based leading and lagging indicators in the
mechanical, operational, and personnel areas of asset integrity following
developed hierarchical framcworkandusing the standard guideline.
iiI. Develop sets of questionnaires: one for standardization of the hierarchical
fTamework indicators weight and another for collection of basic level risk
information.
iv. Develop an aggregation technique to provide the same basis for both types of
indicators' risk estimation and to determine the top level risk index.
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Validate developed model by collecting, aggregating, and integrating information
and determine leading and lagging risk index to monitor asset integrity
performance.
1.9 Novelty of this Research
The major focus of this research is the development ofa risk-based indicators system to
assess the asset integrity in process industries. This research is unique in asset integrity
area since it utilizes the risk definition by selecting indicators, collecting risk information,
and aggregating risk levels based on the highest associated risk of the indicator. This
approach considers both the Icadingand lagging aspects of indicators that arc quantifiable
in terms of risk and can be easily mapped with the standard risk index scale to determine
the asset's condition. This study also proposed a comprehensive set of multi-level
indicators that are easy to establish in particular process facility. Depending on the
availability of current features and future requirements, the indicators can also be
excluded or included, respectively in the identified indicator sets. This developed
approach is a comprehensive, systematic, and integrated risk based asset integrity
indicator system where the physical asset integrity in the section of mechanical and
operational activity can be built on the personnel integrity of every employee.
1.10 ThesisOutline
The thesis is comprised of six chapters. Each chapter of the thesis illustrates the distinct
aspect of asset integrity indicators to achieve stated objectives.
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Chapter I addresses the background, elucidating the asset, asset integrity, and asset
integrity indicator concepts and, objectives. It also discusses novelty of the proposed
research.
Chapter 2 presents a brief review of performance measurement frameworks. Also, it
presents a review of guidelines and literature pertaining to the current research work,
followed by limitations of these approaches. This chapter also includes goals and
described the scope of current research work.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the risk based asset integrity indicator
methodology. It includes the dclimitation and development strategy of multilcvel
hierarchical indicator framework approach for asset integrity. Furthermorc, in accordance
with the framework structure, indicators at each level along with leading and lagging
indicators at specific level were identified. It also discusses the indicator data aggregation,
as well as data collection policy and standardization of multilevel indicator weights.
Chapter 4 presents a benchmark study that determines the feasibility and applicability of
developed indicator systems in different process plants. It also describes the means for
questionnaire dcvelopment for data collection followed by data analysis, evaluation, and
result discussion.
Chapter 5 represcnts an additional work that is very much rclated with the asset integrity
assurance issue. It formulates a risk based spare parts inventory management
methodology that will fulfill the spare parts requirement during maintenance.
Chapter 6 concludes the research work by summarizing the potentiality of the approach,
followed by overall discussion and recommendations on future research scope in this area.
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Chapter Two
Literature Overview
2.1 Introduction
Asset integrity can be considered a measurement of the performance ofassets that operate
in a process facility. At the same time, it can be said that asset integrity is achieved when
the measured performance matches the stakeholder's vision or meets lcgislative
requirement. So the measurement of performance implies lWO important issues. which are
assessing the performance and accomplishmcnt of a target. Measuring the performance
using indicators is very popular in nuclear industries and is also gaining popularity in
process industries. Performance measurement has long been used by management to
monitor and ensure organizational capabilities and to identify whether current
performance met the objectives as planned or not.
Several regulatory organizations, researchers, and specialists have provided guidelines for
developing performance indicators, and quite a largc number of researches on the
development of performance measurcment framework have bcen proposed in the past
dccade. The following are a few of these approaches, which have been discussed and
followed over the years for the purpose of measuring pcrformance.
2.2 Performance Measurement Approach
Thc performance measurement approach enables the ability to plan, measure, and conlrol
performances that can bring substantial benefits to any organization. Performance
measurement is an ongoing process, and can provide several types of information,
26
including information about inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. According
to the American heritagc dictionary (1991), "Pcrformance measurement is the selection
and usc of quantitative measures of capacities, processcs, and outcomes to devclop
information about critical aspects of activities, including their clTec!.'· The following arc
widely used performance measurement techniques selected forbriefdiscussion.
2.2.1 Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard Approach
The balanced scorecard approach was introduccd by Kaplan ct al. (1992) to overcome thc
shortcomings of traditional approaches of a company's performance measurement that
considered only financial results. Balanced scorecard translates an organization's mission
and strategy into a comprehensive set of performance measurcs that provide the
Il-amework for a strategic measurement and management system. This is a strategic
performance management tool that takes into account the fact that companies need to
manage intangible assets and not only physical assets. Along with the traditional financial
approach, indicators should address three more perspcctivcs, which arc customer, internal
business process, and learning and growth. So, this measurement system is more balanced
since it uses a mixture of unanciaI and non-unancialmeasures. One frequently used
balanced score card type is a key performance indicator scorecard with a liamework
describing value-creating strategies that link intangible and tangible assets. The balanced
scorecard is based on measures of efficiency, quality, and effect ivenessateach level of
the performance fi"amework. Key performance indicators can also be organized into
scorecards using a matrix aller being aligned with the established strategy of the
organization. KPI scorecards arc most applicable and helpful when a strategic program
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already exists at a higher level in an organization with clear idea of what to accomplish.
In this way, the diverse indicator enables individuals and teams to definc what they must
do to contribute to higher level goals. Thus, the balanced scorecard is used to measure the
performance of an organization in a more holistic way with numbers of dilTerent
perspectives(Kaplanetal.,200Ia&200Ib).
2.2.2 Wireman's Hierarchical Approach
According to Wireman (2005), performance indicators arc just that, an indicator of
performance. Also pointed out certain characteristics ofpertormancc indicators; these arc
the ability to highlight opportunities for improvement, to identify weak areas, and point to
solutions for solving problems etc. To fulfill the requircment performance indicator,
Wireman proposed a system of multi-level performance indicators systems. The pyramid
structure in Figure 2-1 shows hierarchical approach (or multi-level performance
indicators' development and illustrates the relationship among these different levels of
indicators. The top layer of the indicators' system is corporate strategic level, which is a
measure of vision followed by the financial performance indicator, efficiency and
effectiveness indicators, tactical level indicators, and the actual functional pertormance of
indicators. Also mentioned is the correct way to develop performance indicators, which is
to work from the top or corporate level and then develop indicators at each subsequent
level to allow the indicators to be connected with each level. It is important to devclop
indicators following the top-down approach; otherwise they may be conflicting rather
than supportive. Again, the indicators should link to performance at either higher or lower
levels on the indicator pyramid; otherwise, it will be worthless to usc indicators.
28
Md-
"1.;;';\;1*"&
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Tactical
Performance Indicators
Functional
Performance Indicators
Figure2-I:Thehierarehicaltopdown'performaneeindieatorssystem'(T. Wireman,2005)
2.3 Regulatory Organization's Guidelines for Indicator Development
A set of performance indicators has been developed by World Association of uclear
Operators (WA 0) (2006) for the use in nuclear power plants that will also allow the
user to exchange information and assess the performance of their plants objectively.
There are a total of ten top level quantitative performance indicators in this sct for
monitoring plant safety, reliability, efficiency, and personal safety (Chakraborty et a!.,
2003). This is a widely used set of performance indicators in nuclear power stations
worldwide for monitoring safety and economic performance. All of these performance
indicators are of lagging type. Performanee indicators are mainly used as a management
tool so each user can monitor its own performance and progress, set challenging goals for
improvement, and consistently compare performance with that of other plants or the
industry. The indicators give a quantitative indication of nuclear plant safety and
reliability, plant efficiency, and personnel safety. WANO's experience has shown that
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using pcrformancc indicators can contribute to significant improvcmcnts in plant
performance.
International Atomic Encrgy Agency (IAEA) (2000) devclopcd a framework considcring
thc concept of nuclcar power plant safety pcrformancc. To dcvclop a complctc set of
opcrational pcrformancc indicators, a hicrarchical structurc was dcvcloped, in which thc
top Icvel is operational safety performance and the immediate next level is operational
safety attribute and finally from these the operational safety performance indicators were
developed. The specific indicators werc dcvelopcd to measurc performance and locate the
degrading areas of pcrformance, so that thc appropriatc authority can come with
necessary corrcctive action. Here, the key attributes that wcre chosen corrcspond to the
operational strategy and associated risk. This goal setting approach enhanccs the
effectivcness of monitoring the operational performance. This approach was applied to
different nuclear power stations throughout the world and considered as an excellent
approach for monitoring operational safety performance.
Safety of Eastern European Type uclear Facilities (SE UF) has devclopcd a framcwork
and accordingly selectcd some appropriate quantitative indicators for monitoring the
effectiveness of maintenance performance (SE UF, 2006). They also usc the
comprehensive fTamework, which is an attribute strategy of the IAEA (2000) for
developing maintenance performance indicators. At the same time, they usc some specific
performancc indicators dcveloped by the WANG and the IAEA that arc useful for the
evaluation of maintenance performance. Finally, they have also provided a guideline for
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implementing this maintenance performance monitoring technique to specific nuclear
power plants.
A Step-by-step guide to "developing process safety performance indicators" (HSE, 2006)
has been produced jointly by HSE and the Chemical Industries Association (CIA), based
on gathered information and ideas !Tom several industries. According to this guideline,
the main reason for measuring the performance is to make sure that risks arc adequately
in control in the process facility. To do so, the two organizations have proposed a method
of selling indicators. The main difference of this guideline with other approaches is the
introduction of the dual assurance concept. Dual assurance is the measurement of the risk
control system performance through leading and lagging indicators in a systematic and
structured way. The intention is to provide an early warning of dangerous deterioration of
a critical system through leading indicators. Finally the guideline has outlined a six-stage
process towards implementing process safety performance indicators in an organization.
It has also included a set of leading and lagging process safety performance indicators for
overall installation performance monitoring.
GECD (2008) guidelines on developing safety performance indicators mentioned that an
observable measure that provides insights into the concept of safety is difticultto measure
directly. They have divided the safety performance indicators into two major categories.
The first set is outcome indicators that tell whether the system achieved a desired result or
not, and the other set is activities indicators that allow an organization with a means of
checking, on a regular and systematic basis, whether they arc implementing their priority
actions in the way they were intended or not. The guideline is intended for implementing
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a safety performance indicator program for any enterprise that handles significant
quantitiesofhazardoussubstanees.ltsetsoutaseven-stepproeesswith the aim to locate
and fix potential problems through indicators before an accident 0 eeurs.
Considering the measurement of existing and future performance as an essential clement
of any improvement program, CCPS has developed a guideline for measuring process
safety performance (CCPS, 2007). To continuously improve the performance, they
provide a guideline for developing leading and lagging metries ,md encourage in
implementing effective indicators for monitoring performance. They have also
recommended using three types of metries; these arc: lagging, leading, and ncar miss
metrics in process safety management systems. In this guideline, they have presented
these three metrics as a measurement tool at different levels of the developed "safety
pyramid.'" Finally, CCPS have also demonstrated industry-wide lagging. leading. and
other mclrics cXClmples.
Health & Safety Laboratory (HSL) of HSE, UK (2006) carried out a seoping study to
develop an industry wide common performance indicator model. The major findings of
the study concluded that the nuclear industries arc the pioneers in performance indicator
development, but the other sectors arc also active. The other sectors, like offshore,
aviation, transportation, military and chemical industries, arc working in this field, as
well. Among these who arc currently using the performance indicators! most of the cases
of performance indicators developed in the absence of any fundamental foundation or
model. This simply means that they are developing and using indi'1ators without any
target or without the intension of fulfilling any target requirement. If indicators arc
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developed without following a structured approach then the outcome of the indicator will
not provide a holistic view of overall process facility conditions. Another important issue
is the development and application of leading indicators in performance measurement.
Presently, most of the process industries rely only on the lagging indicators and, more
specifically, on the performance of occupational health and safety. Finally, HSL have
recommended the development of generic principles for developing SPls and for perusal
of different scoring mechanisms for indieators,aswell.
2.4 Asset Integt'ity Development Guideline
Several regulatory organizations have provided guidelines on maintaining asset integrity.
These guidelines arc mostly concerned with the oil and gas operational activity and the
ageing installations in offshore area. These guidelines locus on the asset integrity
management strategy to decrease major incident risks. Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) and
Health & Safety Executive (HSE), UK, have a major contribution in developing
guidelines for managing asset integrity in [he respective areas of concern.
2.4.1 OGP Guideline on Asset Integrity
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) provided a guideline to facilitate
the organizations in reducing major incident risk by focusing on asset intcgrity
management. This guideline is also applicable for existing assets at every stage of the
lifecycle for managing asset. However, the collectcd safcty performance information
shows improvements in occupational safety that does not necessarily ensure reduction of
major accident risk. For [he purpose ofcollccting information and evaluating the risks of
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major incidents, OGP (2008) points out the need for KPI. To monitor and review the asset
integrity performance, OGP also has given several examples of KPls based on HSE, UK,
guideline, which are of leading and lagging category. These indicators mostly cover the
operation, maintenance, and stafTperformance region. At the same time, OGP has given a
guideline on how to usc these KPls to evaluate the asset integrity performance against the
stated goal. This guideline basically summarizes the ways to control major incident risk
throughout the operation period of oil and gas exploration and production activity.
2.4.2 HSE on Asset Integrity
In 2004 the Offshore Division of the HSE, UK, statted Key Program 3 (KP3)-Assel
Integrity (HSE, 2007). The objective was to ensure that offshore duty-holders adequately
maintained safety-critical elements (SCEs) of their installations. SCEs are fhe parts of an
installation and its plant that exist to prevent, control, or mitigate major accident hazards,
the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident. HSE have
considered "Asset Integrity" as the third pillar in the Step Change in Safety temple model
strategy along with recognized hazard and reduces risk and personal ownership for safety
issues. Asset integrity refers to the risk of failure of a structure, plant, equipment or
systems that could cause or contribute to a major accident. It also assists in developing an
Asset Integrity toolkit containing comprehensive guidance with reference to good
industrypracticedoeuments for effective safety-critical plant and equipment maintenance
management. For initial consideration HSE have developed three potential key
performance indicators, which are: KPII, loss of containment i.e. reportable hydrocarbon
releases; KP12, verification of significant compliance issues; and KPI3, production losses
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associated with deficiency in maintaining safety. Finally, for monitoring the cross
industry asset integrity only the KPI3 were replaced wilh safely-critical maintenance
backlog after having a detailed study and observation.
2.5 Integrity Indicator Development Approach
There isa scarce amount of literature that directly deals with developmcnt of indicators.
Sharpet al. (2008) has developed KPls for offshore slructural systems, relating to aspects
which arc important for both safety and asset integrity. Barrier analysis is lIsed for
idcntifying the safety critical clements, and performance indicators were developed to
illustrate thc barrier with the quantifiable measure. Thus, hazards to slruclural inlegrity
were lIsed as a basis for developing performance indicators. Besides these, most of the
research work has been concentraled in the field of maintenance performance
measurement. Ahren et al. (2004) have identified the performance indicators used by the
Swedish ational Rail Administration through a case study. Along with the identification,
the study also analyzed the impact of these indicators on the organization goal and
strategy by establishing a link and effect model. Again Parida et al. (2007) has proposed a
multi-criteria hierarchical maintenance performance measurement framework lor the
purpose of maintenance performance measurement. The indicators arc developed
considering the corporate or stratcgic levels as a first hierarchical level followed by the
tactical or managerial level and finally the functional or operational level. The levels of
hierarchical structures could be more than three depending on the structure of the
organization. Khan et al. (2009) has developed a risk-based approach to measure the
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process safety performance using sets of leading and lagging indicators. This is a unique
work in the field of process safety for monitoring performance using indicator results.
The model uses the probability of an event occurrences and the consequences of that
event to figure out associated risk and aggregated values using analytical hierarchy
process framework to determine the process safety indexes in the form of leading and
lagging index. The applicability of the developed model was also demonstrated by a case
study on a liquefied natural gas facility. The developed model with identitied indicators
showed its potentiality by improving the process safetyperformance.
2.6 Asset condition index
Using asset condition index, to evaluate the asset's status is a very popular measurement
tool. Asset condition index is a standard means of determining an asset's current and
future physical condition. This index allows the comparison of conditions between
different assets and helps in rational decision making for prioritizing maintenance and
other related issues. Here, a predefined measurement scale and weight allocation
technique is used for each category o I' asset. hydroAMP (2006) defined a condition index
as the outcome ofa condition assessment and used a condition index ratings system for
equipment in assessing asset condition. Appropriate condition indicators were used and
their qualitative scores were based on inspections, tests, and measurements that were
performed during the condition evaluation along with the operation and maintenance
history of equipment. Weighting factors were applied to the condition indicator scores,
which were then combined into a condition index, with a normalized scale of 1-10. For
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developing a comprehensive asset condition index FR-PROSMAT (2000, 1999) moves
beyond the traditional approach of considering technical aspects only. Along with the
technical parameter, they have considered financial as well as statistical parameters in
developing an asset condition index. This index was used to observe the asset degradation
pattern and also to compare the current condition with the original state of asset.
2.7 Discussion and Remark
Most of the above mentioned guidelines and literature arc intended for developing
process safety performance indicators. On the other hand, the rest of the literature deals
with the maintenance performance measurement using indicators in case of dilkrent
specific areas. The development and application of indicators for monitoring performance
arc elaborately studied in the nuclear power plant field. Right now, thc stakeholders arc
moving fTom a deterministic approach to a probabilistic approach for monitoring
performance. Their approach highlighted the operational safety performance indicator
development. But, in the other industries, like process industries, indicator systems arc
still in the early stages. There arc a few literatures and guidelines that deal with the asset
integrity indicator's development. In developing or providing guidelines for asset
integrity indicators, the researchers have also followed the same available procedure of
developing process safety indicator guideline. In fact, it is logical to follow the guideline
of process safety indicators, as the asset integrity is one of the nine clements in the risk
based process safety pillar of managing risk (CCPS-RBPS, 2007). Again, maintenance of
equipmcntand its performance mcasuring isan important issue in assuring asset integrity.
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So, the frameworks of monitoring maintenance using indicators will also assist in
determining the set of indicators lor asset integrity. Only OGP (2008) has provided a brief
guideline on developing asset integrity indicators, which corresponds to the liSE
guideline. On the other hand, the model developed by Khan et al. (2009) is a very
comprehensive and structured approach that also follows the HSE guidcline in developing
both typcs of indicators for measuring process safety. Another important issue is lhat
most of the literature and guidelines do not deal with the quantification and aggregation
technique by which the floor level indication can be converted into a top level
performance index. Theoutcomc of individual indicators may not reveal the overall exact
health condition of the asset operating in a facility. So, the impact of deviation on the
overall performance may not be clear or the decision should not always be taken on the
basis of individual indicator outcomc. Asset performance measurcment requires a
quantified value that can represent the current condition and is capable to predicting
future condition based on this value.
In most process facilities, measurement using different paramcter, condition assessment
and evaluation already exists. But, the measurement of only a few certain parameters arc
not sufficient to ensure asset integrity. Here, a comprehensive set of indicators is needed
for monitoring performance that will cover the overall area of assets and related issues
that can affect plant integrity. At the same time, the co-ordination and logical evaluation
of the outputs of these indicators against targeted goals is also essential. Today's process
industries arc measuring performance only for the sake of measuring, without having a
mission or vision. Even the organization has goals, failing to link the indicator's
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measurement with the overall strategy results in a wOlthless attempt. The missing point
here is the alignment between the performed activities through indicators with the
existing policies. So, this type of measurement of performance will be misguiding rather
than supportive for continuous improvement. Based on the identified drawbacks of
described approaches and literature, a risk based asset integrity indicator system is
proposed with the aim of achieving the stated objectives.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In today's compctitivc proccss industry cnvironmcnt, assct intcgrity is a important
conccrn. So, the stakeholders are in need ofa strategy that will monitor the integrity Icvel
of operating assets. Monitoring the asset integrity performance will eventually help in
increasing the level of reliability and availability, as wcll as the lite span of facility. In
this rescarch project, a risk-based asset integrity indicator approach is proposed lor
monitoring and ensuring the asset integrity. This approach is devcloped to I[dfill the
stated objectives and purposes. Indicator system is aimed to mcasure and cvaluate the
current level of asset integrity based on associated risk information. The indicator systcm
is the combination of both leading and lagging indicators, and this will ensure the
comprehensiveness of an approach in assessing assets. The proposed model has the
capability to integrate and aggregate qualitative and quantitative risk information
following a similar approach.
3.2 Risk Based Asset Integrity Indicators Methodology
Asset integrity is a critical issue in process industries. Sclecting meaningful and effective
tools for measuring performance and ensuring asset integrity is becoming increasingly
important duc to thc involvcment ofa large numbcr of factors. In this research thc "risk-
based asset integrity indicators" approaeh is proposcd to detcrmine the level of asset
integrity. Following the risk-based strategy, the process plant will be assessed with
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respect to the likelihood and severity of incidents indicated by the indicators. The
developed process will follow a structured and logical procedure for the identification of
credible incident sequences and the assessment of their corresponding likelihood. The
indicators of leading and lagging category will be used as a means to monitor the
performance of assets. Both types of indicators will be developed following a structured
approach that will ensure the asset integrity strategy and objectives. The mcthodology for
estimating asset integrity level is shown in Figure 3-1, which depicts the diffcrent
scquentialstcps.
3.2.1 Delimitation of Asset Integrity
Asset integrity is a very complex issue in process industry perspective with many lacets.
According to the definition of the asset life cycle, asset integrity starts fi·om the design
activity and ends with the decommissioning phase (UKOONHSE, 2006). Asset integrity
is a common goal to all involved in the design, manufacturing, installation, operation,
inspection,maintenance, modification, and decommissioning. All these activities have an
impact on the integrity of an infrastructure and equipment in a process facility at all
stages of the lifecycle. For the time being, it is of interest to maintain and improve the
asset integrity of an operating process facility. This decision squeezes the aClivities
involved in maintaining asset integrity with the activities related to the upper part of the
dotted line, as shown in the Figure 3-2.
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Delimitation of Asset Jntegrity
Development of Hierarchical Framework for Asset Integrity
Indicator Development
DevelopmentofFourStageStructuredlndicators
Development of Leading and Lagging lndicatorsin Specific
Indicator Area
Questionnaire Development for Data & Information
Collection
Final Stage Leading and Lagginglndicators Risk
Figure 3-1: Methodology for estimating risk based asset integrity level
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Irrespective of the type, proeess plants are usually designed and constructed to operate for
around 20 to 25 years. Considering the designed life, the upper part activities of assets'
lifecycle in Figure 3-2 has great significance in achieving asset integrity. Maintaining
assct integrity during the operational period will help in achieving the target design life
and even could extend it f"i.lrther. The activities in the upper part of Figure 3-2 can be
broadly grouped into operational integrity and mechanical integrity. All operation related
activities are considered as operational integrity and inspection, maintenance, and
modification activities are considered in the mechanical integrity group. In an operating
process facility, these activities are an integral part of everyday operation involving
operators, maintenanee employees, inspectors, contractors, engineers, and other personnel
involved in designing, specifying, and installing, as well as in decision making. So, the
personnel involved to carry out different activities of the above mentioned two integrity
element have great innuence in maintaining the integrity of asset. For this reason, the
third element in the integrity structure is considered as the personnel integrity. Lehtinen et
al. (1998) pointed out that accident prevention is the ultimate goal for any process
installation and can be achieved through the use of reliable structures, components,
systems, and procedures in a plant operated by competent personnel. Personnel involved
in different activities should be competent enough to execute defined tasks with
confidence. However, these three elements primarily involve inspection, preventive
maintenance, predictive maintenance, corrective maintenance, operating procedure and
activities, and quality assurance processes, including procedures and training that
underpin the asset integrity.
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Figurc 3-2: Elcmcnts that havc an impact on the intcgrity of an assct ovcr its lifc cyclc
(aftcr UKOOAlHSE, 2006)
3.2.1.1 Asset Integ.-ity Element Interrelation
Figurc3-3 dcpictsthcrclation bctwccnassct intcgritywith itssclcctcd majorclcmcnts.as
wcll as thc intcrrclation bctwccn thcclcmcnts thcmsclvcs. All ofthcsc thrccclcmcntsor
assct integrity arc intcrrclatcd and thc pcrformancc of onc c1cmcnt has grcat influcncc on
thc othcrclcmcnt. Opcrational activity cxplorcs thc scopcs for mcchanical intcgrity, and
both ofthesc c1cmcnts vcry much dcpcnds on thc pcrsons who arc continuously dcaling
with thcse c1cmcnts' activitics. This cnforces thc rcquircmcnt of pcrsonncl intcgrity to
definc thc assct intcgrity comprchcnsivcly. So, for cnsuring assct intcgrity, vcry good
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intcraction bctwccn mcchanical, opcrational, and pcrsonncl intcgrity is mandatory.
Emphasis should also bc placcd on thc individual clcmcnt for pcrformancc improvcmcnt.
Ifthcsc thrcc clcmcnts arc monitorcd and managcd cffcctivcly and comprchcnsibly, assct
intcgrity can bc obtaincd. Each of thcse clcmcnts has grcat significancc on assct
pcrformancc, which will bc cxplorcd in a latcr stagc.
Mechanical
Integrity
Figurc 3-3: Rclation bctwecn asset integrity with its contributory clement
3.2.1.2 Major Element Contribution to Asset Integrity
Assct intcgrity in process industry is a cardinal stratcgic issue that is firmly rootcd in
maintcnancc and opcrational activitics along with manpowcr competcncy. As assct
intcgrity mainly ariscs from tcchnical issucs like maintcnancc, inspcction, modification,
and cnginecring assessmcnt, which arc grouped in the mcchanical intcgrity catcgory.
Thcsc activitics arc directly relatcd with thc targct of maintaining good asset physical
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health condition. If the physical assets arc in good condition then there is less chance of
an undesired event. That is why mechanical integrity is considered the prominent
contributor of asset integrity. The other two clements, operational, and personnel
integrity, also have potential innuenee on asset integrity. The innuenee and contribution
of these three clements to asset integrity is shown in Figure 3-4, which is developed in
accordance with the target of this research work. The area covered by the each clement in
the pyramid diagram represents its contribution of that clement to overall asset integrity
performance.
Personnel
Integrity
Asset Integrity
Operational Integrity
Mechanical Integrity
Figure 3-4: Major clement contribution to Asset Integrity performance
3.2.2 Hierarchical Framework Development for Asset Integrity
The risk-based asset integrity indicator system uses a hierarchical framework to develop
different level indicators for monitoring and measuring overall asset integrity. The
proposed hierarchical framework has been developed from the IAEA (2000) concept for
the monitoring of nuclear power plant operational safety performance. This approach
followed a four stage top-down indicator scheme, as shown in Figure 3-5, that links the
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top level strategic goal with the noor level events. In a bottom-up approach, there is a
very good chance of losing focus on the details of individual processes or activities. The
proposed top-down indicator scheme can take care of this issue since the number of
indicators will continue to increase with the progression towards downwards stages. So,
there will be the maximum number of indicators at the root level and less chance of
missing important activities. Substantial effort is also given in developing the hierarchical
framework to make sure that the fiInetionality and involvement of different level of
management can be accommodated. Each level of management personnel in a process
plant can be assigned to a particular stage of indicator supervision. Asset integrity cannot
be measured directly; only the noor level specific indicators arc directly measurable. So,
for measurement of asset integrity performance, this multilevel indicator system is
developed and brings down up to specific indicator level. This hierarchical structure is
followed because the specific indicators result will have no value unless it is linked to the
ultimate goal for ensuring asset integrity through performance measuring. Thus the
hierarchical structure eventually turns out to be an asset integrity monitoring system.
In the proposed asset integrity hierarchy, indicators arc uscd at several levels. The
hierarchical structure started with the clement indicators, followed by activity, key and
spccific indicators. Since the characteristics of these levels differ, the functions of
indicators also differ 1T0m level to level. The individual indicators represent the actual
condition of the asset to assure the reliability of the plant at any given time. The indicator
system can provide a comprehensive view of the process plant equipment status and also
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can lead to particular consideration of trends requiring attention. This is done by using the
leading and lagging indicators jointly that support the asset performance measurement.
Asset Integrity
Element
Indicators
Activity Indicators
Key Indicators
Goal (Targct lomaintainassct
intcgritythroughindicators)
MainclclllcntofassctintcgTitythat
finallyassiststodctcrlllinc Icvcl of asscI
IIltCb'Tlty
Major activity which arc Illonitorcd
tOlllcasUTcassctlntcgnty
Showsovcrallconditionof
thcarcasofconccrn
Figure 3-5: Hierarchical indicator pyramid for monitoring integrity level ofasset (afler
IAEA,2000)
Asset integrity can be described as a state of operation in which the risks arc at an
acceptable level. The management ofa process plant should be able to arrange adequate
control measure of the operating assets and make plans to overcome the risk. At the same
time, they have to be prepared for all foreseeable risk situations that can be encountered
and may cause threats to the integrity of the plant's assets. The risk should be below the
limits set by the regulators and concurrently as low as reasonably acceptable, by taking
care of the assets. This can be accomplished by the risk based asset integrity indicators
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system. The ultimate objective of developing asset integrity indicators is to create
intervention strategies to avoid future incidents.
3.2.2.1 Description of Different Stages of Indicators
Since strategic goal, achievement of asset integrity or lirstthree stages of indicators in the
hierarchy structure cannot be measured directly, so the proposed indicator structure is
stretched further via activity and key indicator until it reaches a level of easily
quantifiable or directly measurable specific indicators. The purpose of the four stage
framework is to ensure alignment between the top level policy and the event occurring
on-site. The top level policy is the assurance of asset integrity and the events at site arc
the activities involved in plant operation. This will also allow developing indicators 10
follow the top-down strategy and allow indicators information to Ilow following a
bottom-up scheme. The arrow direction in Figure 3-5 represents the risk information tlow
direction towards an asset integrity goal. Clear understanding ofeach stage of hierarchy is
important to identify the correct indicators those will drive to asset integrity goal. The
structured approach uses the following terminology to maintain logical relationships
between indicators.
Element Indicator: As previously described, clement indicators arc the main contributory
clements of an asset integrity goal. In respect to asset integrity, the mechanical,
operational, and personnel issues related to activities has greatest intluenee on the
equipment performance. These clements arc the starting point of developing other types
of indicators in the respective stages of the hierarchy. The satisfactory performance of
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these three clements is an underlying factor and prerequisite for ensuring asset integrity
throughout the operational period.
Activity Indicator: Since the clement indicators arc also not directly measurable, these
major clements arc expanded to activity indicators. Activity indicators arise fTom the
events that are usually performed or practiced to maintain the fitness lor service of plant
equipment. The activities, practices, and culture followed in mechanical, operational, and
personnel sectors, respectively, arc grouped into different category and named as activity
indicators. These indicators arc used to visualize the performance of major activities
Key Indica/or: This is one of the widely cited terminologies in several sectors,
specifically where measurement is performed using indicators. Most of the regulatory
organization guidelines place more emphasis on this and arc known as key performance
indicators or KPI. In the context to asset integrity, key indicators arc to support the
activity indicators by representing overall asset condition. These arc convenient
parameters that also maintain relationship between root level indications with activity
indicators.
Specific Indica/or: These types of indicators arc very important, irrespective of the
perspective of performance measures. The outcomes of specific indicators arc the only
quantifiable measure of asset performance. This measurement supports and facilitates
achieving the asset integrity goal. The specific indicators should be chosen
comprehensively, following the described characteristics that will ensure meaningful,
reliable, and accurate information. In this research, the specific indicators arc also divided
into two important categories, which arc: leading and lagging indicators.
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3.2.3 Reason for Hierarchical Framework
Hierarchical framework is a structure of entries having several levels arranged in a
pyramid like formation. In this structure, the height of a stage represents that level's
significance and the width ofa stage represents the quantity of the indicator at that stage
relative to the entire framework. The hierarchical structure has the following Icatures that
could be used to achieve the stated objectives:
Hierarchical fi·amework provides a way to connect the strategic management goal
withthecurrentplantspeciliccondition.
A multi stage in the hierarchy providcs the flexibility in prioritization of action
and measurable bottom Icvel spccific indicators can bc used to gcnerate
meaningfulmeasurc forthcuppcrlcvcl pcrformancc(NSPI, 2009).
iii. Framcwork providcs correct information at a glance regarding thc asset
performance to higher level management for strategic and rational decision
making.
iv. Somctimcs the indication of a single indicator docs not ensure thc viability or
actual impact or can be misleading. In those cases, hierarchical framework based
uppcr level indicators could provide comprehensive and improved asscssmcnt of
thecvent.
Hicrarchical structure facilitates easy mapping and assessment of asset
performance by allowing weighting or prioritization of diftcrent indicators in a
particular stage.
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vi. The hierarchical framework approach allows differcnt levels and areas of
management to focus on the particular stages of indicators that are relevant to
them and to locate where they have to put more emphasis to mitigatc the effect of
deleterious factors.
vii. Framework also has the capability to modity/incorporate/eliminate diffcrent level
indicators in the course of time when necessary.
The pyramid structure can be diagrammed cither in the shape of triangle or in tree
format for convenient indicator representation.
3.2.4 Indicator Framework Overview
Measurement of asset performance is an cssential precursor [0 all attcmpts to improve.
Indicators have become a widely used measuring tool in many diffcrent fields and play an
important role in highlighting problems, idcntifying trends, and contributing to the
process of priority setting, poliey formulating, evaluating and monitoring of progress
(Sehirnding, 2002). The depicted hierarchical structure in Figure 3-5 provides a
functional platform to develop multilevel indicators. Latcr, the multi level indicators will
be illustrated by a trce diagram as illustratcd in Figure 3-6 for better orientation of
indicators and rcpresentation of integrity goal.
3.2.5 Risk Based Approach for Asset Integrity Indicator
Asset integrity is off the mark physical condition of asset that eventually cnsured the
reliability of the equipmcnt operating in a process facility. Reliable equipment, coupled
with dependable human performance, is critical in managing risk. In addition, both are
necessary conditions for reliable operation of process plants that will minimize risk.
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Collins et al. (2003) in the HSL investigation report mentioned that, among the sample of
718 losses of containment related chemical accidents over an II year period, about 81%
of these eame as a conscquencc of inadequate risk management strategies. So, to reduce
the number of incidents, risk profiles of assets should be given priority while planning for
monitoring asset performance. In this research, to mcasureand evaluate asset integrity the
risk based indicators approach is used. The objective is to identify areas of most risk and
put relatively more emphasis on those for optimum outcome. Risk is typically described
as the quantified form of the probability of an event occurrence and its potential
consequences in terms of economic, health, and environmental costs (CCPS, 2000). The
risk based indicator system is a risk information tool, which can generally be used to
monitor asset performance and to alert the user if asset performances excecd certain
levels or followed undesired trends. Indicators can also be used for assessing the
efliciency, effectiveness, dependability, and completeness of asset health. To do so, the
specific indicators have been extended and categorized into two distinct groups. These are
leading and lagging indicators, which will be focusing on the parts of activities where
incidents are most likely to occur. This root level indicator will provide risk information
and the asset performance can be assessed subsequently. So, from the risk basedeoncept
of indicator, asset will aehieve integrity if they are operated and maintained sueh that the
likelihood and consequence of an event that delivers risk to people, environment, and the
facility remains within anaeceptable limit.
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3.2.5.1 Risk Based Leading Indicator
Risk based leading indicators arc intended to identify two primary pro-acliFe risk factors:
the likelihood of success and the corresponding importance of that success for an event.
From this information, posterior risk associated with the policies, procedures, activities,
and practices can be predicted. These indicators arc usually expectcd to providc in
process information on activities that arc employed to improve asset integrity
performance. Leading indicators arc most useful as a precursor to asset integrity
degradation tor early management response so that adverse result can be avoided. They
also enable one to take pre-emptive actions to improve changes of achieving strategic
assct integrity goals. The major benefit of using leading indicators is it can assist in
figuring out the root cause of an unexpected trend easily. With the advanced feedback of
asset performance, necessary immediate action can be taken before an undesired incident
occurs or deficiency can show up that can decrease performance level. Thus, leading
indicators basically reOect present or future perfomlance rather than past performance.
These indicators arc hard to identify and difficult to quantify. One way to approach this
issue is to identify and develop leading indicators that can measure the performance of
fillletional areas within the process taeility, such as operation, maintenance, inspection,
management of change, training, and engineering support (Holmberg et aI., 1994). The
characteristics of these functional areas will be taken into consideration and studied
systematically to find out the suitable predictive risk based leading indicators.
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3.2.5.2 Risk Based Lagging Indicator
In contrast, risk based lagging indicators arc intended to identify also two primary
reactive risk factors: the likelihood of failure and the corrcsponding conscqucnces of that
cvent. Thcy are conventional quantitative type indicators and usually reported throughout
the process industries to drive plant performance and for benchmarking against similar
plants. These indicators hclp to asscss whcther asset-related activities arc achieving their
desired performance or not. Risk bascd lagging indicators ollen measure changes in asset
performance ovcr timc, by idcntifying and rcporting incidcnts and subscqucnt impacts on
hcalth, cnvironmcnt, reputation, and property. But, unlike leading indicators, thcy do nol
tcll the root causes for the incidents or how the reoccurrence can be prevented. In this
case, corrcctive action can only be taken aller the adverse events and the effect of
corrective measure taken may not become apparent until the ncxt measuring cycle.
The leading indicators can be considered measures of inputs to asset intcgrity systems,
which arc associated with the causes of an activity and lagging indicators, arc measure of
outputs, which arc associated with the results of that. The concept of using only lagging
indicators will not give any information how thc outcome is achieved or any early
warning on the way to achieving the strategic goal. On the contrary, using leading
indicators only will enable the ability to focus on short-tcrm performance measurement
and will not be capable of visualizing the long term outcome measurement. So for
optimum assct integrity performance measurement, asset integrity indicator systems
should contain a combination oflcading and lagging indicators.
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3.2.6 Performance Index Development
Risk based leading and lagging indicators play the critical role of monitoring the
operating asset condition, so these indieators can also be considered as "pertormance
indicators." For a comprehensive pcrformance mcasuremcnt system, thc number of
indicators in the three major areas of asset integrity will usually be increased. Mengolini
etal. (2008) mentioned that several indicators are required tor performance measurcment
because focusing on a single feature can often be misleading rather than supportive.
When too many indicators fi·om several areas are considered then two important issues
arise. Oneofthcm is the presence of dissimilar units of indicators fTom different areas,
which will be taken care of by the proposed risk based approach and helps to create a
unit-less measure. Another issue has to compile the entire indicators outcome into an
overall measure of asset performance. In this situation performance indexing is a very
useful tool that is capable of combining all the indicators' information into a single value.
A risk index scale will be developed for indicator performance mapping that will
illustrate the assets' conditions. This will eventually also assist in comparing the
composite outcome of indicators to a corresponding asset performance target.
3.2.7 Risk Based Indicator Development
Selecting appropriate indicators for measuring asset performance is very critical.
Indicators are of diverse naturc, having different units and a wide array of information
that is also quite tough to integrate. This is why most of the available literature does not
deal with the performance indexing system. The risk-based approach provides an
opportunity to locate the target region in developing indicators. The risk concept allows
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fixing one target, which is the identification of risk significant events and will be done via
indicators. At the same time risk also provides an easy way to integrate the indicator
outcome to an index. Risks involved in different activities are of paramount importancc in
managing assct intcgrity. A successful assct intcgrity systcm require~ considcration or
risk for developing multilevel indicators. So, thc indicators will be s'1lected considering
all the risk enhancing scenarios since the target is to avoid any kino of incidents that
could Icad to an accidcnt.
For devcloping a comprehcnsivc set of indicators, thc asset integrity guidelines provided
by I-ISE (2007), RBPS (2007), and OGP (2008) are considered and followed at eaeh
stage. The identification of an initial set of indicators was based on literature review. The
Texas City explosion investigation report provided by Mogford (2005) and Baker (2007)
panel were thoroughly studied to identitY a comprehensive set of indicators. These
investigation reports have highlighted several asset integrity related issues that were
overlooked. Besides these, the detailed aeeident investigation report by Collins et al.
(2003), titled "Loss of Containment Ineident Analysis" was also considered. This report
investigated 718 accident scenarios and grouped them into different catcgories to identify
the causes of the accidents. In developing indicators the speeified causes relating to
physical equipment, operational activity, and human factors are also taken into
consideration. Along with these the IAEA (2000) and SENUF (2006) repol1s were also
analyzed for a potential set of multilevel asset integrity indicators df:velopment. More
emphasis is given to identify the floor level speeific indicators. In thc specific levels the
selected leading and lagging indicators will cover all the aspects of plant, proecss, and
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pcople. This will bc donc by idcntifying thc potcntial dcgradation mcchanism and thrcats
to thc intcgrityofthc cquipmcnts.
3.2.7.1 Mechanical Integrity Indicator Development
Mcchanical intcgrity (MI) is an intcgral part ofthc assct intcgrity systcm that suppOl1S thc
protcction ofthc plant, proccss, cmploycc, cnvironmcnt, and surrounding community. MI
in rcspcct to proccss facility is a major conccrn and failurc to adcquatcly maintain
cquipmcntcan havccatastrophic rcsults. Mcchanical intcgrity hasgaincd popularity with
thc introduction of Occupational Safcty and Hcalth Administration (OSHA) rcgulations
on Proccss Safcty Managcmcnt of Highly Hazardous Chcmicals. Thc OSHA rcgulation
29 CFR 1910, scction 119(j) rcquircs a mcchanical intcgrity systcm whcrc all inspcction
and tcsting of cquipmcnt arc pcrformcd using writtcn proccdurcs and by compctcnt
pcrsonncl (OSHA, 1992). In addition, thc Environmcntal Protcction Agcncy (EPA, 40
CFR Part 68, USA) in "Risk Managcmcnt Program" and Amcrican Pctrolcum Institutc
(API, RP 750:1990) in "Managcmcnt of Proccss Hazards" also pointcd out thc
rcquircment of mechanical integrity assurancc (Mannan, 2005).
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The Chemieal Manufacturers' Association, USA, defines mechanical integrity as ..the
cstablishmentand implementation of written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity or
the process equipment." Mechanical integrity is the state ofa process or cquipmcnt that
indicates that it is capable ofcomplete operations within the designed limit. It can be ensured
through a documented program of procedures, policies, inspections, and tests and through
preventive and corrective maintcnance based upon good engineering practice, applicable
codes, standards, specifications, and manufacturers' recommendations. Thc objective is to
ensure equipment docs not fail in a way that causes an unwanted scenario. Sutton (1997)
states, MI beyond the fact the title contain the word "mechanical." Mechanical Imegritl,
covers much more than mechanical engineering issues. Mechanical integrity is also not just
the maintenance of equipment, although maintenance isa major part of an MI. Other good
engineering practices, such as inspection, process safety, reliability discipline, and quality
assurance etc., are also included. MI is the systematic implementation of all activities
necessary to ensure that important equipment will be suitable for its intended application
throughout the life span of an asset. It also increases the plant availability by reducing
equipment failure and minimizing the unplanned maintenance time.
Mechanical Integrity indicators are employed to monitor and assess the activities
performance in all engineering and other practices carried out to ensure the quality of the
service of operating equipment. Using the root level risk information, MI activities can be
monitored at three distinct stages. The following tree diagram in Figure 3-7 represents the
identified activity, as well as the key indicators in those respective areas. The mechanical
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integrity will be monitored using four major activity indicators, which arc: inspcction,
maintenance, inspection & maintenance managementandengineering assessment.
IlISpection: Inspection is one of the integral parts of the mechanical integrity program.
Inspection is the systematic way to verify of compliance with standards or to assess the
current condition of equipment. This is usually performed with the assistance of special
inspection instruments or tools along with visual observation. Most of the process industry
ulilizesthe inspection data to determine the overall asseteondition. The success of inspection
activity depends on inspection strategies, typcs/mcthods, lools, intcrvals, and lhc coverage.
These parameters vary with respect to the type of components to be inspected and with the
applicable legislation requirement. So inspeetionshouldbemonitored via key indicalors
tailored to specific indicators. Inspection activities arc asscsscd through three key indicators;
these arc: inspcction strategy, inspection effectivencss and compliance with statutOly
requirement. Thesc key indicators arc expanded to specific level and several leading and
lagging indicators arc proposed in these areas, as shown in Figure 3-8. These indicators will
collect the basic information to detennine the inspection pcrformancc.
Maintenance: Maintenancc is intended to minimizc assct downtime whilst maximizing
inherent safety, rcliability, availability, and integrity levels of the equipment. Maintenancc isa
complex practicc that involvcs diffcrcnt typcs ofmaintcnance perspcctivcs and several other
related aspects. It usually involves measurcmcnts, tcsts, rcpairs, rcplaecments, adjustmcnt,
and tcstingalter maintenanec activities to rcstore or retain cquipment to its original operating
condition. Convcntionally, maintcnancc has bcen considered as a secondary process (UHsten,
1999) or sometimes treated as a necessary evil. This stratcgy will be changed if cquipment is
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not monitored properly and maintained routinely before breakdown. To identifY the
performance of maintenance activity, five relevant key indicators arc employed. These arc:
PM performance, CM performance, reliability perspective ofSSC, availability of equipment,
and compliance with rules and regulation. These five key indicators further expanded up to
several applicable specific Icadingand lagging indicators levels as shown in Figure 3-9.
Il1.\pection & Maintenance Management: The inspection and maintenance activity will have
no value or will not beefl'cetive unless they arc managed properly. The management requires
the planning and scheduling along with logistic support arrangement. Failures to provide and
implement proper maintenance procedures have been reportedasa rooteauseofaceidentsin
several occasions. This activity indicator should be employed for ensuring mechanical
integrity. For monitoring inspection and maintenancc management activity four convenient
key indicators arc proposcd, which arc: planning and schcduling, corrcspondcnce with
opcrational activity, work flow monitoring, and procurcment and inventory control. These
key indicators perfonllances arc determined by certain specific leading and laggings
indicators, which arc shown in Figure 3-10.
Engineering Assessment: Assessment is a very important issue to determine the present
performance and to decide the future essentials. All maintenance and inspection activities
should be assessed fromatechnicalaswellasafinancial,pointofview.It'saprerequisitelor
any type of engineering activity. Again two key indicators arc proposed to determine the
assessment performance. These arc: financial optimization and control and quality of work
execution. And finallY,a fewdevelopcdrootlcvelspecific leading and lagging indicators arc
shown in Figure 3-1 I.
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[ Quality of Work Execution K
Figure 3-7: Tree diagram for mechanical intcgrity indicators development
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Figure 3-9: Leading and lagging indicators for maintenance activity
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3.2.7.2 Operational Integrity Indicator Development
It is commonly believed lhat asset integrity can be achieved only by maintaining
mechanical integrity. But, the success of asset integrity is also rooted in the performances
of operational practices. The equipment in a process facility could be in excellent
condition, but it will not assure integrity unless operated appropriately. The equipment
should be operated as per standard updated operating guideline and within the designed
limits. Sale and reliable operations arc essential in today's process tacility to maintain the
integrity level. Strict control of operational discipline and competent operation in a
process facility is essential to establish operational integrity. Sound equipment with sound
operation will ensure the optimum level of asset integrity.
Operational Integrity: Pirie (2007) defined 01 as "appropriate knowledge, experience,
manning, competence and decision making data to operate the plant as intended
throughout its lifecycle." Beyond appropriate operating procedure, 01 performance also
depends on the other issues, like safety system, plant configuration, and emergency
management system and on some other non-technical management systems as well.
Operational Integrity Indicators are developed to monitor the different activities.
operations, and processes in the operational areas. The performance of the operational
integrity clement depends on certain activities. These activities move beyond operational
performances and also include technical initiatives and safety system management issues.
Operational integrity clements have been divided into five major activities, as shown in
Figure 3-12, which arc practiced to maintain operational integrity. These arc: operating
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performance, state of SSC, plant configuration and modification, engineering safety
system,andemergeneyresponsearrangement.
Operating Performance: Plant operating performance has great innuenee in the
operational integrity achievcmcnt. Incidents may occur if thc opcrating proccdurcs arc
inadcquatc, incorrcct, or could be misintcrprctcd due to ambiguity in understanding.
Efficient plant operation, particularly during thcabnormal condition is rcallya tough task.
Opcrational errors have becn noticcd sevcral timcs as a root cause for accident
occurrcnccs even while the plant was in normal operating conditions. This type of
incident can be avoided by following a written operating procedure for normal as well as
in emergency situations. Operating limits for each operating mode and operating
instructions should be clearly defined and updating should be done routinely. Operating
procedures and instructions should be regularly reviewed for maintaining completeness
and accuracy levels. The activity indicator performance will depend on the two key
indicators: operating procedure and forced outage. Key indicators are fi.lrtherexpanded to
specific leading and lagging indicators level, as shown in Figure 3-13, for the necessity of
quantifiable indicators.
State ol SSe: State of systems, structures, and components also innuence the operating
performance. Corrosion and fatigue condition of equipment is an important aspect for any
type of establishment. The importance of attention also increases with the increase age of
SSe. With the increase of age the corrosion propagation rate also moves more rapidly.
The reliable performance ofSSC eventually provides confident in incident tree operation.
To ensure dependable performance, this activity indicator is planned to monitor through
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three key indicators. These arc: corrective WO, corrosion and fatigue condition, and
ageing conditions of SSe. The developed specific leading and lagging indicators in these
key areas arc shown in Figure 3-14.
Planl Con/iguralion & Modi/icalion: Plant configuration is a design aspect that is beyond
the scope of in-service asset integrity approach. Still, modifications arise with the design
configuration and limiting operating conditions during inspection and maintenance
period. The modifications in design and configurations plants also have impacts on the
operational integrity performance. Plant configuration is to be analyzed first 10 identify
potential areas of improvement. Severalleehnieal, financial, and safely issues have 10 be
considered during modifications. Assessment of modification requirement and change in
operating procedure arc most important. Since operating performances have relation with
these activities, they also need to be monitored. Three key indicators arc employed to
monitor the plant configuration and modification activity. These arc: plant design,
modification effectiveness, and modification assessment. Thoroughly studying the key
areas of performance observation, several specific leading and lagging indicators arc
developed, as shown in Figure 3-15.
Engineering Salely Syslem: Engineering safety systems and safety related systems and
items should be given more priority in every respect. These systems arc usually remains
standby, so their operating performance should be ensured at the time of requirement.
This could be done by performing routine inspection and arranging provision lor
immediate maintenance of safety system related breakdown issues. Safety systems help to
avoid the rise of any undesired event. So, with the need of monitoring the performance of
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this important activity, two key indicators are proposed. These arc: safety system
performance and safety system related backlog. Under these two key indicators,
appropriate developed specific leading and lagging indicators arc shown in Figure 3-16.
Emergency Response Arrangements: This is a reactive arrangement system followed by
an undesired incident. Major incidents in a process facility arc rare, which is why the
emergency arrangement system receives less attention. But, future occurrences cannot be
neglected and arrangements should be made to lower the impact level if an unlikely
accident occurred. And, continuous observation of this activity is essential to ensure the
response system operability and to avoid the enhancement of occurred incident. In this
area, two key indicators arc set-up, followed by numbers of specific leading and lagging
indicators, as shown in Figure 3-17, to collect routine information. The key indicators arc
emergency response system performance and emergency preparedness. These two will
cover the entire process facility and includes training, educating and motivating
employees and contractor staffs in emergency notification, response, preparedness and
evacuation procedures.
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Figure 3-15: Leading and lagging indicators for plant configuration and modification activity
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Figure 3-16: Leading and lagging indicators for engineering safety system activity
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3.2.7.3 Personnel Integrity Indicator Development
The integrity of mechanical and opcrational clements can only be achieved if all involved
activities are adequately handled by competent personnel. Withoutefficient,trained,and
competent personnel asset integrity goals can never be attained. So, asset integrity in this
respect means making sure all operating facilities arc operated properly, inspected, and
maintained adequately by efficient manpower. Human factors arc important issues in
process operation and research revealed that human errors contributes to unsafe practices
and accidents more than two thirds of the time in industries (Wilsonetal.,2005).I-luman
factor aspect has a dominant impact on the activities that arc carried out for attaining
mechanical and operational integrity sectors. For long term growth ofa process facility
and to ensure asset desired performance, competent personnel have to be developed. The
development process involves training of personnel, and it should be an on-going process
that contributes to keeping the professional skills up to date. Along with this, the
commitment I'Tom the senior management is also required to make sure of consistence
performance I'Tom plant personnel. Kletz (1993) mentioned that, "Organizations have no
memory; only people have memories." Their experience with past incidents should be
shared with others with lack of experience, so that the likelihood of making errors can be
reduced. To maintain integrity, any process needs to take human 11letors into
consideration that protect integrity.
Personnel Integrity can be defined as the condition when plant personnel showed
adequate performance in all asset integrity related activities and their skill levels arc
developed continuously with the updated trainings scheme. It basically requires the
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assurance of optimal human performance so that no incident will oceur due to human
errors. The success of this element is also firmly rooted in the personnel's self behaviors
towards achieving asset integrity and the organization culture.
Personnel Integrity Illdicator: Personnel integrity indicators are a means of measuring
human performance effectiveness in everyday's plant activities. Iluman performances are
closely related with the physical plant asset activities along with a few subjective issues.
Multistage indicators are developcd here also to visualize the performance level. To
monitor the plant-wide human performance, the personnel integrity element has to be
observed using the proposed four activity indicators. These are: training, staff
competence, permits to work, and communication, as depicted in Figure 3-18 in tree
diagram format.
Training: Training is the best way to develop plant pcrsonnel to attain the personnel
integrity goal. This is the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and abilities to mcct thc
requiredperformancc level for particular activities. Thcrolesandresponsibiliticsofevery
personnel in a process facility should be specific and clearly defincd. Then, the training
need and scope should be identified accordingly. Relevant training should be provided to
those personnel based on their involvement in spccific task (OGP, 2008). Training
requirements related to update operating proccdures and safety culturc is mandatory along
with other technical, specialized, and interpersonal training. Mogford(2005) pointed out
that in a Texas City refinery several management of change (MaC) were conducted and
operating procedure were changed accordingly, but no indications were found that
training had occurred. Training should not be limited to plant personnel only; contractors
79
pcrsonncl should also bc traincd in some mandatory aspcct. Training ofa contractor's
pcrsonnel issucs wcre also rccommcndcd in thc Pipcr Alpha invcstigation rcport
(Mannan, 2005). Hcrc, training activity will bc monitorcd using two kcy indicators, which
arc: safcty culturc and tcchnical and intcrpcrsonal training. Thcsc kcy indicators arc
furthcr cxpanded for the rcquircmcnt of quantifiablc spccific Icading and lagging
indicators. Both scts of indicators in respcctive arcas arc dcvclopcd and prcscntcd in
Figurc 3-19.
Siall Compelence: Plant pcrsonncl compctcncc Icvcls can bc considcrcd as onc of thc
main barricrs towards achicvcmcnt of pcrsonncl intcgrity. Compctcncc is thc ability to
prcciscly and rcliably mcct thc pcrformancc rcquircmcnt for a spccific rolc. Kcy
activities, tasks, and supervision in thc critical arcas rcquircd compctcnt pcrsonncl so that
incidcnts can bc avoidcd. Compctcncc plant pcrsonncl can makc thc diffcrcncc bctwccn
flawlcss pcrformance and occurrcncc of major incidcnts. Opcrations and maintcnancc
tcchnicians working dircctly on a particular assct rcquircd compctcncc i.c. skills,
knowlcdgc, and pcrsonal attributcs in thc rclcvant typical workplacc arcas (OGP, 2008).
Considcring thc importance of staff compctcncc, thc invcstigation rcport ofPipcr Alpha
rccolTImcndcd that the minimum qualificationofoffshorc platformmanagcrsshouldbcof
graduatc Icvcl (Mannan,2005). To vcrifythc staffcompctcncc, Ievcl two kcy indicators
arc cmploycd, which arc: staffpcrformancc and asscssmcnt ofcompctcncc. In thc samc
manncr, these key indicators arc monitorcd through scvcral spcciflc Icading and lagging
indicators that arc shown in Figurc 3-20.
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Permit to Work: OGP (1993) defined a permit to work as "a formal written system used
to control certain types of work which arc identified as potentially hazardous" The PTW
usually contains information on hazards involved in the maintenance operation, the
appropriate personal protective equipment to be worn, and loek-out-tag-out (LOTO)
information. The aim ofPTW is to make sure that adequate planning and consideration is
given to the risks of a particular task. At the same time, the PTW should be followed
during work execution that may have potential adverse consequences. The Piper Alpha
explosion investigation report pointed out that one of the prominent cause of the accident
was a failure in one of the major management system that is a PTWsystem. The report
also places considerable emphasis on the need tor an effective PTW system (Mannan,
2005). Considering this, OGP (1993) has developed a guideline that describes different
steps to be followed for issuing PTW. This important activity performance also needs to
be monitored and to do so two key areas arc identified; these arc: effectiveness of PTW
and compliance with PTW indicators. To observe the performance in these two key areas
specific leading and lagging indicators arc developed in their respective field and shown
in Figure 3-21.
Communication: Communication is one of the most important issues in a process facility
and can be considered as a key factor to asset integrity accomplishment. Effective
communication is a prerequisite for implementing an asset integrity strategy and helps to
create and maintain a safe workplace. Communication channels should be open,
redundant, and capable of flowing Irom both vertical and horizontal direction. All
managements, plant supervisors, managers, operators, and workers should be aware of
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their definite task and increased communication between them will reveal numbers of
weakness in a process plant. In this way, the ncar misses and incidents occurrence can
also be minimized. The activities under the communication should be monitorcd closcly
and any problem in a communication system should be given top priority and
subscquentlyshould be solved immediately. For observing the performance for this vital
activity, three best suited key indicators arc choscn. These arc: rcporting incidents,
communication systems and management of change. Reporting all typcs of incidents
irrcspcctiveofseverity through proper communication systcm will havegrcat influence
on future occurrences. All type of MOe processes necd to be communicated to every
relevant and required place. Specific leading and lagging indicators arc developed, as
shown in Figure 3-22 underthekcyindicators fortheneedofquan tifiableindieators.
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Figure 3-18: Tree diagram for personnel integrity indicators development
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3.2.8 Aggregation Technique
The meaning and relation of specific indicators' risk information arc more important
rather than its measurement only. "A numerical value of any individual indicator may be
of no significance if treated in an isolated manner, but may be enhanced when considered
in the context of other indicator performances" (IAEA, 2000). So, the aggregation mClhod
has to bc uscd to represcnt the overall pcrformance of all opcrating assets. The asset
integrity indicator system should be integrated in a systematic way to achicve the targct
(or which they arc developed. Aggregation is a special technique that combines and aligns
thc values of lowcr level indicators' outcomes in a common scale that assists in
estimating the values for higher level indicators. Proposed indicator system based on
hierarchical structure provides an easy way to systemalically aggregale lower level
information and to Ilow towards the upper level.
Aggregation of data fTom lower root level specific indicators to top level strategic goals
will be performed in two steps. In the first step, the root level specific risk information
will be aggregated. The root level leading and lagging indicators for monitoring asset
performance arc of different natures with different units such as number, ratio, percentage
etc. So, it is quite difficult to transform all these outcome values of indicators into a
common comparable rating scale. To overcome the diverse nature of indicator data, a risk
based approach is followed. Risk provides a common ground of measuring units for both
types of indicators (Khan et aI., 2009). At the same time, risk measurement can be used
without units for asset performance that makes the aggregation process easier. In the
second step, the risk factors of individual indicators will be multiplied by the appropriate
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weighting factor at each level of indicators to get the final asset risk index. To identify the
varying levels of importance for each stage of indicators', analytical hierarchy process
(AHP) will be used. Pair-wise importance comparison of indicators from an expert's
panel will be analyzed by AHP to assign different weights to same group of indicators.
Finally, the weighted average technique will be used to calculate leading and lagging risk
index at different levels of the hierarchy and to obtain the final risk index value. Thus, the
developed aggregation tcchniquc will integrate risk information from lower level specific
indicators to the top levcl ofthc hicrarchical framework. This is done to quantify the risk
indcx through thc correspondcd impOitance level of the each level indicator in the
hierarchy to determine the overall asset integrity index.
3.2.9 Indicator Risk Determination
Risk isa random event that may possibly occur and, ifit did occur, would have a negative
impact on the goals of the organization (Vose, 2008). Indicators indicate the quantified
value and the trend in risks by combining two primary factors. The product of these two
primary factors: likelihood and consequences constitutes risk. Conscquences in this
respect will be considered as health and safety, production loss, environmental damage,
repair cost, and reputation loss. Like other industries process industries, have the common
practices of ignoring low probability events, even those, which could have potential
consequences. This type of scenario is very much evident from the Esso Longford gas
cxplosion in 1998; a low probability event like major gas leak causes the catastrophic
accident (Hopkins, 2000). The risk based indicator approach will provide a picture of the
overall risk other than looking into likelihood and consequences separatcly. The timely
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indication can change the risk profile of a process facility before risk events tends to
manifest. Assets risk in a process facility should be measured on a timcly basis by leading
and lagging indicators. Assct indicators' risk value acl as feedback and can be used (or
monitoring, controlling and determining future essentials to achieve strategic the goal and
asset integrity. Monitoring will be done by indicating significant changes in risk level,
control will be done by mapping underlying risk with the risk index, and management can
make rational decision offilture essentials based on individual assct indicator risk.
3.2.9.1 Leading Indicator Risk Determination
Stcp Change in Safety defined 'leading performance indicator' as "something that
provides information that helps the user respond to changing circumstances and take
actions to achieve desired outcomes or avoid unwanted outcomes. Their role is to help
improve nlture performance by promoting action to correct potential weaknesses without
waiting for demonstrated failures." The developed forward-looking specific leading
indicators can be employed for monitoring two important parameters: percentage
likelihood of success and the importance level of the success for an input activity. Here
the term importance level is used, as no adverse incidents have occurred yet and mapped
using the Appendix A consequence criteria. Using these two parameters, the risk
associated with the individual action is estimated by Equation 3-1.
Risk faclor for leading specific indicator (R wsl );
=(IOO-%agcofsuccess)ximportanceofsuccess
Whereiisthenumberofleading indicators in the specific indica tor group.
(3-1)
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All of the specific indicators arc monitored through multiple leading indicators. There arc
different aggregation operators availablc to deal with the individual parameters and to get
a combined result. Usually, thc arithmetic averagc and weighted average arc used to
normalize the indicators' risk factors. Avcraging the risk factor docs not reprcscnt the
actual condition of the plant. By averaging, high risk cvents arc actually diluted and the
outcomc could misguide the managemcnt too. This simply means that the indicator with a
high risk factor will be compensatcd by the other low risk factor indicators. But, in
reality, it is not possible to lower the risk Icvel of an event by the good performance of
other events. Here, the proposed approach gives priority to worst-case scenario and
considers the maximum risk value among all leading risk factors under each specitic
indicator. The maximum risk value will be considered as a risk factor for that particular
leading specific indicator. This highest risk value using Equation 3-2 will be thc risk
factor for that particular key indicator and will be used for further aggregation.
Risk factor for leading key indicator (R LDKI)j
= Highest risk score among 'i' leading specific risk factor (R ws1 ),
Wherej is the numbcrofkey indicators in an activity indicator.
(3-2)
The leading key risk factor I'Tom Equation 3-2 will be multiplicd by the respectivc
weights of kcy indicators to get the risk factor for the leading activity indicator using
Equation 3-3.
Risk factor for leading activity indicator (R WAd)k
= ~Wj x Risk factor of leading key indicator (RLDK1)j (3-3)
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Wherek is the number of activity indicators in the clement indicator.
The leading activity risk factor from Equation 3-3 will be multiplied by the respective
weights of activity indicators to get the risk factor for the leading clement indicator using
Equation 3-4.
Risk factor for leading element indicator (R wu ),
= :8 w k x Risk factor of leading activity indicator (RLD;,d)k
Where I is the number of clement indicators in asset integrity.
(3-4)
Finally, the leading asset integrity risk factor is estimated by multiplying the risk t'actor
for the leading clement indicator with respective weights of clement indicators using
Equation 3-5.
Leading risk ['actor for asset integrity (R WA1 )
= ~WI x Risk factor of leading element indicator (Rum),
3.2.9.2 Lagging rndicator Risk Determination
(3-5)
Lagging indicators arc traditional performance measurement tools and represenl the resull
of unwanted incidents. The identified noor level specific lagging indicators can be
employed to those specific areas for recording the occurred incidents. These lagging
indicators will also monitor two basic risk parameters, suehasthe frequency or number of
event occurrences for a particular time period and the severity of the occurred incident.
Here, in case of lagging indicators, since the event has occurred already, the term severity
is used and also mapped using the Appendix A consequence criteria. Using the collecled
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two parameters' information risk related with the individual event is estimated by
Equation 3-6.
Risk factor for lagging specific indicator (R LGSI L
= Number of occured events ill unit timex severity of that event
Where 111 is the number of lagging indicator in the specific indicator group.
(3-6)
In this case also, several lagging indicators arc developed to monitor the atter effeel of
events under each specific indicator. So, the same strategy followed in case of leading
indicators will be used here and highest risk factor using Equation 3-7 will be used lor
further aggregation.
Risk factor for lagging key indicator (RL(;KI)j
= Highcst risk score among' m' lagging specific risk factor (R L(;SI L
Where) is the number of key indicator in the activity indicator.
(3-7)
The lagging key risk factor fTom Equation 3-7 will be multiplied by the respective
weights of key indicators to get the risk factor for the lagging activity indicator using
Equation 3-8.
Risk factor for lagging activity indicator (RLGAcI)1
= ~Wj x Risk factor of lagging key indicator (RL<;KI)j
Where k is the number ofactivity indicators in the clement indicator.
(3-8)
The lagging activity risk factor from Equation 3-8 will be multiplied by the respective
weights of activity indicators to get the risk factor for lhe lagging clement indicator using
Equation 3-9.
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Risk factor for lagging element indicator(R!(;E1),
= Bw k x Risk factor of lagging act ivity indicator (R !(;Ad )k
Where I is the number of clement indicators in asset integrity.
(3-9)
Finally, the lagging asset integrity risk factor is estimated by multiplYing the risk factor
for the lagging clement indicator with respective weights of clement indicators using
Equation 3-10.
Lagging risk factor for asset integrity (R I.(;AI)
= ~ W I x Risk factor of lagging element indicator (R IIiEI ),
3.2.10 Analytical Hierarchy Process Technique
(3-10)
It was mentioned earlier that the aggregation of risk based asset integrity indicators will
be done in two steps. The first step totally depends on the plant specific information that
varies from interval to interval and will be collected in that specific time interval lor
assessment. But, the second step that is related to the weight allocation between different
indicators in the asset integrity hierarchy is independent of the varying phenomenon. So,
this weighting part can be standardized by taking expert opinion of indicators' relative
importance. Once the indicators standard weight factors arc determined, multiplying this
with the specific indicators parameter aggregation target can easily be achieved. The
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) technique will be used for analyzing the expert opinion
and to determine the standard weight factors.
AHP developed by Thomas L. Saaty (1980) is one of the most popular and commonly
used approaches for multi-criteria decision analysis. This is a standard statistical analysis
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technique to determine the relative weight i.e. importance of parameters. AHP is based on
pair-wise comparisons between criteria or attributes provided by one or more experts in
deriving weights for individual alternatives (Alonso et al. 2006). AHP is especially suited
for assessing the qualitative information from experts. AHP also uses a weighted average
approach, but it uses a method for assigning ratings so derived wcights can bc considcrcd
morc rcliablc and consistcnt. Herc, thc objectivc is to dcterminc the weight factors lor the
multilevel indicators and AHP is selected considering the following advantages:
Pair-wise comparisons solve thc problem of handling the different types of scales
andprovideaveryeonvenientformofdatainputfi·omexperts.
It enables the synthesis of both subjective and objeetiveevaluationmeasuresand
capable to detect inconsistent judgement in pair-wise comparison.
iii. Relative importance of each parameter is apparent and allows justifiable weight
computing.
iv. AHP allows integrating multiple experts' judgements by taking the geometric
average of the individual pair-wise comparisons (Zahir, 1999).
3.2.10.1 Multilevel Weight Calculation using AHP
Multilevel weight in the asset hierarchy means the weight determination of key, activity,
and clement indicators. The same procedure will be followed for all three levels of
indicators weight determination. Since hierarchical structure is already developed, the
multilevel weight calculation using the AHP methodology will be performed following
these steps:
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Step one: developing a pair-wise comparison matrix
Depending on the number of indicators in the particular level of hierarchy a comparison
matrix will be developed. Pair-wise comparison allows determining the relative order or
ranking of a set of indicators by assigning weight. In a pair-wise comparison of
indicators, the contribution of an individual indicator to achieve the asset integrity goal
will be considered. To overcome one of the drawbacks of AHP fixed scaling system in
relative importance, an open scaling system is proposed. In pair-wise comparison, the
experts arc allowed to give any weighting value in the upper triangular of the matrix. If
the given weight value is less than I that means that the compared indicator in less
important than the other indicator. On other hand, more than I means the compared
indicator is more important than the other indicator. If both the indicators arc equally
important then I will be given as weight value. The diagonal clements of the matrix arc
always I and for the lower triangular matrix the reciprocal values of the upper triangular
matrix will be used. ow if C 1, C2 •.•C, is the set of indicators then the quantified
judgements on pairs of indicators C;, Cj can be represented by an n-by-n matrix
A = (aijh (i,j=I,2, ,n)
and matrix A has the form
(3-11)
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Step tl'VO: Geometric averaging o.lexperts 'judgement
For standardization of multi-level indicators' weights, pair-wise comparison of indicators
will be done by several experts. Several methods arc available for averaging the expert
judgment. Among those a key aggregation mechanism is the geometric mean that gives a
good approximation of correct value. A geometric mean, unlike an arithmetic mean, tends
to dampen the effect of outlying weight values, which might bias thc mcan if an
arithmetic mean were calculated. The mathematical representation of the gcometric mcan
is shown in Equation 3-12, by taking the nIh root of the product of comparcd indicator
relativcweightfromncxpcrts.
Gcometric mcan of indicator wcight (GM)=(Ilx, Jx,
,-I
(3-12)
Where x is the relative weight of indicator provided by a particular expert and n is the
numberofexpertsinthcpancl.
Step three: Mathematical basis a/AN?
The relations bctwccn thc wcights, Wj. and judgemcnts, alj. can bc given by
(fori,j= 1,2, ..... ,n)
and matrix A in(ll)canbewrillenas
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A= . (3-13)
This paired matrix should be normalized to obtain the eigenvalues, which should
correspond to eigenvectors. There arc several methods for calculating the eigenvectors
and again the geometric mean will be used. Weight at each level will be calculated using
Equation 3-14.
\\I; =[n(~J] y.
i-llWj
(3-14)
This weight will be totaled and the sum will be used to normalize the eigenvector
elcments and standardized weight can be determined from Equation 3-15.
(3-15)
These standardized weights arc normalized to a sum of I, i.e. tw, = 1.0.
3.2.10.2 Consistency Index and Consistency Ratio
Since the AHP analysis is based on the subjective judgment, the consistency test has to be
performed before using the calculated weight value. This scenario arises when the
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comparison matrix dimcnsion has more than two clcmcnts. Consistency indcx and
consistcncy ratio arc uscd to vcrify thc rcliability ofpair-wisc comparison and to chcck
whcthcr thcre is inconsistcncy in subjcctivc judgmcnts. Thc AHP tcchniquc lor
dctcrmining wcight rcmains incomplctc unlcss consistcncy indcxcs arc computcd and
chcckcdwiththcrandomconsistcncyvalucs.
In thc idcal casc, thc cigcnvcctor w of A with cigcnvalucs 'n' is rcprcscntcd as
AW=/1W
And thc matrix Acan bcwrittcnas
~~2' \~n
w~, I w~" WI \VIlV2 lV:!
A=
wi, wi2' lV" HI"
(3-16)
(3-17)
Human judgcmcnts arc not complctcly pcrfect and thc condition a,. = a;; .a i• in thc
rcciprocalmatrixand Equation 3-16 does not hold and is rcplaccd by
AW=AW (3-18)
Whcrc '/c' is an cigcnvaluc, and in this casc thc cigcnvcctor valuc 'w' should satisfy thc
Equation 3-19.
Aw = Ann< W, Where Ann, ~ /1 (3-19)
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Here, Am., is the maximized eigenvector of a pair-wise comparison matrix and can be
ealeulated using the Equation 3-20.
(3-20)
The difference between Am., and 'n' isan indication of inconsistency of expert judgement
and the logicality of the weighting can be evaluated through the consistency index that is
estimated by the Equation 3-21.
CI = A"", -11
11-1
(3-21)
The final step is to estimate the consistency ratio that is the ratio of the CI to the random
consistency index (RCI) for the same order matrix. This is done to compare the level of
consistency relative to the consistency of large samples of purely random judgement .The
following Table 3-1 gives the values for RCI derived fTom simulation. The CR is given
the Equation 3-22.
CR=~
RCI
(3-22)
Saaty (1980) suggested that a consistency ratio of 0.1 0 or less is acceptable. If the CR is
more than 0.10 then the experts' judgements arc unreliable, and CR 0.00 means
judgements arc perfectly consistent.
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Table3-1: Randomeonsisteney index (Saaty, 1980)
Dimension of
Comparison Matrix
(n-by-n)
Random Dimension of Random
Consisteney Index Comparison Matrix Consisteney Index
(n-by-n)
0.00 9 1.45
0.00 10 1.49
0.58 11 1.51
0.90 12 1.48
1.12 13 1.56
1.24 14 1.57
1.32 15 1.59
1.41
3.2.11 Leading and Lagging Risk Index Scale
Risk index (RI) isa eomposite representation of an estimated asset risk condition that is
manipulated in some manner to give a crisp value. Risk index is formed by aggrcgating
several indicators' risk scores and multiplied with the varying levels of importance at
each Icvel of indicators. The weighted average exprcsses the current overall leading and
lagging risk condition of assets by generating a single index value. These index values
have to be interpreted by a risk scale for categorization and for quick illustration of
performance. To do so, a four tier standard risk index scale is developed following the
API (2008) risk index system as shown in Table 3-2. A proposed index scale is developed
considering the specific indicator risk mapping strategy for maintaining consistency. So,
any leading or lagging risk index score in between 0 to 100 can be easily mapped on the
index scale category. At the same time, any other level of individual indicators' risk in the
indicator hierarchy risk can also be mapped with this scale. The risk scale tier categories
are developed by assigning thresholds limit for each tier. The limit for the first tier is
chosen trom 0 to 19, indicated as green that represents the low risk. The second tier
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indicatcd as yellow reprcscnts medium risk with the risk indcx limit from 19 [0 44. Thc
third ticr indicated as orange represcnts high risk with the risk index limit from 45 to 74.
The final tier represents thecxtrcme risk indicatcd as red with the risk index limit 01'75 to
100. The interpretation of each tier is easy and allows the management to make a quick
decision in determining the future essentials. The thresholds limit also allows the
management to trace easily the changes in the risk profile of asset.
Table 3-2: Asset risk index characterization scale and color code
Asset Risk Index Scale
Ranking of Risk Risk Index Range Risk Class Color Code
75<Risk Index<IOO Extreme
45:'SRisk Index<75 High Orange ~I
20:'SRisk Index<45 Medium Yellow
I
O:'SRisk Index<20 Low ~~td.~i~1
3.2.12 Data Collection
Data collection is essential for validating the proposed asset integrity indicator model.
Data will be collected for both of the sections of the developed approach. To determine
multilevel indicators' weight in the asset integrity hierarchy, relative importances of
indicators' information will be collected. This information will be collected from several
experts to standardize the respective weight of indicators. Collecting and analyzing
information fTom several experts' and academician will assist in damping the subjectivity
of weight determination. On the other hand, since the developed indicators arc not yet
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employed in any process industry, to check the feasibility of these indicators risk
information has to also be collected. This information is also necessary to determine the
functionality of a proposed model and to perform the benchmark study. The
sueccssfulness of plant specific data collection will ensure the viability and
appropriateness of the identified specific indicators. There arc several ways to collect the
data from various sources, such as interviews, inquiries/survey, discussion, and
questionnaires. Among these, considering the nature of the required information/data in
this approach, the questionnaire system is selected. "A questionnaire system is easier to
administrate and to treat" for achieving desired outcome (IAEA, 2000). So, two sets of
questionnaires were developed and arc presented in Appendix B based on guidelines
provided by IAEA, OEeD, and OGP. The first questionnaire is used to collect leading
and lagging risk information of assets and will be described in detail in the benchmark
study. The second set is particularly developed to collect feedback fi'om experts on
different level indicators pair-wise comparison value. The questionnaires were
communicated to the respective respondents via emails. In both of the questionnaires'
simple examples arc demonstrated how to give input easily. This makes the questionnaire
set more trustworthy and is expected to have desired feedback from evaluators.
3.2.13 Multilevel Indicator Weight Assessment
The feedback from experts (list of expert in Appendix C) for pair-wise comparison was
analyzed thoroughly using the described AHP technique. Estimated standardized weights
for three level indicators arc presented in Table 3-3. Both academic and process plant
personnel were selected in the expert panel to get feedback on the pair-wise comparison
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quaternaries. The calculated consistency ratio as shown in Table 3-3 docs not represent
any outliner value that goes beyond the acceptable range. So, the judgements provided by
the experts arc consistent and reliable for fllrther use in aggregation.
Table 3-3: Standardized weights for multilevel indicator in asset indicator hierarchy
Indicators Relative Consistency Consistency
Importance Index(CI) Ratio (CR)
(Weights) (%) (%)
Levell: Key Indicator
Area: Mechanical Integrity
Inspection Strategy 0.38 1.20 2.08
Inspection Effectiveness 0.36
Compliance with Statutory 0.26
Requirement
Preventive Maintenance Performance 0.25 1.42 1.27
Corrective Maintenance Performance 0.16
Reliability PerspeetiveofSSC 0.24
Availability of Equipment 0.17
Compliance with Rules & Regulation 0.19
Planning & Scheduling 0.30 0.10 0.11
Correspondence with Operational 0.25
Activity
Work Flow Monitoring 0.26
Procurement & Inventory Management 0.19
Financial Optimization & Control 0.47 N/A N/A
Quality of Work Execution 0.53
Area: Operational Integrity
Operating Procedure 0.62
Forced Outages 0.38
Corrective Work Order Issued 0.34 0.08 0.14
Corrosion & Fatigue Condition 0.37
Ageing Condition ofSSC 0.29
Plant Design 0.42 0.50 0.87
Modification Effectiveness 0.28
Modification Risk Assessment 0.29
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Safety System Performance 0.51 N/A /A
Safety System Related Backlog 0.49
Emergency Response System 0.54 /A /A
Performance
Emergency Preparedness 0.46
Area: Persollnelilltegrity
Safety Culture 0.54 N/A N/A
Technical & Interpersonal Training 0.46
Staff Performance 0.50 N/A N/A
Assessment of Competence 0.50
EffectivenessofPTW 0.48 N/A N/A
Compliance with PTW 0.52
Reporting Incident 0.35 0.27 0.47
Communication System 0.29
Management ofChangc 0.36
Level 2: Activity Illdicator
Area: Mechanical Illtegrity
Inspection 0.31 0.83 0.93
Maintcnance 0.24
Inspection & Maintenance Management 0.23
Engineering Assessment 0.22
Area: Operatiollalilltegrity
Operating Performance 0.20 0.54 0.48
StateofSSC 0.21
Plant Configuration & Modification 0.17
Engineering Safety System 0.22
Emergency Response Arrangement 0.20
Area:Persollllelllltegrity
Training 0.30 0.40 0.44
Staff Competence 0.24
Permit to Work (PTW) 0.23
Communication 0.23
Level 3: Elemellt Indicator
Meehanieallntegrity 0.40 0.71 1.27
Operational Integrity 0.34
Personnel Integrity 0.26
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3.2.14 Implementation of Indicators
Maintaining asset integrity is a continuous process throughout the lifespan of the assets in
a process facility. This enforces the requirement of implementing the asset integrity
indicators in different areas of the process plant. To support the management decision
making on integrity related issues, asset integrity indicators should be implemented
efTectively. Because the function of asset integrity indicators is not limited 10 measuring
asset performance only, it also can be used as a means to manage the asset (or
maintaining integrity level. It may be questioned with the large number of specilic
indicators and the practicability of the implementation of these indicators in real life
situation. According to the Oxford dictionary, 'integrity' is defined as 'the state of being
whole and undivided.' To maintain asset completeness, a single or limited indicator system
is not capable to express all the relevant aspects of asset health, environment, and salcty
issues in designated areas (Vinnem et aI., 2006). Again the outcome of any individual
indicator may have no significance if treated independently but may become relevant
when considered in the context of other indicators' performances (IAEA, 2000). These
issues justified the requirement and development of a large number of indicators and
requirement of implementation, as well. Mostoftheindicatorrelated activities arc usually
followed and practiced throughout the process industries. This has been proved with the
information collection strategy of the benchmark study. Even the indicators' areas of
concerns or activities arc not practiced or followed performance of asset can be estimated.
And, to ensure future comprehensive asset performance measurement and subsequent
good asset performance requirement, the non practiced indicators can be established. The
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technique and steps for establishing the asset integrity indicators' system in any process
plant is given Figure 3-23. The flow diagram represents the stepwise process lor
implementing, measuring, and marinating asset risk performance. Concern relatcd to the
implemcntation of this indicator system comprehensively is to locate the exact indicators
areas. The hierarchical structure will provide an easy way to locate the areas and to
establish specific indicator systems lor monitoring the performance of an asset.
Sometimes the functionality of leading indicators may be puzzled with lagging indicators'
activity. Care should be taken while locating the leading and lagging indicators activities
in all of the major areas of assets. The proposed approach is a systematic orientation of
risk information collection and storing systems that arc analyzed aner certain time
interval. If the risk performance is within the acceptable limit based on the process plant
risk acceptance strategy then measures should be taken to maintain this performance and
even should strive for better performance. If not then the most risk vulnerable or
contributing areas should be identified and measure have to be taken to improve Illture
performances. Since the performance o I'each indicator can be mapped with the developed
risk index, the major risk significant areas that arc contributing to poor asset performance
can be figured out. These areas can also be ranked according to the associated risk value
and prioritize subsequently that provide an case to rationale decision making in asset
performance improvement task. This means areas should be given more concern that
could have greatest influence on the better asset performance. This will also ensure
optimum resource utilization, and better asset performance can also be achieved
consequently.
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Figure 3-23: Implementation of indieator system for achieving asset integrity (after HSE,
2006)
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Chapter 4
4 Benchmark Study
4.1 Introduction
Thc dcvclopcd spccific Icading and lagging indicators undcr thc hicrarchical indicator
structurc arc aimcd to monitor thc risk condition of asscts. Thc risk condition will
dctcrminc the tangiblc assct functionality and intangible parameter performance to the
dcsirc scrvicc level. To do so, first of all the indicators should bc cstablishcd in the
spccificareas ofproccss facility. The process for implcmenting the indicators' system for
monitoring asset performance has been described in the last chaptcr. Thc dcvcloped
indicators are not yct cstablishcd to any proccss facility. Even when the indicators are
established, it requires considcrablc timc to observe theactivitics in diffcrcnt arcasand to
deliver appropriate data. So, to check the applicability and functionality of dcvcloped
indicators indiffcrcnt proccss industrics, a bcnchmark study approach is conducted. The
aims of thc bcnchmark study arc to validatc the dcveloped indicator system, as well as to
compare thc assct risk pcrformance among diffcrcnt industries. Such comparison can bc
tcrmcd as benchmarking and promotcd as a mcans to bcttcr idcntifY opportunitics for
improvcmcnt also (CCPS, 2010). Again, for comparing thc assct pcrformancc, risk
indicated by Icading and lagging indicators is considcrcd comparison paramcter for thc
bcnchmarkstudy.
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4.2 Questionnaire Development for Specific Indicators
To carry out the benchmark study the first step is to collect data tTomprocess facilities
that are associated with various process events. Benchmarking is most used to measure
the performance of tangible as well as intangible assets using a specific indicator. In this
case, since the specific indicators arc not yet established, the study will beperlormed ina
different manner. For the collection of data, the developed specific leading and lagging
indicators were transformed into questionnaire format. In developing the questionnaires,
effort was made to investigate all aspects of tangible and intangible assel. The proposed
methodology adopted a risk-based approach, so the questionnaires should be developed in
such a way that the risk information can be achieved. Based on the specific leading
indicators, a questionnaire was developed that seeks basic leading risk information from
the respondent. The required two factors for leading indicators risk arc the percentage of
success of an event or activity and the importance level of that success. On the other
hand, the specific lagging indicators were used to develop a lagging questionnaire that
also seeks two basic lagging risks information. These arc the number of incidents
occurred for a particular time period and the severity of that event for lagging indicators
case. The developed questionnaire for both leading and lagging case arc shown in
Appendix B. These questionnaires were conveyed to different process plant personnel and
the feedback on specific noor level plant information was collected. The lists of the
respondents tTom the process plant are presented in the Appendix D. Importance level in
case of leading indicators and severity level in case of lagging indicators arc associated
with the factors. Equipment failure or lack of required mandatory activities leads to the
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above mentioned issues and results in either production loss or breach or an
environmental standard or injury/death of employee or extra repair cost or could be any
combination of these consequences. The detail description of the consequences
considered for mapping the importance or severity level in risk estimation is presented in
Appcndix A.
4.3 Result Analysis
The benchmark study questionnaires were communicated to five process industries with
the aim to collect specific risk information. The collected input data ti'omlhose process
plants were analyzed and aggregated following the described aggregation procedure. The
leading and lagging risk index values arc finally determined by using the multilevel
standardized indicator weight trom Table 3-3 and results arc presented in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1: Asset integrity leading and lagging risk index for participants' process plant
ame of Participant Process Facility
Dubai Electricity & Water Authority
Lafarge Surma Cement Ltd
INTECSEA Canada
Lloyd's Register Kazakhstan LLP
QatarGas
Leading Risk Value Lagging Risk Value
23 16
24 15
20 9
56 34
19 23
The overall result shows that leading indicators' risk values arc always higher than
lagging indicators' risk values except in the case of QatarGas. Most of process plants
usually practice the lagging indicators and the leading indicators arc not established
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properly. So, it is obvious that the risk represented with the leading indicators will be
higher. In case of QatarGas, the outcome of leading indicators arc different trom others
because they arc used to usc the leading and lagging indicators activities' since process
safety performance indicators arc practiced over there (Khan et aI., 2010). In the
benchmark study, the QatarGas leading asset risk index was lound as the best in its class
among the participants. When risk values of QatarGas arc mapped with the risk index,
the leading indicator values arc on the low risk region and the lagging arc in the medium
risk region. Mechanical integrity clement has the highest risk contribution to both cases of
leading and lagging indicator asset integrity index, followed by operational and personnel
integrity clement.
_1....·.lllinl,:H:1
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Figure 4-1: Overall asset risk index for process plants in benchmark study
On the other hand, the leading risk performances of Dubai Electricity & Water Authority,
Lafarge Surma Cement Ltd, and INTECSEA Canada arc on the medium risk category and
the lagging indicator performances arc on the low risk region. Since the leading
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performance of these process plants arc in the moderate region, the lagging performances
arc also under adequate control. This also proved the requirement and the functionality of
leading indicators for a lagging outcome. This means if the inputs to the system arc
adequate then the outcome will also be as desired within a tolerable limit. These
performances of assets fora particular period arc reasonably lair for the time being. To
maintain this performance level and to cven further lower the risk values, efforts should
be given to the outliner indicator areas. The risk contribution lor DEW A and Lafarge
also show the same order of contribution as QatarGas. The only exception is in case of
lagging perlonnance of La farge where the risk contribution ofpersonnel clement is more
than the operational clement. For INTECSEA Canada, in leading indicators case
personnel integrity has the greatest risk contribution followed by mechanical and
operation clements. And, for lagging indicators the mechanical clement has the highest
contribution followed by personnel and operational clement contribution. Among the
studied process plant performances, the performance of Lloyd's Register Kazakhstan LLP
showed higher risk values in both of the leading and lagging categories. The leading
indicators fall in a high risk category and the laggings fall in a medium risk category. This
is the result of the poor leading i.e. input to the system performance that also resulted ina
higher risk outcome in case of lagging indicators. The risk levels of their assets arc higher
due to the poor performance of the safety system, planning, and scheduling, as well as
plant design and inspection as indicated by the leading indicators. In case of lagging
indicators, the poor performance of inspection as well as maintenance, arc primarily
responsible for higher asset risk index value. So, the assets of Lloyd's Register
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Kazakhstan LLP arc in the most vulnerable condition among the studied process plant
asset performances. Here, in case of leading indicators, the operational clement has the
highest risk contribution followcd by mcchanical and personnel clements. For lagging
indicator casc, the personnel clement has the greatest contribution lollowed by
mechanical and operational clements. Again, in this case the lagging asset risk index
INTECSEA Canada's performance was found as the best in class among the participants.
The variations in the asset performance of different process plants arc obvious due to the
dilTercnce in strategy, functionality, and altitude towards asset integrity. The variations in
asset risk index outcome arc depicted in Figure 4-1. In most of the cases of the
benchmark study, it is observed that the mechanical clement has the greatest impact on
the asset performance irrespective of leading and lagging indicator risk scheme. So, the
benchmark study result also goes with the declared hypothesis that the mechanical
integrity has the highest impact on the asset integrity. The identified best in class leading
and lagging asset risk index can be considered as a benchmark asset II1tegrity
performance for the time being.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Scnsitivity analysis intends to illustrate how Illuch model output values arc affected by
variations in the inputs data/aggregation technique to the model. The mathematical model
of this study involves many input variables and uses a wcighting system for transferring
the input data to the upper level. Since weighting technique to allocate relative
importance is controversial due to its subjective nature, and the uses of indicators that
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involvc aggrcgation of numcrous input valucs may smooth out highcr risk valucs. So,
assct intcgrity mcasurcmcnt systcms involving many input variables and wcighting
tcchnique rcquirc scnsitivity analysis for modcl output quality assurancc. Thc scnsitivity
analysis study is organizcd to obscrvc thc impact of indicators' wcights on thc ovcrall risk
indcxand to chcck thcvarying input data scnsitivity to thc modcloutput risk indcx.
4.4.1 Impact of Indicators Weight on Ovcrall Risk Indcx Valuc
In this stcp, thc cffcct of individual indicators' wcight and aggrcgation opcrator on thc
ovcrall risk indcx will bc analyzcd. Both thc AHP tcchniquc lor indicators' wcight
dctcrmination and thc aggrcgation opcrators has significant influcncc for achicving highcr
Icvcl risk index valucs. Wcighting is a subjcctivc issuc and to ncutralizc thc subjcctivity
rclativc importancc qucstionnaircs wcrc conductcd to thirtccn cxpcrt pcrsonncl, as
dcscribcd carlicr. Although thc brainstorming outcomc of pair wisc comparison
ncutralizcs thc subjcctivity, it may bc argucd that thcsc arc still subjcctivc judgcmcnts.
So, thc variation of indicators wcights were also chcckcd to obscrvcd thc variability of
outcomc. To obscrvc thc variation in thc outcomc, thc following sccnarios prcscntcd in
Tablc 4-2 with varying wcight wcrc analyzcd. Scnsitivity analysis was pcrformcd bascd
on thc sccnarios that rcflcct diffcrcnt observations on thc rclativc importancc of thc
paramctcrs in diffcrcntlcvcl. Scnsitivity analysis can bc pcrformcd fi·om any Icvcl inthc
assct indicator hicrarchy; for thc timc bcing, third Icvcl indicators in thc assct hicrarchy,
i.e. clemcnt indicators' wcight variation, wcrc analyzcd. Thc data of INTECSEA Canada
from thc benchmark study wcrc uscd for indicators' wcight scnsitivity analyscs.
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Table 4-2: Sensitivity analysis scenarios with leading and lagging risk index outcome
Sl. Scenarios Assigned Weight Leading Rl Lagging Rl
o.
I Equal Importance MI=.33, 01=.33, PI=.33 20
MaximizingMI MI=.75, 01=.15, PI=.IO 19 10
MinimizingMI MI=.IO, 01=.50, PI=.40 20
Maximizing 01 MI=.15, 01=.75, PI=.IO 18
Minimizing 01 MI=.50, 01=.10, PI=.40 21 10
Maximizing PI MI=.15, 01=.10, PI=.75 23 10
Minimizing PI MI=.50, 01=.40, PI=.IO 19
Note: Leading baseline RI=20 and Lagging baseline RI=9.
Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-4 represent the leading and lagging risk index outcome
corresponding to varying weights according to the mentioned scenarios in Table 4-2. The
variation in the final risk index outcome was compared with the baseline leading and
lagging risk index, respectively to observe the variation extent of index value. For the
leading indieator case, Figure 4-2 showed that with the different assigned weight
scenarios the outcome RI is much closer to the baseline value except in two cases. These
two cases arose for the scenarios of minimizing 01 and maximizing PI weights. When the
different scenarios RI outeome were mapped with the asset risk index scale, these two
cases change the outcome classes and move to the upper risk class. Figure 4-3 shows the
percent variation of RI compared to the baseline index value for different scenarios.
Again, the highest variation was found in the case where the PI was maximized. This
wide variation in this case is obvious since the study coneentrated on the asset integrity
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and has given most importance on the personal integrity clement. Except this value. the
other scenario variations arc less than 10 percent, which is reasonably in the allowable
vanatlonregion.
Figure 4-2: Leading risk index variation fTom baseline risk index value
i
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'Yfl Vanatiun ofkaJing RI rorJiitli;n:nl sc~narios Ii-om basdirH.; RI
Figure 4-3: Leading indicator sensitivity to parameter weight in the RJ outcome
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For the lagging indieator case, Figure 4-4 depicts the RJ outcome and compares results
with the baseline RJ. In this case, the variations in outcome compared to leading
indicators are widespread. Though the risk class docs not change in any oflhe scenarios,
still the variations are extensive within the same risk tier. And, in sensitivity analysis
Figure 4-5 showed that the scenario 4 where the 01 were maximized provided the highest
percentage of variation in outcome while compared with the baseline values. Again, the
maximization of MI weight also represents more than 10 percent variation compared to
the baseline RJ. This could be because of ignoring the intlueneeofOI and PI clements in
the asset integrity. Other sccnarios also showed allowable variation within 10 pcrcent
t'i-om the baseline. Analyzing this leading and lagging indicator weight variation it can be
concluded that the variations in the outcome arc not very significant and arc reasonable
where variations arc significant. So, the subjectivity of the expert judgement diminishes
considerably and stability of the estimated weights is achieved. This also ensured the
applicability of standardized indicators' weights in different process plant assessments.
Figure 4-4: Lagging risk index variation from baseline risk index value
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Figurc 4-5: Lagging indicator scnsitivity to paramctcr wcight in thc RI outcomc
Whatcvcrthcvariation in importanccorwcights,thcpriorityofthcmcchanical intcgrity
clcmcnt in assct intcgritycannot bc ovcrridden by othcrclcmcnt. So, with this hypothcsis,
numcrous variations in wcights wcrc also chcckcd and comparcd with thc basclinc final
outcomc. Thc variation of outcome risk indcx docs not shift bcyond ±5% of original
indcxvaluc.ltisalsobclicvcdthatthcsamcscenariowillariscincaseofothcrstagcsof
indicators and for thc casc of other proccss plant data too. Thc arbitrary variation in
wcight also shows insignificant changcs in the final outcomc, thus cnsuring thc viability
ofstandardizcd wcight prcscntcd in Tablc 3-3.
For dcriving thc ncxt Icvcl indicator risk, using aggrcgation opcrator still has promincnt
impact and continucs up to thc final levcl of assct intcgrity. Thc aggrcgation opcrator
uscd hcrc is thc wcighting avcragc and thisopcratorsmoothes out thc cftcctofthc highcst
risk valuc in cach operation until thc final outcome. So, thc final risk indcx is a rcsult of
smoothcd wcighting average of basic indicators' risk itcms. But, this stratcgy of
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aggregation docs not show eclipsing characteristics. Eclipsing is thc phcnomcnon whcre
high basic risk items are smoothed to a very low risk value. Hcre, observing all thc
benchmark study calculations it can be concluded that in most of the cases the input and
the outcome risk values have a reasonable variation. One of the reasons is because the
weights of all stages' indicators arc normalizcd to a sum of 1.0. These variations arc
pcrmissible since overall asset pertormance is estimated instead of individual asset
performance. Again, fi'om this model the most risk significant itcms can casily be
determined and action can be taken subsequently for assets' superior future performance.
4.4.2 Model Response to Changing Indicators Inputs
Since thc indicators arc not yet established in the process facility, the variability of the
output corresponding to changing input needs to be analyzed. The benchmark study was
conducted by collecting leading and lagging indicator information and analyzcd
accordingly to get thc final risk index. The uncertainty about the collected information is
obvious. So, it is imperative to find out how the final risk index derived from the model if
the assigned information values were changed to other sets of plausible values. This will
also allow assessment of the impact of particular indicators' inputs to the final risk index
and to identify the indicators that are the key drivers of outcome results as well. In this
case input data variation with a certain percentage shows a linear variation in the
outcome. Since fed data to the system arc very site specific, the extensivc analysis will
not be worthwhile. This scnsitivity analysis ensured the robustncss of the developcd
model in determining risk-based asset integrity levels.
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Chapter 5
5 Additional Work: Risk Based Spare Parts Inventory Management
"For want ofa nail the shoe was lost;
forwantofashocthchorscwas lost;
and forwantofahorscthcridcrwas lost."
Bcnjamin Franklin (1706-1790)
5.1 Preamble
Thc implcmcntations and uscs of an indicators' systcm plays a vital rolc in attaining assct
intcgrity. An indicator systcm can also assist in managing asscts by idcntifying thc
vulncrablc arcas that rcquirc improvcmcnt to avoid futurc mishap. For instancc, onc of
thcm is thc managing of sparc parts that havc bccn ovcrlookcd ovcr thc ycars duc to
budgct constraint. For cxccuting maintcnancc work cffcctivcly, tangiblc cquipmcnt sparc
parts' availability and adcquacy is mandatory. Spare parts unavailability could havc thc
grcatcstncgative impact on plant availability and rcsult in costly downtimc oflhc assct.
Inproccssindustrics,toaccomplishthebusincssrcquircmcntthcavailabilitytargctis
particularly challcnging. To mcct the availability rcquircmcnt and to rcducc downtimc
proccss industrics usually maintain large stock ofsparc parts. So, thc non-optimizcd sparc
parts stocking rcduccs thc profitabilityofthc ovcrall invcstment. Evcn ifit optimizcd duc
to lack ofattcntion towards the critical cquipmcnt, sparc rcquircment and shortagc could
thrcat thc intcgrity Icvcl of cnginccring assct. A risk-bascd approach can bc cstablishcd
for thc managcmcnt of sparc parts rcquircment cffectivcly. Risk-based spare parts'
managcmcnt makcs surc the adcquacy level of sparc parts invcntory on thc basis of
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equipment criticality without compromising the integrity of the plant's asset. This also
allows inventory optimization and effective allocation as well as utilization of limited
maintenance resources.
5.2 Introduction
Effective inventory management of spare parts is essential for ensuring asset integrity in a
process facility. With the increased mcchanizationand complexity in process plant, there
isa rise inlhenumberofcomponent failure scenarios. Failure of components incurred
downtimc and unavailability of the plant, which may prolong with the inadcquacy of
spare parts. Spare parts have great innuence on all types of maintenance activitics and the
availability of process plant. For the case of critical equipment Ihis could lead to severe
consequences like excessive downtime costs, idle manpower cost and so on. Modern
process plants arc required to be available for operation most of the time and
unavailability due to spares is not tolerable. Maintenance often depcnds on the spare parts
availability and, thus, the adequacy of spare parts in stock has a direct impact on the
operability of the system. It could easily be achieved by storing an adequate quantity of
spares in the inventory. However, numbers of issues arises with respcct to storing of spare
parts. First of all, the quantity of spares to be stored fora particular time period requires a
reliable forecasting technique and basis of forecasting. Secondly, among all spare parts
which spares should be given priority in storing due to financial constraint. This means to
allocate the capital expenditure on spares will be more efTective to maintain and
maximize plant availability. Thirdly, the optimization of spares parts quantity is based on
the consequences of unavailability of the plant. This required an acceptable balance
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between the available allocated budget for spares and the stock-out consequences.
Considering these factors, one may convert the spare parts inventory managemcnt into a
holistic approach.
Spare parts demand forecasting is one of the most crucial issues lor inventory
management and also a big challenge in the repair and ovcrhaul industry (Pham, 2006).
The vital challenge ariscs due to thc sporadic naturc of components' lailure and
corresponding random demand of spare parts. Sparc parts dcmand forecasting refers to an
estimation of thc most likely futurc rcquircmcnt of spares on components' tailurc undcr
given conditions. Forecasting of spare parts also has a prominent etTcct on cxecuting the
other issues ofsparc parts invcntory managcment like procurement and holding policy.
Spare palts inventory model differs substantially from regular inventory models since
spare parts demands arise with the failure of components. Kennedy et al. (2001) pointed
out that invcntories of spare parts differ 1T0m other manufacturing inventories Irom
functionality as well as from storing strategy point of view.
To resolve the above mentioned issues, numbers of studies have been carried out to
investigate the forecasting techniques as well as to resolve other different issues of spare
parts inventory management. Among the forecasting model, traditional exponential
smoothing is the most popular technique applicable to time series data, where historical
demand data are smoothed and extrapolated to formulate forecasts. However, it does not
generate required confidence and is usually suitable for short periods of forecasting
(Pham, 2006). To overcome the drawback of exponential smoothing, Croston (1972) has
proposed a method that predicts the size of the demand peaks and demand intervals
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separately and also effective intermittent demands. Besides these deterministic
approaches, probabilistic approaches arc also popular and effective in spare parts
forecasting. ahman et al. (2009) proposed a probabilistic approach where the optimum
numbers of spare transformers arc forecasted based on the widely used Poisson
distribution process in demand prediction, and optimization is performed considering the
cost for spares and the outage cost of transformer. Usually, it is considered that
component's failure process followed a Poisson process, and historicallailurc data arc
used to determine probability of future occurrences fora certain time interval. However,
the forecasting of spare requirement using Poisson distribution docs not provide reliable
estimation and usually ends with overrated estimation. So, there is always a possibility of
the spare parts to be remains unused. For probabilistic estimation of spare parts demand
forecasting, compounded Poisson and Gamma distribution arc also used in different
literature (Kumar et al. 1997, Watson 1987, Vereeeke et al. 1994, Johnston 1980, Yeh
1997).
For the optimization between different inventory parameters, like spare quantity,
availability, cost, and downtime, there are many stl.ldies reported in the literature. Adams
(2004) has studied different spares parts analysis methods and optimization techniques to
determine the best approach that can meet the cost constrained and availability targets.
Poisson and Normal distribution techniques were used here to determine the
recommended quantity of spares based on demand rates. To effectively control the spare
parts inventory, Dekkeretal. (1998) proposed a stocking policy where the plant's critical
equipment spares arc given more attention as well as priority in storing. Yang el al.
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(2004) considcred criticality ofcomponcnts as an important issuc and uscs criticality of
sparcs parts to dctcrminc thc initial adcquatc quantity of spares to be stored for executing
maintenance effectively. Bharadwaj et al. (2008) proposed a risk-based methodology
aiming to maximizc the availability ofa machine by maintaining a certain level of spare
parts in the inventory. It utilizes the risk term in the context of probability of failurc 10
meet the spare demand and the corresponding consequences of the failure to meet the
demand. But this approach only deals with spare optimization based on thc risk without
conccrning spare forecasting strategy.
The missing point in all of the spare parts inventory management literature is the
comprehensive integration and consideration of the above mentioned three isslles.
Forccasting the demand of spares is the most difficult task; however, the demand of spares
and inventory managcment depends on issues like i) failure rate of the components/parts
ovcr a specified period of time, ii) criticality of the components or spare parts and in this
case it is thc risk associatcd with unavailability of components, iii) lead time required for
procurement of spare parts, iv) financial consideration and optimizations, and, v) ensuring
availability of spare parts in storage condition. Hence, a more precise demand lorecasting
technique is essential forsucccssfuland effective inventory management. In present work, a
new risk-based inventory management methodology is proposed that adduces the earlier
mentioned three issues. The proposed risk-based inventory management methodology
comprises of tour steps as depicted in Figurc 5-1. Each of the steps of the methodology
addresses the above described issues. In a subsequent section of the paper, a detailed
description of the methodology with application is presented.
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Utilization of Risk Definition to
Justify the Cost of Inspection
Figure 5-1: Methodology (or Risk-based spare parts inventory management
5.3 Criticality ranking of components
Thc risk-bascd sparc parts invcntory managcmcnt modcl proposcd in this papcr is bascd
on thc fundamcntal conccpt ofsystcmatically prioritizing thc sparc parts corrcsponding to
thcircriticality. Thccriticalityin thisrcspcct isdcfincd with rcspcct tothcrisk associatcd
with thccomponcnts ofproccss facility. Critical componcnts arc idcntificd bascd on thc
failurcriskcxcccdingacccptablcrisklcvclandhavcpotcntialimpact on thc opcrational
targct ofthc plan!.
Thcrcarc many tcchniqucs availablc to asscss risk. Thc primary factors to calculatc risk
arc thc probability of fililurc and thc conscqucnccs of fililurc. Thcrc arc numcrous
componcnts inanopcrating facility that may Icad to a numbcrofhazardouscvcnts.
Thcrcforc, cvcry componcnt is to bc cvaluatcd in tcrms of associatcd risk. Thc risk
cvaluation rcsults arc uscd for criticality ranking. The kcy purposc ofrisk asscssmcnt is to
support managcmcnt in rational dccisionmaking.
Criticality ranking bascd on componcnts' risk is donc by using cquation 5-1,
Risk (K)= Pr xCr (5-1)
Whcrc Pris thc probability ofcomponcnt failurc and Cris thc failurc conscqucnccs i.c.
cost of a givcn failurc. In thc prcscnt study, risk is considcrcd in tcrms of associatcd
cconomic conscqucnccs corrcsponds to componcnts failurc. Scala ct al. (2009) pointcd
out that sparc parts invcntory-rclatcd risk is the rcvcnuc loss associatcd with plant
shutdowns or dc-ratcs opcrations if parts are not availablc whcn nccdcd. Componcnts'
failurc probability information is important in quantification of risks. Historical plant
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specific data, generic failure data of components, or expert judgment can be used as a
basis for determining suitable failure probabilities. Consequences in this context arc the
financial losses due to the failure of components. The financial loss consequences include
several factors, such as loss of production ($),eost of replacement ($), and Iiabilityeosl
($). The aggregated financial loss associated with the failure of components can be
assumed using Equation 5-2.
Cost of component failure, C, ($)= tei (5-2)
Where C is the financial loss due to failure ofeomponent'. The financial issue along with
the failure probability information assist in quantifying the risk ($) assoeialed with the
individual component of the process plant. This way every component has a risk score
that will facilitate rationale comparisons between components and decide criticality.
Thus, criticality analysis will assist in avoiding plant outage situations and also suggest
group of spares to be stored on the priority basis. Based on the estimated risk, the spare
parts can be grouped into four categories: high critical, medium high critical, medium
critical, and low critical components. This provides an case in budget allocation for
different group of spares.
S.4 Spare Parts Demand Forecasting Technique
Once the spare items to be procured and stored 10 suppOli maintenance arc decided, then
the next step is to determine how many spares of each type to be stored. This requires a
suitable forecasting technique to specify the future demand of spares. The forecasting ofa
demand is a complicated task where several issues are involved. The characteristics of
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spare parts demand is a major issue that determines the technique of forecasting. Ghobber
et al. (2002) categorize the spare pal1s demand patterns into four categories: intermittent.
erratic, slow moving, and lumpy demand. Irrespective of the types of demand, forecasting
primarily depends on the failure history or failure rate of components. The historical
components' data of mean time between failures can provide the failure rate depending
on the hazard rate function. The simplest way to forecast the demand explained by
Kececioglu (2003) as the expected number of spare parts demand lor a finite operating
time interval is equal to the expected number of failure; it can be estimated using
Equation 5-3.
(5-3)
Sinee the forecasting is based on the failure rate function,A.(T), it is not possible to
exactly envisage the demand of spare parts. In that case, the conceptofsparepartsservice
at a certain confidence level will be more appropriate for forecasting. For forecasting the
quantity of spares to be purchased and stored with a desired confidence level, a Poisson
distribution can be used. This distribution requires a single parameter that is the mean
failure rate and can uphold the randomness of spare demand. Considering the event are
exponentially distributed and components fail according to a Poisson process, the
probability of'n' or fewer failures during a time interval 01'(0, t) can be estimated by
Equation 5-4.
p(norfewerfailure)=f C,V)" exp(-At)
H n!
(5-4)
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So, bascd on thc dcsircd Icvcl ofconfidcncc or scrvicc Icvcl, thc quantity ofsparc parts
rcquircment can bc estimatcd assuming a constant lililurc ratc. Hcrc, thc forccasting is
solcly bascdon thc prior failurc information, bcforcdcmand data has bccn gcncratcd. Thc
forccastcd quantity is usually ovcrcstimatcd (assuming constant failurc ratc) and
unccrtainty also is not takcn into considcration. With thc incrcasc of unccrtainty thc
variation in thc cstimation incrcascscxponcntially. To minimizc unccrtainty, thc Baycsian
mcthod is most appropriatc tool for forccasting and continuous dcmand updating. Thc
Baycsian approach in dcmand prcdiction is suitablc for cithcr casc of unknown dcmand
with constant or varying dcmand ratc (Popovic, 1987). Thc utilization of thc Baycsian
mcthod for dcmand prcdiction is not ncw in invcntory managcmcnt litcraturc. Sevcral
studics havc illustratcd thcapplication ofthc Baycsian mcthod indcmand forccasting that
dcals with diffcrcnt aspccts of invcntory managcmcnt (Silvcr ct a!. 1965, Smith ct a!.
1969, Brown ct a1.l973, Kamath ct a!. 2002, Aronis ct al. 2004 and Dolgui ct al. 2008).
Brown ct a!. (1973) also mcntioncd that thc Baycsian approach can cstimatc dcmands at
initial provisioning bcforc dcmand data has bccn gcncratcd, as wcll as having thc
capability of progrcssivc updating as data bccomcs availablc with timc. This is donc by
incorporating thc rcccnt dcmand information and updating simultancously.
5.5 The Bayesian Analysis Approach
Thc Baycsian tcchniquc, with rcspeet to sparc parts managcment, combines prior
information with actual obscrved data dcrivcd from subscqucnt cvcnts to prcdict the
future demand of spare parts. The Bayesian theorcm is used to convcrt likelihoods into
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probability. It is considcrcd as one of the bcst systcmatic mcthods for incorporating
currcnt dcmand information and continuous updating ofthc dcmand distribution. This is
donc by rcvising thc prior information about thc mean failurc ratc with thc gathcrcd
Iililurc information. Thc unccrtainty in failurc ratc, i.c. dcmand, is tackled by considcring
it as a prior probability distribution, which is updatcd routincly in thc form ofpostcrior
distribution. Baycs' thcorcm allows combining thc prior dcmand distribution with a
dcmandproccss(1ikclihoodfimction)tocstimatcapostcriordistributionfordcmand.
Considcring thc failurc ratc (A.) ofcomponcnts as unknown, a prior assumption is madc
that failurc ratcs follow a Gamma distribution and, as conscqucnccs of failurc as a
Poisson distribution, thc postcrior Gamma distribution can bc dcvclopcd. Capability of
dcvcloping an cxtensive array of mcan and variancc's cncouragcd to cmploy Gamma
distribution as a dcmand prcdiction conjugatc. Thc prior Gamma distribution has two
paramctcrs; thcse arc a and ~, and the postcrior Gamma will bc with rcviscd paramctcrs
a' and W with gcncratcd dcmand data. Thcsc two paramctcrs arc positivc and rcal
quantitics similar to the variable Iltilurc ratc(A.). Thc proofofconjugacy bctwccn sclcctcd
priorcandidatcscanbcshowcdas:
Postcrior ex: Prior * Likclihood
oc {/Lk+a-I e'A(I+(Jl}
Thc posterior parametcrs arca'=k+aand,B'=t+,B, which arc samc as thc Gamma
distribution paramctcr. So, it can be considcrcd as an appropriate pair that can scrvcs
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spare parts forecasting. The conjugate Gamma-Poisson probability function for ok'
number of demand for spare parts with on' operating unit during operating period 't' is
given by Equation 5-5 (Brownet al. 1973).
(5-5)
The Bayesian approach assumes that one has prior information about the demand
distribution, which is updated using the observed demand values to obtain the poslerior
distribution to be employed for forecasting. So, the spare parIs quantity requirement will
be updated using the Bayesian technique as described earlier and represented by
Equations 5-6 and 5-7.
p(AI k)= " p(k / ,i)J{1.)
!p(x/,i)/(,i)d,i
(5-6)
In a more specific form of updating, in case of conjugate Gamma-Poisson, probability
distribution is given by Equation 5-7.
(5-7)
After observing Or' number of failure of components during the mosl recent operational
period of 'I' the parameter of prior distribution will be updated as follows:
a'=r+aand fJ'= 1+ fJ (5-8)
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These revised parameters will be used as an updated parameter for prior distribution and
the posterior distribution will be developed aecordingly. Again, pursuing the same
strategy of desired levels of confidence or service levels as followcd in case of Equation
5-4, the required minimum number of spare parts (S) can be determined for a desired
level of confidence (P) using the cumulative format of Equation 5-5 as shown in Equation
5-8. From now, it can be considered that this required service level is the reliability level
of spare parts adequacy that is capable of meeting the certain levels of demand.
~ 1(nJ..I ye-"AI fr J..n - I e !.{J dJ.. ~ p
l"" k l r(a) (5-9)
Ilere, the two prior Gamma distribution parameters (a, ~) are unknown and need to be
known to estimate the spare parts demand. If the historical information is available for the
components then, using the moment method, the two parameters of Gamma distribution
, ,
can be cvaluate by setting scaleparameter,a=~ and shape parameter,p=.:c..
cr II
(Bevilacqua, 2008). Least square method, the moment method, and maximum likelihood
approach are also used in many applications for estimating Gamma distribution
parameters (Choi el al. 1969, Fisher, 1992, George, 1999). At time when no prior
knowledge is available, this situation of prior distribution is known as non-informative
prior. This required some subjective estimation and several literatures have attempted to
find out these two parameters. Brown et al. (1973) has chosen a wide range of the
parameter a, ~ to illustrate the prior distributions all having the same mean but with
increasing variance also has selected the optimum one. Sherbrooke (2004) has estimated
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the prior mean of the Gamma distribution and relates this with the observed demand
estimated the parameters. Using the expert judgement and statistical method, Aronisetal.
(2004) proposed a typical approach 10 estimate the parameters. The paramcters of a prior
Gamma distribution 'a', 'Ware estimated by setting mean a/~= ~ and, assuming the
actual failure rate does not exceed twice of original estimated failure rate, "'I i.e. A:S2"'l.
The prior Gamma distribution can be set as follows and the proposed approach will adopt
this to determine prior parameters of a, ~.
2i"j3a,la-I-'fJ!, ~d,l=spareAdeqllaCy Level,p (5-10)
The failure rate is important to predict the prior distribution paramcters. Gamma
distribution parameters can be estimated for both cases: where the failure rate information
is available and also for the case where suffieient failure information is not available. In
case of inadequate failure information, the original estimation of failure rate, predicted
during the design or product development testing stage, can be used. On the other hand, a
rough estimation based on an expert's opinion for mean failure rate or dcmand can also
be lIsed. In either of the options, the estimation ean be refined continuously and will be
more certain as additional information is used to update the initial estimation of
parameter. Using the estimated prior distribution parameter the minimum quantity of
spares to be stored can be determined corresponding to desircd reliability level of spares
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5.6 Risk Estimation for Spare Parts Service Reliability
It is not possible to predict and maintain spare parts thai can ful fill the spare parts
demands in all conditions. This is constrained by the economic factor as well as by the
random nature of the components failure. The proposcd tcchnique is an appropriate
candidatcforforecastingdemandcorrespondstoparticularscrvice level. As this approach
is also based on the strategy of maintaining a certain level of spare parts adequacy levels,
the associated risk with the unavailability of spares cannot be overlooked. There is always
a probability that the dcmand could go beyond the expected or maintained service level of
spares. This gives birth to the risk rclated to maintaining a certain Icvel of spares scrviee
reliability level. The risk is corresponds to the spare parts adequacy level and can be
estimated using Equation 5-11.
Risk ($)
= Probability of inadequacy of sp arcs scrvice level (P') * Consequcnces of inadequacy (C,)
(5-11)
Whcrc,theprobabilityofinadequacyofsparepartsservicelevelisdeterminedby,
P'=(I-Spareadequacy Level, p) (5-12)
Consequence of inadequacy of spare parts includes the cost ofprocurcment of spare parts
and the cost of downtime of a unit due to the unavailability of spares. With this
informationforcertainservicelevelsandsparepartsquantitics,lhcassociated risk can be
quantified. At thc samc time, fordiffercnt servicc levels, the quantity of spares and the
associated risks can also be determincd. This will provide an aid to the management to
make a decision of which service level should be select cd based on risk. It is 10 be
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mentioned here that the service level of spare parts may also vary corresponding to their
criticality. This simply means that management can select service levels based on the
criticality of the components. For high critical components, higher service level should be
chosen and for normal components lower service level can be chosen. So this will allow
the management to allocate their limited recourses optimally and place emphasis where it
will be more effective. Again, to cope up with the varying characteristics of components
they can also select a range of service levels that will provide a zone of risk taking
capability. Within this range, the plant management can handle the non-availability of
spare parts with respect to the downtime cost. This decision, at the same time, will
provide the range of spare parts adequacy level, which will provide more flexibility in
inventory control.
5.7 Risk Level Reduction and Procurement Policy
Even after deciding the appropriate service level, there is a fair provision to lower the
selected risk level. The risk level can be lowered by changing the procurement policy of
spare parts. Instead of purchasing the entire forecasted spares corresponding to service
levels it is worthfull to purchase the spare parts in accordance with the minimum lead
time for replenishment of spares. With the minimum lead time procurement strategy, the
quantity of procured spare parts will be less and the risk will also be less, accordingly.
The same technique as described earlier will be used to determine the forecasted quantity
of spare parts and risk level with selected service level, and only the pcriodofforecasting
will be changed. This period of forecasting will be based on the minimum lead time lor
manufacturing and supplying the spare parts to the place ofuse. The overall risk lor entire
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spare parts procurement will be distributed among the several slots of procurement
decided by minimum lead time. Lowering the risk level will also develop the concept of
maintaining a constant risk level throughout the operating cycle. The spare parts shortage
and abundance will be adjusted in the upcoming cycle, and this will assist in maintaining
an almost constant risk level throughout the procurement cycle or plant life cyclc.
Thereforc, thc risk Icvcl can bc minimizcd and maintained by adapting the minimum Icad
timc procurcmcnt policy. Thc mathematical evidcncc of this stratcgy is providcd in thc
illustrativccxamplc for bctlcr undcrstanding.
5.8 Inspection Interval
It is usually assumed that components in operational condition may filii; and. the sparc
components in the invcntory or storagc condition arc always ready 10 fit in, onward
failurcs. This assumption could seriously impact Ihc invcntory managcmcnt system. Thc
spare parts failurc incidcnt whilc thcy arc in storagc condition has bccn taken into account
in thc prcscnt work. Failure of sparc parts in storage condition can rcsult from cither
latcnt manufacturing defect or improper storing. Rcalizing this, the availability of sparc
parts can be maintaincd by performing inspcction at a certain optimum intcrval to
maximize thc Icvcl of availability of components. Assuming that thc failcd componcnts
will bc rcpaircd pcrfcctly to as good as new condition, thc stcady statc availability ofthc
componcnts is givcn by Equation 5-13 (Ebeling, 2009).
[, R(/)dl
A(T) T+ I, + 1
2
[1- R(T)] (5-13)
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Where R (T) is the reliability of the dormant failure i.e. failure in storage condition
distribution, tl is inspection time, t2 is repair time and T is time between inspections. So,
the inspection interval, T, can be estimated from Equation 5-13 for an optimum level of
availability of spare parts in storage condition.
5.9 Cost Consideration forlnspectioll
To maintain the availability of spares in storage, condition by routine inspection will
incur extra inspection cost. On the other hand, if the availability ofsparcs in storage
condition is not maintained then, at the time of spares requirement, inventory could be out
of available workable spares. The maintenance and inventory personnel in believe that the
adequate quantity of spare parts available for maintenance intervention could be in
trouble. At that time, for the spares parts outage, several adverse consequences may lake
place. Here also, risk based strategy is followed to justify the extra cost associated with
inspection personnel. It is obvious that the probability of failure of spare parts in storage
condition will be higher compared to the probability of failure with inspection at storage
condition. In both of the cases, the consequences, like emergency spare procurement cost,
idle maintenance personnel cost, and downtime cost, arc similar. The spares failure at
storage condition or shortage of spare parts could have a significant impact on the
production performance. So, to avoid downtime, immediate action is necessary for the
procurement of the spares. This immediate procurement of spares will cost more than
regular procurement costs. At the same time, the assigned manpower for the maintenance
job will also be idle which will also incur cost. The higher probability of unavailability of
spares with defined consequences will give higher risk value. On the other hand,
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inspection on routine intervals will reduce the probability of unavailability of spares
value's as low as possible. So the higher risk value will incur higher loss of production.
Equation 5-14 is utilized to justify the inspection requirement of spare parts at storage
condition. If the risk ($) associated with the application of inspection strategy is less or
equal to the risk ($) associated with the strategy of adopting inspection then the
implementation of inspection strategy is economically justified.
Risk cost witha.lt inspection scenario (R N, ) ~ Risk cost with inspection scenario (R w, )
(5-14)
In simple words, the cost of the inspcction is justified in case of higher penalty COSl
associated with the unavailability of spares. The scenario is fmther explained in the
illustrative example.
5.10 Illustrative Example
A typical process plant is an oil refinery that consists of numerous equipment of diverse
type. It involves scveral distillation stages along with other processing steps and utilities
systcms to convert crude oil into useful petroleum products. The entire sub units arc
required to function for complete operation of the plant. It runs around the clock 365 days
a year and the degradation ofcomponcnts occurs more rapidly. Again, corrosion occurs in
various forms in the refincry and is considcred as onc of the major causcs of frequent
component failures. The type, number, degradation rate, corrosion rate and failure rate of
the components varied widely in this type of process plant. Duc to the diverse nature of
lhe spare parts demand, it is encourage checking the functionality of the proposed
mcthodology for the case of refinery spare parts inventory management.
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Step one: Criticality Ranking a/Components
The risk-based inventory management strategy is illustrated considering pumps as the most
critical component, through criticality analysis components are ranked bascd on associated
risk. The pump is identified to bc the most critical component in the process lacility.
The/allowing data are comidered./ar the illustrative example:
Number of Pump in the proccss plant, n: 449; Observed Failure rate, A: 2.052x IO-'/hr
=79.65 failure per year; Operating time, t: I Year; Original Estimate of fililure rale, An:
3.076 xIO-'/hr =121 failure per year (OREDA, 2002); Minimum lead time required to
replenish the inventory, tl 3 month (Based on manufacturer recommendation); Spares
collection cost ($)/unit, C r = $ 500.00; Downtime cost ($), C2=$ 50,000.00 (in the case of
spare parts unavailability); minimum spare replcnishment period of= 3 months (0.25 Year);
Failure rate of pump while in storage condition, A= 0.000 I026/hour; Inspection time, t,= 32
hours; Repair time, t2= 40 hours (OREDA, 2002).
Step two: Spare Parts Demand Determination
For different spare parts adequacy level, the required quantity of spares is calculated using
Equation 5-9, and prior initial values of parameters (a, ~) are determined using Equation 5-
10. After observing 79.65 numbers of failures of components during the operation pcriod of
one year, the parameters of prior distribution are updated utilizing Equation 5-8. The result
presented in Table 5-1 showed thc forecasted spare quantity for one year and the updated
demand quantity with the varying level of spare adequacy level. The updated demand
quantities of spares are much closer to the observed number of failure. It is observed that
with the increase of spare parts adequacy level the forecasted quantity also increases. But,
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with the higher level of spare adequacy, the gap between the forecasted quantity and the
exact observed number of demand also increases. Although the difference will be reduced
with the filrther updating of parameters, suitable adequacy level still have to be selected
considering associated risk and minimum spare gap issues.
Step three: Risk Estimation. Risk Level Selection & Risk Reduction
Risk Estimation. Risk Level Selection
Risk associated with the different levels of spare parts adequacy levels is calculated using
Equation 5-11 and the results arc presented in Table 5-2. The results shown conlirmlhe
earlier observationlhat increases of spares service level i.e. with the increasing number of
sparepartsrequirementtheassoeiatedriskleveldecreases.Figure5-2depictstherisk
variation associated with the inadequacy of spare parts service level. The risk ($) linearly
increases with the higher spare inadequacy level. Though the risk ($) is low with the higher
spare adequacy level, it requires more investment, as well. At the same time, it could also
increase the gap between actual demand and forecasted quantity. This results in more
numbers of unused spares in the inventory and also increases the holding cost. From Figure
5-2, plant management can decide the zone of risk taking capability based on financial
resources, within which range the plant can handle the non-availability of spare parts with
respect to the downtime risk ($). This decision provides the range of spare parts adequacy
level, which will provide more flexibility in inventory control assuming the plant has the
capability of taking a risk ($) in between $ 4,000.00 to $8,000.00 and the corresponding
spare parts adequacy level lies in between 92 to 96 percent. So, the risk level will be
maintained within the selected region for the forecasted operating period.
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Table 5-1: Parameter of prior distribution and spares quantity corresponds to service level
Item Spare Adequacy Parameter, Parameter, Spare Parts Updated Parameter, Updated Scale Updated Spare
Name Level, p a ~ Quantity, S a'=a+r Parameter, W= P+t Quantity, S'
0.85 2 0.0165 205 81.65 1.0165 93
0.87 3 0.0248 200 82.65 1.0248 95
0.89 3 0.0248 210 82.65 1.0248 96
Pump 0.91 3 0.0248 222 82.65 1.0248 98
0.93 4 0.0331 220 83.65 1.0331 100
0.95 5 0.0431 214 84.65 1.0431 103
0.97 6 0.0496 232 85.65 1.0496 107
0.99 8 0.0661 246 87.65 1.0661 114
Table 5-2: Risk determination based on the spare parts adequacy level for one year
Probability Quantity Spares Total cost Probability of Cost of Consequence of Risk,
of adequacy of collection of spares, inadequacy of downtime inadequacy ($), R($)=POIS*
of Spares, p spares, S cost($)/unit,CI C3=S* CI spares POIS= (l-p) ($),C2 C=C2+C3 C
0.85 93 500 46500 0.15 50000 96500 14475
0.87 95 500 47500 0.13 50000 97500 12675
0.89 96 500 48000 0.11 50000 98000 10780
0.91 98 500 49000 0.09 50000 99000 8910
0.93 100 500 50000 0.07 50000 100000 7000
0.95 103 500 51500 0.05 50000 101500 5075
0.97 107 500 53500 0.03 50000 103500 3105
0.99 114 500 57000 0.01 50000 107000 1070
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Table 5-3: Initial spare parts requirement quantity determination
Item Spare Adequacy Parameter, Parameter, Spare Parts
Name Level,pap Quantity, S
Updated
Parameter,
Updated Scale Updated Spare
Parameter, P'= P+t Quantity, S'
0.94 0.0331
Table 5-4: Risk Determination following minimum replenishment time interval
Probability of Quantity of Spares Total cost Probability of Cost of Consequence of Risk,
adequacy of spares, S collection of spares, inadequacy of downtime inadequacy ($), R($)=
Spares, p cost($)/unit,CI C3=S*CI spares POIS=(I-p) ($),C2 C=C2+C3 POIS*C
0.94 32 500 16,000 0.06 50,000 66,000 3,960
Table 5-5: Spare parts quantity & risk level corresponds to spare supply lead time
Desired Spare parts at Spare parts Spare parts in Spare parts to be Exact quantity of Corresponding
service level hand in last consumed in this hand procured in the next spares procured Risk ($)
of spare parts interval interval interval (Predicted)
32 28 4 34 30 3,900
34 36 -2 38 40 4,200
0.94 38 37 3 38 35 4,050
38 35 3 39 36 4,080
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Figure 5-2: Risk level corresponds to spare parts service inadequacy level
Risk Level Reduction and Procurement Policy
Now, instead of purchasing all the spares corresponding to the selected range service
level, it is advised to purchase the spare parts in accordance with the minimum lead time
for replenishment spares. In this way, the risk level is minimized and maintained at that
level for the subsequent cycle. Using the same procedure as followed for spares quantity
determination described above, the minimum spare replenishment period of 3 months
(0.25 Year) for the initial spare parts requirement iscalculatcd and presented in Table 5-3.
Considering the observed number of failures, r= 20, during the replenishment period,
trp=0.25 years the forecasted spare quantity and risk is presented in Table 5-4. The risk
value shown in Table 5-4 corresponds to a selected service level 01'94 percent. The result
showed that the risk level is reduced significantly to a lower value, while the purchasing
policy of spare parts has been on the basis of minimum replenishment lead time. So, for
the first interval, 32 numbers of spares arc procured that will ensure 94 percent of service
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levels with the risk value of only $3,960. ow, the target is to maintain this risk level
throughout the plant's operating life.
ow, if the observed number of failure of components in the next time interval turns out
to be 28 then using this number of failure the requirement of spares for the next cycle is
predicted. This time the prediction showed that a total 01'34 spare parts will be required to
maintain the desired service level. But, at this point 4 numbers of spares arc on hand that
were not used. So, the exact number of spares for the upcoming cycle will be 30, but the
ultimate service level will remain constant. The risk levels with this policy for
consecutive cycle are calculated using same procedure as described earlier, and result arc
presented in Table 5-5. The result showed that forecasted quantity is determined by
ensuring the desired service level constant. But, the procurement quantity of spares is
adjusted based on the earlier cycle scenario of shortage or excess of spares. Accordingly,
the risk is calculated for the consecutive procurement cycle. As the service level is
maintained constant and the actual procured quantity is adjusted, the risk level in the
different cycles remains almost the same as the initial cycle risk. Again, the forecasted
quantity fora one year period is 103 spares with adequacy level of 0.95. And, with this
lead time procurement policy, the procured quantity is a total of 105 with the adequacy
level of 0.94. This policy represents a very small variation in requirement and is
considered to be justifiable with the significant decrease in risk level.
Figure 3 shows the exact quantity procured and on hand spare parts quantities at different
intervals. The interval is set depending on the minimum replenishment time. The
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variation in demand, uses, and the procurement allows the risk level to be within the
marginal tolerances.
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Figure 5-3: Spare parts quantity with minimum lead time interval procurement strategy
Figure 5-4: Risk level variation throughout the observation period
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Figure 5-4 shows the variation of risk levels corresponding to the spares procurement and
uses strategy. From the plot', it is clear that the variation of risk level is not significant
and is instead within the tolerable limits and can be considered constant risk throughout
Ihe cycle. This ensured the stability in spare parts forecasting and corresponding risk 100.
Step/our: Inspection Interval
Step four: Impection Interva/& Inspection cost .Justification
Il1.\pectionlnterva/
Considering the exponential failure tendency while the spares arc in inventory Equation
5-13 can be written as:
(5-15)
Using Equation 5-15, optimum level of spare parts availability at storage condition can be
determined and presented in Figure 5-5.
Figure 5-5: Optimum inspection interval that maximizestheava ilabilityofsparesparts
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The optimum inspection interval corresponds to maximum availability of 0.94 at 550
hours. The availability showed increasing trends until it reached the inspection interval of
550 hours. Af1er this time interval, the availability of spare parts in inventory condition
followed downward trend. So, inspection has to be performed following this time interval
to ensure the availability o I' spares in storage condition.
III.\pection COyt Justification
Risk associated with both of the strategies should be analyzcd, and inspection strategy is
to be justified by the cost of the inspection pcrsonnel. Since the availability of the spares
with inspection is 0.94, the probability of unavailability of spare parts with this strategy is
P'wl=0.06. On the other hand, thc probability of unavailability of spare parts in storage
condition without inspcction strategy will be more and is considered as P· N1=0.15. The
consequences in this case arc downtime cost ($), C2=$ 50,000.00; emergency spare parts
procurement cost, CE= $ 750/unit; and idle manpower cost, C~1 = $ 1,000, for both of the
scenarios. The cost for the inspection including the man-hour cost is C1 = $ 60,000/year.
Risk cost associated without inspect ion scenario, R NI
= Probability of unavailabi Ity of spareparts* Consequences of unavailabi lity
Consequences of unavailability of spare parts= C2+ CE+ CM
So, the risk cost without inspection isRN1 =$ 7,765.00
Risk cost with inspection scenario, R WI
= Probability of unavailabi Ity of spareparts* Consequences of unavailabi lity
Consequences of unavailability of spare parts= C2+ CE+ CM+ C1
So, the risk cost with inspection is RN1 =$6,705.00
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So, the calculated risk satisfies the Equation 5-14, and the risk without inspection is more
comparable to risk with inspection. The inspection cost is justified with the higher risk
associated without utilizing inspection in storage condition. Therefore, from this example,
it is evident that it is profitable to perform routine inspection 0 fsparecomponcntsin
storage condition.
5.11 Conclusion
The current attempt is a risk-based spare parts inventory management in consideration
with the objective of maintaining the cquipmentofa process plant in optimum operating
conditions. Upon failure of components in the process facility, spare parts are required to
support the maintenance activity. The inventory is to be maintained adequately and
effectively. This requires a dynamic technique for forecasting demands along with
updating capability to cope up with the diverse nature of components. The appropriate
candidate used in this paper is the Bayesian method that predicts the demands in
conjunction with the associated risk. The risk concept also permits developing balance
between the costs of downtime of equipment or service to the cost of stocking spares
parts. Risk associated with components also used to elassify the components instead of
using traditional Pareto rules of 80/20 in the criticality analysis. Besides accurate
forecasting, the proposed methodology also attempted to lower the risk level. For
lowering the risk level, this paper explored the functionality procurement policy and
executed spare procurement based on the minimum lead time of supply. The result
presented in the illustrative study shows the direct impact of this policy that drastically
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reduces the risk level from a higher risk. The total forecasted spares quantity tollowing
lead time interval strategy is also almost the same as the quantity as forecasted for an
entire period. Both scenarios are analyzed mathematically for better illustration and to
make comparisons bctween strategies outcome's. This also makes sure that, without
increasing the number of spares the risk level is reduced only by changing the
procurcment policy. The introduction of spare inspection strategy also strcngthens the
proposed methodology by cnsuring the maximum availability of the spares in storage
condition. The cost for thc inspection is also justified, and its requirement (or better
inventory management is cstablished. The presented illustrative example shows the
potentialityandtheapplicabilityofthisapproachinacapitalsensitive process plant.
150
Chapter 6
6 Summary, Conclusion and Future Research Suggestions
6.1 Summary
The underlying causes for recent process industry accidents identified by several
investigations were reported as due to the lack of asset integrity. Considering, assessing,
and maintaining the occupational safety performance only is not adequate now-a-days.
Asset integrity should also be achieved, assessed, and maintained along with those
traditional performance measurement systems. Asset integrity is a versatile area, and it is
very difficult to measure asset performance and maintain subsequently. In most of the
cases where indicators arc used for performance measurement, lhey seem to be developed
in the abscnee of undcrlying rationale. This implies the lack of rationale linking (he
strategic goals and measured or observed parameters.
To overcome the hurdle risk based the asset integrity indicator system is proposed with
the methodology for identifYing multilevel indicators for monitoring asset performancc
and for assessing asset performance levcl risk-based performance quantification strategy
is also illustrated. For establishing an indicator system, a hierarchical framework is
developed that is capable of integrating the top level strategy with functional activity. Thc
hierarchical structure also acts as supporting models or fi'ameworks and assists in
identifying four level indicators: clement indicators, activity indicators, key indicators,
and, finally, specific indicators. The selection of clement indicators: mechanical integrity,
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opcrational intcgrity, and pcrsonncl intcgrity in thc spccificd arcas of covcragc is assct
intcgrity issuc. Instcad ofconsidcring thc ovcrall assct's lifc cyclc, thc functional pcriod
of proccss plant asscts arc takcn into account. Thc ccntral purposc is to assist in
idcntifying scts of functionallcading and lagging indicators in thc spccific indicator Icvcl
that providcs risk information. Thc risk information is uscd as fed data for thc cvaluation
of risk bascd assct intcgrity pcrformancc. To convcy thc risk information to thc apcx or
thc assct hicrarchy through a multilcvcl indicator systcm, thc analytical hicrarchy proccss
tcchniquc is uscd. Bascd on thc importancc Icvcl ofonc indicatorovcrothcr, i.c. by pair-
wisc comparison, thc wcights of diffcrcnt indicators arc dctcrmincd. To ncutralizc thc
subjcctivity ofpair-wisc comparison and wcight allocation, comparisons of data wcrc
collcctcd from numcrous cxpcrts. Thc comparison data rrom thc cxpcrts' wcrc
gcomctrically avcragcd to dctcrminc thc final comparison valuc that Icads to wcights or
indicators. At thc samc limc, consistcncy in thc cxpcrts' judgcmcnts was also chcckcd to
dctcnllinc thc applicability of assigncd indicators' wcights. In this way, standardizcd
indicatorwcightsarcdcvclopcd fordivcrscproccssplant assct pcdormanccmcasurcmcnt
application. So, thc important indicators' data arc givcn morc priority whilc transfcrring
thc risk information to thc ncxt Icvcl by taking wcightcd avcragc. A univcrsal four stagc
risk indcx scale is also dcvclopcd to map both Icading and lagging indicator valucs and to
locatc thc risk class accordingly.
Thc multilcvcl indicators arc dcvclopcd mcticulously, considcring cvcry possiblc risk
sccnarios. But, thc indicators arc not yct cstablishcd in a proccss plant to obscrvc assct
pcrformancc and to collcct risk information. Evcn whcn indicators arc implemcntcd, it
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requires considerable observation periods in order to gain valid results. So, to visualize
the proposed model outcome and to validate the methodology, a benchmark study is
conducted. To carry out the benchmark study, the leading and lagging indicators were
converted to sets of questionnaires to collect the risk information. The questionnaires
were conveyed to five different process plants seeking leading and lagging risk
information. This risk information was aggregated separately, and, final leading and
lagging risk indexes were determined for each participant process plant. These risk
indexes were mapped with the risk index scale to determine the performance level of
Finally, a sensitivity analysis was also pertormed to check the variability of the outcome
risk index with the variation in the weight of indicators. The variations in the outcome arc
reasonably satisfactory and considered to be feasible for any process plant risk based
performance determination.
These risk-based indicators can be employed to illustrate the current status of plant assets
and also to identitY future needed tasks for maintaining plant integrity. The hierarchical
structure is developed in such a way so that, at the end with risk information, it will turn
out to be a risk based index tool of asset perfollllance. And, the benchmark study also
proved the applicability and functionality of the risk based asset integrity system for
performance measurement.
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6.2 Conclusion
The fate of an asset integrity indicator system depends mostly on the identificationofa
handful indicators and rationale linking between multilevel indicators. Accident
investigation reports and several process plant accident analyses were studied extensively
to determine the areas and activities that arc mostly responsible for incident OCCUITences.
These analyses assist in developing appropriate and generic hierarchical indicator
structure that correlate the overall goal with functional activities. The developed
hierarchical structure provides a strong base for integrating and identifying a
comprehensive set of indicators. In the specific level, the utilization of both leading and
lagging indicators also makes the risk based asset integrity approach more robust. Forthe
aggregation of risk information, appropriate techniques were used and sensitivity was also
analyzed to check the variability. The standardized set of indicator weights were also
developed by taking indicators pair-wise comparison feedback [Tom experts. A
benchmark study has been presented, in order to have an idea of real life applicability of
risk based asset integrity indicator methodology. The feedback of the study determined
that the developed indicators arc practicable and appropriate for assessing asset integrity
It is to be mentioned that these indicators arc selected in such a way that all the risk
enhancing scenarios are involved. Again, the indicators should not be static and have to
be updated continuously depending on the present situation to avoid any kind of accident
scenarios. Eventually, this handful of indicators and risk based asset integrity indicator
methodology will decrease the operating and maintenance cost of a process facility
irrespective of the aging effect. So, the idea of higher operating and maintenance cost for
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an aging facility can bc provcd as wrong, and it could cvcn dccrcascs with time. The
thinking process should be changed in a way that the outcome of maintaining asset
integrity is the reliability that results in more productivity. Thus, the asset integrity is
achieved through the appropriate application of an indicator system and keeping all
records for all of these activities so that performance can be measured and quantified.
6.3 Future Research Suggestions
A number of future research possibilities to SUppOIt continuous improvements in a risk
based asset integrity indicator system follow from the findings presented in this thesis:
• Development of a more comprehensive, generic, and user friendly indicator
development framework having adequate rationale linking between different
stages of indicators.
• Risk based indicator selection strategy development for identification of most
important parameters that have the most impact on asset integrity.
• Development of more adequate aggregation techniques and the selection of most
appropriate aggregation operators so that basic risk fed data exaggeration or
eclipsing tendency can be avoided.
• Overcome the inadequacy in dealing with inherent uncertainty and subjectivity of
AHP pair-wise comparison fuzzy pair-wise comparison can be utilized for
standardized indicators' weight determination.
• Asset integrity trend analysis strategy development.
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Appendixes
Appendix A : Consequence Class Rating
Consequence I Health & Safety Production Loss Environment
Class Damage
O(Negligible) I No health No loss of Production I No effect
impactlinjury
I(Slight) I Slight injury, First Slight loss of
fe~ce&veryquickaid, Slight medical production
Treatment remediation
2(Marginal) I Healtheffect/injury Minor damage and Minor effect within
causes lost time & potential downtime the fence & short term
hospital attention causes minor loss of remediation
production
3(Critical) I Significant health Local damage leads to Localized significant
effecthnjurycauses downtime causes more effect also crosses the
irreversible damage production loss fence with medium
range remediation
4(Severe)1 Permanent total Major damage causes Seriousoffsiteimpact
disability or single several days downtime , long term impact
fatality leads major loss of with extended period
production for remediation
5(Catastrophic) I Multiple fatalities Extensive damage Massive impact with
causes shutdown of long term effect and
whole production very long time
facility remediation
Repair Cost I Reputation
loss
No damage I No impact
Slight damage I Within Plant
Confines
Minor damage I Surrounding Areas
of Plant
Significant Local Territory of
the plant
Major Damage I National impact
Extensive I International impact
damage
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Appendix B: Questionnaires for data collection and pair-wise comparison
QucstionnaircforAssctlntcgritvlndicators
The following section which is part of ongoing research on "Risk based asset integrity indicators", is
intended to validate and to determine the accuracy of the developed model. A hierarchical framework is
lollowed to develop indicators for ensuring asset intcgrity in a process fhcility. This hierarchical structure
cventuallybecomesan intcgrity monitoring system. Asset integritymainlyarisesfromtcchnical issucs like
maintenance, inspection and engineering assessments, which aregroupedasmcchanicalintegrityfollowcd
by opcrational integrity and personnel integrity. Thcse thrce arc considcred the main elemcnts to ensurc
asset integrity. The on site view of asset health helps to predict, detect and correct eonditionsthat can lead
to equipment fililureorprocess upset, betore they result inan un planneddowlltime.Functionalindicators
are developed called 'ieading'and'iagging', usingcriteriasuchas:rclevancy,selectivity,availabilityof
data, changes over time. statistical quality and scope of coverage etc. Data corresponding to related risk
information will be collected usingthefollowingdevelopedqucstionnairesalongwiththcrelative
importance of different level indicators. Then, using the bottom-up strategy, the indicator risk inlonnation
will be converted and will be mapped with the risk index. Risk based indexingofassetindicatorsisuscdas
an asset information tool. This asset information 1001 monitors the asset performance and alcrts the plant
personnelifparametersexceedcenainlevelsorfollowanundesiredtrend
Qucstionnairc:
There are two sets of qucstionnaires developed for this research program. The lirst questionnaire is
speciallydevelopedtogetfeedbackonthespecificindicatorsfrom the personnel directly involved in the
Ilmctional area. The second questionnaire is developed to collcct information related to the rclativc
importance of element indicators, activity indicators and key indicatorsin the hierarchy of an asset integrity
tree. This is done to integratespecilic indicators to an overall asset integrity indicator
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Srt I Qurstionnairr:
The rollowingquestionnaires is developed ror activities and actions perrormed in the plant area as well as
rorplantequipment. TI1issetofquestionnairesisdividedintolwoseclions. The lirst section deals with the
issues related to the proactive or leading information and the second section deals with reactive or lagging
information. In both sets two types or information areasked,about the likelihood 0 rsuccess&importancc
level of success lor the leading indicator. and the likelihood of occurrencc&consequenceoranewntlor
Ihe lagging indicator.
Oucstionnairrrdatrdto LradingIndirators
Irtheanswer to the following questions in the second column is 'no',then place '0' in thecorresplll1ding
thirdcolumn.andir'yes'.inyourjudgement.dependingonlheextent or usc. comprehensiveness,
coverage, availability, el'feclivel1ess etc. give a value between '1-100'. AI the same time, lor each orthe
lollowingquestions, based on the importance of subject matter's success in the process 1;lcilityprovidea
value between '0-100' in the fourth column. In some cases the questions arc lormatted insuchawaysothat
the answer could be either 'yes' or 'no', with nothing in between. Then you are requested to give '0' lor
each 'no'answerand '100' lor each 'yes' answer
For example, ifit is asked, "docstheyoungdriverobeythesib~1swhilehedrivesthecarT
• If the answer is 'no' place '0'. If the answer is'yes', according to the judgement. ashe isa young
driver and usually obeys the road signs 80% of the time. the score here is 'SO' (indicated in
boldface) and have to place 'SO' in the third column of the matrix
• Ifobeyingonlyroadsignswhiledrivingisconsideredasanimportantissuelhathelpstoavoidan
accident scenario. lhenon a scale of 0-100%, '7S' (indicated in boldface) importance level can be
given lor this event'ssuccess in the fourth column of the matrix .
SI
No
Questions
Does the young driver obey the road signs while he
drives the car?
Fill in the arrow indicated spaces by putting a value in the scale of 0-100 170
Area: Mechanical Integrity
Group: Inspection
Measure: Inspection Strategy
Questions
Is any standard inspection slrategyor recommended praclices fo Ilowed?
Is a writtcn schcmc & guideline available forpcriodicinspcction&test?
Arc inspcctions performed byY' party specialized inspection team?
Measure: InspectionUlcctivcncss
fXJage Importalll:c
likelihood !evelof
of success
51
No
Questions
Are overall inspeclionprocedurc.il1lcrval &chccklist followed?
Importance
Icvelof
2 AI appropriate inspection tools & logistic support available lor
Isanystrategyfollowcdforthependinginspectionrelatedjobs?
Pcrcentageofinspecliontaskcompletcdonschcdule.
Safety critical equipment inspected & tested on schedule.
Percentages of different local gaugcs/regulators/indicatorsca libratedand
loundconsistenl.
Is any asset inspection database maintained that covers theequ ipmentto
be inspected along with asselS' condition information and their inspection
history?
Mcasurc: Compliance to Statutory Requirement
SI
No
Questions
Issystcmaticappraisal availablc todetcrmine the inspection compliance
with applicableslandarcls & legislation?
Is inspection performecl byqualilied & certifiecl personnel?
Are Inspection c1ata & information documentecl for future use?
% Importance
level of
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Group: Maintcnancc
Mcasurc:Prc"cnti"cMaintcnanccPcrformancc
Questions
Isanymethodandtechniqueusedtoestablishpreventivemaintenance
program?
Percentage of preventive maintenance work compliance with
instructions & work request guideline.
PercellIageofpreventive maintenance work order completion
Percentage of preventive maintenance work order completion 011
schedule
5 Percelllage of preventatively maintained equipment found in good
% age Importance
level of
SI
No
Questions
Corrective mailllenance work order completed successfully beyond the
coverage area ofinspeetion & preventive maintenance.
Corrective maintenanee work ordereompleted within allocated time.
PercellIage of maintained equipment found in good condition on test ing
aflercorrectivemaintcnance.
% Illlportallce
leveluf
Mcasurc:RcliabilityPcrspccti"cofSSC
51
No
Questions
Is any strategy followed for corrective work order completion of highly
eritiealequipmentofplant?
Are there quantilied targct reliability sets lor system, structure &
Percentage of maintenance work lor safety critical equipment complcted
in allocated time
Percentageofequipmenthavingcitheractiveorstandbyredundancy
% lmportancc.:=
level of
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Measure: Availability of Equipment
Questions
Equipment having provision for maintainability.
Logistic support level for carrying out maintenance
Percentage of equipment with prior knowledge of mean time to tililure &
mean tlllle to repair
Emergency or unplanned repair work order completed success til lIy
Measure: Compliance with Rules & Regulations
% age Importance
likelihood level of
of success
51.
No
Questions
Is anysalety practice lollowed during maintenance work execution·)
Are allY written maintenance rules & guidelillesavailable?
15 documentation ofrisksigniticant eventsperlormed?
'X, Importance
level of
Group: Inspection & Maintenance Management
Measure: Planning & Scheduling
Questions
Percentage of work (maintenance & inspection) executed through
planning & scheduling?
Is any strategy followed for contingency work planning&schedul ing?
Quality level and responsiveness strategy of the planning & scheduling
activity
Percentage of work completed within the allocated time.
Percentage of planned activities (maintenance & inspection) completed
on schedule.
6 Percentage of work order lor which execution is not delayed due to
Is preventive maintenance history used to correct future preventive
I critlicaln:pairs;andIPreparatiOllforlllationrteCnaarrn(y:eiin?gOut inspcction & tests,
%age Importance
Icvclof
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Measure: Correspondence with Operational Activity
51
No
Questions
Emergency work order response system performance level
% Importance
levclof
3 Assistance & cooperation level of operational department with
Mcasurc:WorkFlowMonitoring
51
No
Questions
for monitoring the work execution process as
Inlportance
level of
Measure: Proeurelllent& Inventory Managelllent
51
No
Questions
Is any methodology followed for maintaining spare parts inventory
management?
Adequacy level of spare parts to support PM, eM and emergency
maIntenance
Ufectiveness ofelllergency spare parts procurement policy
Is any strategy followed to maintain the availability of spares in storage
condition?
% ItnpOrlant:e
level of
Group: Engineering Assessment
Measure: Financial Optimization & Control
51
No
Questions
Is comparison carried out between repairs to replacement cost during
maintenallcedecision?
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Measure: Quality of Work Execution
SI
No
Questions
Is any computerized maintenance & inspection management system
available?
Percenlageofinternalmanpower& lilcilities usage for different types of
work execution.
Is gathered experience used to improve the PM & eM work?
Importance
level of
Area: Operational Integrity
Group: Operating Perforll1anee
Measure: Operating Procedure
SI
No.
Questions % age Importance
levclof
Does the operating manual have a clear structurealld organization?
Areoperatingproceduresrevalidatedperschedule/plan/period?
Percentageofequip1l1entoperatedbythewrittenoperatingprocedureo
Are written operating procedures lollowed during all operation related
activities and situations?
Is anytl"Ouble shooting procedure available to handle upset situation')
Are readiness reviews performed belorestart-up of plan I?
'ercentage 01 eqUipment wllll w,,'~,~'" ,,,,. """'y'" to indentify the
Are the operators otlen in the lield to visually inspection the condition of
theoftlineassets?
Percenlageofequipment withoul interlocking system that have alarms&
tripsoptiontorsatetyoperation.
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MCllsurc:ForccdOulllgcs
SI
No
Qucstions
procedure available & followed during unit
Importance
level of
Group: Slllic ofSlruclurcs, Syslcrn lind Cornponcnls
MCllsurc:CorrcctivcWorkOrdcr
MCllsurc: Corrosion & FlIligucCondilion
lt1lportan~e
Icveluf
SI
No
Questions
Reliability of inspection method followed for monitoring the corrosion
andliltigllecondition?
ElTectiveness level of the corrosion control techniqlle used
% Importance
level of
4 Percentage of SSC found in good condition on inspection with CP
PercentageofSSCpaintingandcoatingwithinaliowablerange.
MClIsurc:AgcingCondilionofSSC
Is the intormation related to the design life ofSSCs are availabIe?
SI
No
Questions
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Is any strategy followed for the over age SSCs'?
Is relllaining life analysis carried out lorSSCs'?
Is Iitness lor service analysis carried out lorsafetycriticalSSCs'?
Croup: Plant Configuration & Modification
Measure: Plant Design
SI
No
Sl
No
SI
No
Questions
Percentage of start-up, operating & shutdown procedure revised that
ArethedeviationlTolllthecodes&standardjustilied?
Questions
is any amassment process tollowed for justifying the requirement of
modification?
PercentageofmoditicationtorisksignificantSSCs
Modificationcolllpliance level with the current design standard
i\remodificationsreportedforthenecessarychangesinallrelatedareas')
Questions
Are modification to plant design & configuration performed after duerisk
assessment'?
Are Modifications performed so that limiting condition lor operation
doesn't arise'?
test performed for ensuring synchronization with
'Yo
%
Importance
Icvelof
importance
level of
Importance
level of
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Group: EnginccringSafctySystcm
Mcasurc:Safcl)'SystcmPcrforlllancc
Questions
PercentageofsafetysystcllldemandtiJltiliedduringrequircmcnt
Pcrcentageoflimesaletysystempcrformcdsucccssfully.
Saletysystem actuatcdsucccssliJllyduringtcst run
Mcasurc:SafCl)'SyslcmRclalcdBacklog
% age Importance
likclihood levclof
of success
SI
No
Qucstions
Percentage ofsalety systcm related work ordcrcomplction in all ocated
Ilmc.
'Yo 111lportanl:~
Icvd of
Group: EmcrgcncyManagcmcnl
Mcasurc: Emcrgcncy RcsllOnsc Systcm Pcrformancc
Qucstions
Safetyandcmcrgcncyresponse procedure are in place and adcquate.
Success ofcmergcncy response system during trial run.
lmcrgencyrcsponseequipmentperformssucccsstiJlly.
Pcrcenlageofworkordcrs lor emergency response equipmcnt compleled
on time.
Tcndcncyoflcarning Irompreviousemcrgcncysituation
Mcasurc:ElIlcrgcncyPrcpllrcdncss
o/uage Importance
likclihood Icvdof
of success
SI
No
Qucstions
Stratcgicpolicy lor responding toany kind of emergency situat ion
Emcrgencysituation planning organizcd based on the nature Oflhe
idcntitiedandanalyzcdpotentialcmcrgcncysituation.
% age Importanc~
I~vcl of
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Emergency plan reviewed 10 schedule for emergency preparedness
Percentage ofstalTwho received training on emergencypreparedness.
Emergency preparedness exercises completed on schedule.
Area: Personnel Integrity
Group: Training
Measure: 5afety Culture
51
No
Questions
Commitment & involvement of top level management in sakty related
Are safeiy related issues given highest priority?
Continuous observation of safety system and striving lor salety
Improvement.
Adequacy level of training/seminars on safety culture and salety related
PercentageofstafTwho believes training is appropriate and effeClive.
Are foekoutllagout procedures lollowed for each piece of equipment
during maintenance?
Percentage ofincidents!near miss events investigated successfully.
%age ImpOrlanl:l:
Icvel of
Measure: Technical & Inteq)ersonal Training
Questions
Extent ofstafTtraining on inlerpersonal &lechnical matters
Compliance tOlraining successfully as planned
Percentageofpcrsonneltrainedpriortostart-upofproeessplantunil
Percentage of staff trained in standard activities
% Ill1portanc~
level of
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Group: Staff Competence
Measure: Staff Performance
Questions
Percentageofstaffthatcompletedmandatorytraining&othcrspecializcd
training.
Knowledge,skill&physicalcapabilityleveiofstatT
Willingness ofstafTto participate in differenttrainings/scmi nars
Measure: Assessment of Competence
°0 age Il1lportanc~
likelihood level of
of success
SI
No
Questions
Isanyassessmentproccss followed to determine the competence Icvel of
stalP
Is there any provision of sequential training & routine follow- up?
Percentage ofstalTwho satisfied the competence assurance rcqu irements
StafTtendency to maintain the competency level.
% Import:lllCC
level of
Group: Permit to Work
Measure: Effecti\'enessofPTW
SI
No
Questions % Importance;:
level of
Is there any guideline available for issuing PTW?
Is theconlent of permit 10 work casy 10 understand & follow'!
Is there any lollow up procedure for determining the elTectivencss of
PTW?
Is PTW guideline managed, routinely inspected & reviewed'!
6 Are all types ofPTW ow .... _~. of both operations and
180
Measure: Compliance with rTW
SI
No
Questions % Importance
kvelof
Are permit to work guidelines followed while carrying oUlmainlcnance
work?
Willingnessofthestalfto follow the I'TWguidelineeffectively.
Percent of work permits complded correclly.
Croup:Collllllunication
Mcasure:Reportinglncidents
SI
No
Questions "Iu Importance
level of
Areincidentsreportingguidelines&lormatsavailable')
StalTtendency towards reporting all kinds of incidents along with near
1111ssevents
Communication of senior management to lhe general workforce of
prol11otlllgreqlllrcmellts
Measure:CollllllunicationSystclII
Questions
Is any structured communication system available?
Are process upsets & emergency conditions communicatcd lor furthcr
action?
Is any strategy lollowed for revision of communication system?
Successful cOlllmunication among plant personnel that rc:sults in
avoidance of an ullwanted incident.
Mcasure:ManagclllcntofChangc
%al!.C Importance
likelil;ood level of
of success
SI
No.
Questions % age Importancc
level of
Percentages of MOCs reviewed were in full compliance with the sile's
MOCprocedure?
MOCsdecisiontakenwithadequalehazard/riskanalysis.
Level ofMOC organization and authorization strategy
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OuestionnairereialedtoLaoginglndicalors
In the case of questions for lagging indicators, corresponding tothe number of event occurrences, you are
requested to give a value between '0' to '100', Using the guideline below you are requested to provide
values in the third column of the following matrix based on in which slot the numbers of occurrences arc
placcd. At the same lime provide a value between '0' to '100' in lounh column depending on the
severity/impaCI level of the incident which OCCUlTed
'Yo.ageLikelihoodofOccurrences
For example, ifit is asked that, number of incidents due to not obeying thcroad signs while driving car is
If the answer is four (4) incidents due to not obeying the road signs,thcn'40'(indicated in boldlilcc) will be
the value as per above table in the third column ofthefollowingmatrix
Corresponding severity bascd on judgement could be given '60' (indicated in boldface) in the founh
Questions
Number of incident occurred due to not
obeying the road signs while driving car
Fill in the arrow indicaled spaces by pulting a value in the scale of 0-100
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Area: Mechanical Integrity
Croup: Inspection
Measure:lnspcction5lralegy
Questions
Number of incidents due to lhe incorrect selection of inspeclion
technique & tools
Number of incidents lhat are related to an incorrect inspection inlerval
selection
Measure: Inspcction Effectivcncss
llioage St:verity
likelihood of level
51
No
Questions ~lage Severity
likelihood of level
Number of incidenls in uninspected equipment due to lack of
II1spectlon.
Number of incidents dueto inspection & testing deliciency.
Number of incidents due 10 overrun inspection period.
5 Number of incidems due to the incorrect
1easure:Complianceto5lalutory Requirement
51
No.
Questions
Number ofincidenls due 10 avoidance of recti ticat ion recommendation
related to inspection.
Numberofincidems due to the non-compliance of inspection wilh the
legal requirement
% age Severity
likelihood of level
Croup: Maintcnance
Measure: Preventive Maintenance Performance
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents in the equipment due to PM errors
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Number of incidents in the equipment where preventive maintenance
was not performed on schedule.
umberofincidemsduetoPMbacklogissue.
umber of incidents due to improper selection of equipment in the
prcventivemailltcnanceplan.
Qucstions
Numbcrofincidems in the equipment due 10 CM errors
Number of incidents while perlonning corrective maintenance
NumberofincidentsduetodelayinCM
Mcasurc:Rcliability l'crspcctivcofSSC
l~agc St:vcrity
likdihoodof level
SI.
No
Questions % age S~vcrity
likelihood of kvel
I NumberofincidentsduetosignificantdeteriorationofSSCs
2 Number of incidents due to the maintenance errors ofSSCs.
Number of incidents due to temporary repair worksofSSCs
4 Numberofincidems where poor reliability is found asa rool cause.
Number of incidents due to unsafe engineering practices for the
purpose of improvement in the reliability.
Measure: Availability of Equipment
SI
No
Questions % age Severity
likelihood of level
I Number of incidents in the over maintained (equipment having
Number of incidents due to the unavailability of equipment or
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Mcasurc: Compliancc with Rulcs & Rcgulations
SI
No
Questions % age Scverity
likelihood of levd
oftechnicalspecilicationsand
Group: Inspcction&MaintcnanccManagcmcnt
Mcasurc:Planning&Schcduling
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents duc to planning& scheduling dellciency (orderof
work execution)
Number of incidents due to work order backlog in the planning &
scheduling stage
Number of incidents due to multiple works planning and schedulingin
the samc area at the samc timc.
Numberofincidentsdueto incorrect maintenance procedure/mcthods
""'"u~, ,,,,,,,,,,,,, "''' ,,,,,,~v,,,,. "'~«" v, in service deficient
%age Sevcrity
likelihood of Ievd
Mcasurc: Corrcspondcncc with Opcrational Activity
Sl
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to temporarymoditication
% age Severity
likelihood of level
185
Mcasurc:WorkFlowMoniioring
Questions
Number of incidents duc to non- compliance to scheduled time lor
work completion
Numberofincidentsductolililureofwork Ilowmonitoringsystcm.
Mcasurc:Procurclllcnt&lnvcntoryManagclllcnt
% age Sl:verity
likelihood of Icvel
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents duetothe unavailability of spare pariS on demand
l}Oage Severity
likelihood of kvcl
2 Number of incident, due to unavailability of tools and logistics lor
Number of incidents due to procurement delay of spare parts &
Group: EnginccringAsscsslllcnt
Mcasurc:FinanciaIOptilllization&Control
SI
No.
Questions O/uage Severity
likelihood of level
I Number of incidents due to the deiiciency of the optimization
Number of incidents due to the inadequate maintenance lor allocatcd
budget & manpower constraints.
Number of incidents due to unavailability of budget & manpower
duringthcemergency work schedule
Mcasurc:QualityofWorkExcculion
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to errors in technique ior determining the
quality of work execution
Number of incidents occurred in components for which rectifications
%age Severity
likelihood of level
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owcr"ttO""',"'odbY'",,,""""' ED
3 umber of incidents occur.red due to weak links between pertormance
standards and work orders
Area: Operational Integrity
Group: Operating Performance
Measure: Operating Procedure
Questions
Number of incidents rclaledtolhe inadequateoperatingprocedurcs
2 Number of incidents rclaled to procedures that were unclear, not
NUlllbcrofincidcnls lor which the operational rcadinessrcviews were
notperlormed
NUlllber ofineidents that occurred during start-up of unit
Numberofincidentsduetohuman-machineinterfacedeticiency.
6 Number of incidents due to faulty trouble shooting procedure
7 Number of ineiden IS during the steady-state operating condition
l; Number ofineidents at thetimeofshitl ehange in operation
Measure: Forced Outages
Questions
NlImber of incidents due tosp"rio"s or lin planned shutdown allerstart
up
2 Number of incidents due 10 external causes tor forced outages.
3 Numberofincidentsduetointemal causcs for forced outages
Number ofincidcnts duc toan operational condition that cxcceded Ihc
design limit
Number of incidents due to accumulation of transient stresses 011
equipment becauseoftrequent shutdowns and restarts.
% age Severity
likelihoodot level
% age Severity
likclihoodof levcl
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Group: StatcofStructurcs,Systclll andColllponcnts
Mcasurc:CorrcctivcWorkOrder
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents related to errors during corrective work order
Number of incidents due to outstanding work order on SSCs
Number of incidents due to non Illl1ctionalityofSSCs
% age Severity
likelihood 01 level
Mcasure: Corrosion & FatigucCondition
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to 1;lIigue ",i1w-eofSSCs
~ um bel' InCldent: due to incorrect measurement of corrosion and
Number of incidents due to inadequate corrosion control technique.
Number of incidents due to corrosion rate exceeding the predicted rate
% age Scverity
likelihood of Icvel
Measure: Ageing Condition ofSSC
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents where over age equipment is contributing issue.
Number of incidents arose due to the ageing process ofSSC's
Number of incidents due to lack of proper monitoring of ageing
components.
% age Severity
likelihood of level
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Group: Plant Configuration & Modification
Measure: Plant Design
Questions
I Number of incidents due 10 lhedeficiency in plant design.
NI lber of incidents due to noncompliance of design standards &
3 Number of incidents due to "llIltydcsigncontiguration issues.
% age Severity
likelihood of kvel
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to plant design modification issues
Number ofineidents due 10 lack of peer-checking of modi Ii cation .
Number of incidents due to delay or ignorance of necessary
modification
Questions
Number of incidents due to lack of risk identification and evaluation of
any modification
Number of incidents due to errors in post checking process.
IXJage Severity
likelihood of level
% age Severity
likelihood of kvel
Group: EnginecringSafctySyslcm
Measurc:SafctySyslcml'crformancc
SI
No.
Qucstions
Numberofincidentsduelothedormanllailureofsafetysystem
Number of incidents due to saletysystem not performingsuccessll.lly
after actuation
% age Severity
likelihood of level
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Number of incidents due to filllity safety system actuation
Numberofincidentsduetosatetysystem being bypassed
Measure: Safety System RelaledBacklog
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to the unavailabilityofsatety system
Number of incidents due to extended maintenance period of safety
system
Number of incidents due to not performing safety system inspection
routinely
'X, age Severity
likelihood of level
Group: EmcrgencyManagement
Measure: Emergency Response System I'erformance
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to overdue maintenance work on emergency
response system.
'Yo age Severity
likelihood of level
Measure: Emergency Preparedness
SI
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to "llIlly exercises on emergency
preparedness.
Number of incidents due to not perlorming the recommended
correctiveaclionfromemergencydrill.
Number of incidents due to lack of up to date emergency response
IralT1J11g
Number of incidents due to the deficiency of emergency operating
procedure.
t%age Severity
likelihood of level
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Area: Personncllnlegrity
Croup: Training
Measure:Safel)'Cullure
Questions
Number of incidents due to lack of appreciation of risk involved in
saletyissues
Number of incidents dueto unsolved safety system related issues
Number of incidents due 10 degradation of safety culture & pracli ceo
Number of incidcnts due 10 work performed without adequate
equipment or personnel protection
Number of incidents due to accepting increasingly poor performance
along with overlooking weak sigllals in critical areas
Measure:Teehnical&lnlerpersonaITraining
% age Sewrity
likdihoodof level
SI.
No
Questions
Number of incidents due to training deficiency
Number of incidents due to the overdue staff training
% age Severity
likelihood of level
3 Number ofincidenls due toelTors in simulator training program
4 Number ofincidenls due to negligence of training.
/Ullmer 01 IlClllell1S VIIICIl are related to the issue of not following
Croul):SlaffCompetence
Mcasure:SlaffPerformancc
SI
No
Questions % age Severity
likelihood of level
Number of incidents due to not having appropriate training.
Number of incidents with root cause of insutlieicnt
training/knowledge.
Number of incidents duc 10 operator overlooking control signals
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Measure: Assessment ofCompelenee
Questions
umber ofincidcnts due 10 incorrect assessmentofcompetencc Icvel
umber of incidents due to engagement of non compelent personnel.
Group: Pumit to Work
Measure: Effeetivenessofl'TW
SI
No
Questions %1 age Sc:verity
likelihoudof level
Number of incidents where errors in PTW are identilied as contributing
NUlllber of incidents duc 10 not understanding the guideline instruction.
Measure: Compliancc with PTW
Questions
Numbersofincidentsduetoviolationofworkperlllitinstruclion.
Number of incidenlS due to fililure to properly apply a safe work
Group:Colllmunication
Measure: Reportinglncidenls
% age Severity
likelihood of level
SI
No
Questions %agc Severity
likelihood of level
Number of incidents rclatcd to the sccnario of not reporting the earlier
near miss event ill those areas.
Numberofincidcnts ducto improper reporting of event
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Measure: Communication System
SI.
No
Questions % age Severity
likelihood of levd
Number of incidents occurred due to lack of proper communication
systcm
3 Number of incidents due to poor communications within the plant
Measure: Management of Change
51
No
Questions 'Xl age S.:vcrity
likclihoodof Ievcl
Numbers of incidents due to temporary MOCs conditions were not
corrected/restored to the original state.
Number of incidents due to MOCs lor which the drawings or
procedureswerenotupdaled
4 Number of incidents due to backlogofMOCs issues
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Set 2 Questionnaire:
Weighted factors estimation for each level indicator by pair wise comparison toevaillate relative
importance of indicators
Similar! y if yOUI ,h ink ,hal: rei ialbil ity' is a~; imp10rtan 11 as price,p lace I (i nd ica ted in bold lilcc) in thc pricc
Reliability
FuciEfficicncy
Rcliability Fuel Efficiency
\ /Y
N: B: You need only to fill in the white blank spaccs, and the same procedurc can be followcd for following
matrixes. You are allowed to put any weighting valucsaccording to your ownjudgemcnt
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Level I: Pair wise importance comparison of Key Indicators for all three ma,jor areas of Asset
Integrity
Area:Meehanieallnlegrity
Availability 01 Compliance
Equipmcnt with Rules&
Regulations
Compliance with
Rules & Regulations
Planning & Correspondence with Work Flow Procurcmcnt &
Scheduling Operational Activity Monitoring Invcntory
Management
Planning & Scheduling I
Correspondence witl
Work Flow Monitoring
Procurement &
Inventory Management
Financial Optimization & Control
FinancialOptimization&Conlrol
Quality of Work Execution
Area: Operational Integrity
Corrective Work Order Corrosion & Fatigue Ageing Condition of
Issued Condition SSC
Corrosion & Fatigue
Condition
AgeingConditionofSSC
Plant Design
Plant Design
Safety System Performance
Safety System Related Backlog
EmcrgencyResponseSystemPerformance I
Emergency Preparedness
Arca: I'ersonncllntcgrity
Modification
Effectiveness
Modification
Assessment
Safety Culture
Technical & Interpersonal Training
Tcchnical & IntcrpcrsonalTraining
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IS"rr,,,foc,,."oc
CompliancewithPTW
Reporting Incident Communication Systcm ManagcmcntofChangc
Reporting Incident
Communication System
Management or Change
Level 2: Pair wise importance comparison of Activity Indicators for all three major areas of Asset
Integrity
Area: Mechanical Integrity
Inspection
Inspection & Maintenance Management
EngillceringAssessment
Inspection Inspeclion& Enginecring
Maintenance Assessment
Management
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Arca:Opcrationallntcgrily
Operating
Performance
Operating
Performance
Plant
Configuration &
Modification
lngineering
Arca: I'ersonnellntcgrity
Plant Configuration Engineering Emergency
& Modilication Response
Arrangement
Training StalTCompetence Permit to Work Communication
Training
StalTCompetence
Permit to Work (PTW)
Lcvel 3: Pair wise importanee comparison of Element Indicators for Asset Integrity
Mechanical Integrity
Operational Integrity
Personnel Integrity
Mechanical Integrity Operational Integrity Personnellnlegrity
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Company Name
Telephone
(Optional)
Please Provide the following General Information
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Appendix C: List of Experts provided feedback on pair-wise comparison for
multilevel weight determination
SI. No. Organization Position
Dubai Elcctricity & Watcr Authority Engr.-Mcchanical
(DEWA) Maintcnancc
Acurcn Group Inc Mcchanical Enginccr
Lafargc Surma Ccmcnt Ltd Assistant Managcr-Production
Mcmorial Univcrsity ofNcwfoundland PhD candidatc
Mcmorial Univcrsity ofNcwfoundland PhD candidatc
Mcmorial Univcrsity ofNcwfoundland PhD candidatc
Mcmorial Univcrsity ofNcwfoundland PhD candidatc
Mcmorial Univcrsity ofNcwfoundland Graduatc Studcnt
INTECSEA Canada Dircctor ofOpcrations
10
\I
Lloyd's Rcgistcr Kazakhstan LLP
QATARGAS
Kashagan IVB Projcct
Mana cr
Sr. Rcliability Enginccr
200
Appendix 0: List of process plant participate in benchmark study
SI. No. Participating Organization
Dubai Electricity & Watcr Authority (DEWA), Dubai, UAE
La farge Surma Cement Ltd, Chaltak, Sunamgonj, Bangladesh
INTECSEA Canada, NL, Canada
Lloyd's Register Kazakhstan LLP, Kazakhstan
QATARGAS, Qatar
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Appendix E: Definitions
Error: an action that unintcntionallydcparts fj·omancxpcctcd bchavior.
Evenl: an unwanted, undesirable change in the state of plant structures, system, processor
components or human/organizational conditions (health, behavior, administrative control
environment, production, safety and so forth) that exceed established criteria and which
occurs due to either f,1ilure of asset i.e. equipment or improper functioning of
components.
Salely crilical planl and equipmenl: Plant and equipment relied upon to ensure safe
containment of hazardous chemicals and stored energy, and continued safe operation.
This will typically include those items in a plant's preventative maintenance program,
such as: Pressure vessels, Piping systems, Relief and vent devices, Instruments, Control
systems, Interlocks and emergency shutdown systems, Mitigation systems, Emergency
response equipment.
Salely Crilical Equipmenl In.l'peclion: Percent of inspections of safety critical equipment
completed on time. This may include pressure vessels, storage tanks, piping systems,
pressure relief devices, pumps, instruments, control systems, interlocks and emergency
shutdown systems, mitigation systems, and emergency response equipment.
Salely Culture: The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health
and safety management [Glendonetat, 1995).
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Risk-based: Thc adjcctivc 'risk-bascd' is uscd to portray onc or morc risk attributcs of a
proccss, activity, or facility. For simplicity, rathcr than usc thc indcpcndcnt tcrms hazard-
bascd, conscqucncc -bascd, or frcqucncy-bascd, thc singlc tcrm risk-based is used to
mcan anyonc or combination ofthcsc tcrms.
LaTa: Lock-out and tag-out (LOTO) is a critical part of a strong all-around safety
program. It is a safctyproccdurc which is uscd in industry and rcscarchscttings to cnsurc
lhatdangcrousmachincsarcpropcrlyshutoffandnotstartcdupagainpriortolhc
complction of maintcnancc or scrvicing work. It refers to thc spccific practiccs and
proccdurcs to protcct workers fi·om injury duc 10 thc uncxpcctcd cncrgization during
maintcnancc or opcration. In LOTO, maintcnancc cmployccs work with production
cmployccs to positivcly prcvcnt all forms ofhazardouscncrgy from causing harm.
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